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"One reason why modern life is so uncom-
fortabl,e is that we have grown sel,f-
oonsaious about things that used to be . 
taken for granted. Formerl,y peopl,e 
bel,ieved what they bel,ieved because they · 
thought it was true" or because it was 
what al,l, right-thinking peopl,e thought. 
But since Freud exposed to us our propen-
sity to rational,isation and Marx showed 
how our ideas spring from ideo l,ogies we 
have begun to ask: Why do I believe what 
I bel,ieve? The fact that we ask such 
questions implies that we think that 
there is an answer to be found but" even 
if we coutd answer them at one l,ayer" 
another remains behind: Why do I believe 
what I believe about what it is that makes 
me be lieve it? So we remain in an impene-
trabl,e fog. Truth is no l,onger true. 
Evil, is no l,onger wicked. 'It al,l, depends , 
on what you mean.' But this rrukes life im-
possibl,e - we must find a way through. 
Robinson [169] p. 7. 
Historically economic development has inevitably implied that 
substantial structural changes take place in the economic organi-
sation of the society in which it has occurred. 
" ••• In the ideal,ised life cycl,e of historical, 
devewpment a successfuUy evolving economic 
system is likely to proceed from agrarianism" 
through dualism to economic rruturity" 
Fei and Ranis [54] p.37. 
Although there is no strict demarcation between the three phases 
of the economic life cycle, each has its own distint character-
istics. In the agrarian or traditional society the main 
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economic activity is subsistence agriculture, standards of living 
in the economy are· low and little or no capital accumulation 
takes place. 
On the other hand the dual economy is a far more dynamic and 
stimulating society. Here a modern industrial sector, making use 
of advanced technology and capital, exists side by side with the 
traditional agrarian society, which largely still practices sub-
sistence agriculture. As the dual economy continues to evolve, 
howeve~, the agrarian sector becomes less and less significant, 
both in terms of its contribution to the total output of the 
economy and in terms of its contribution to total employment. 
As the agrarian sector diminishes in relative importance, so the 
modern capital intensive sector becomes increasingly significant, 
until finally this sector dominates the economic scene. In the 
final phase of this life cycle, both sectors of this stylised 
economy use capital and modern techniques of production but, as 
economic growth proceeds further, the relative importance of the 
agricultural sector continues to diminish, though clearly the 
output of the sector is likely to continue to grow in absolute 
terms. 
The evolution of a dual economy is essentially a process of econ-
omic transformation and, with this transformation, there will be 
a flow of productive resources from the agrarian sector to the 
modern sector. Labour will be drawn by the prospect of more 
productive jobs in the modern sector, at more attractive rates 
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of pay and capital by the more profitable openings for investment 
in the industrial sector. 
The pattern and rate of economic evolution in a dual economy is 
in fact governed by the relationship that exists between the 
growth of the labour supply, originating mainly in the agrarian 
sector and supplied to the modern sector by migration and the 
rate at which the modern sector is able to absorb these migrants 
productively. Labour migration is therefore an integral part of 
economic transformation. As early as 1889 Lord Ravenstein 
concluded his study on labour migration with the comment: 
"Migration means Ufeand progress: a 
sedentary popuZation stagnation". 
[158] p.288. 
Labour migration is a widespread phenomenon found in all parts of 
the world in varying degrees. Sjaastad [lB5] estimated that, in 
the twelve months preceding the 1950 U.S.A. population census, 
5.6 per cent of the population had moved to a different county 
and 2.6 per cent to a different state. Estimates by anthropolo-
gists of the extent of migration amonst African Tribes in the 
countries other than South Africa, indicate that in the areas 
that they studied, as many as 50 per cent of all able bodied 
males were absent from the tribal areas at anyone time and that 
nearly all males migrated at some period in their economically 
active life Richards [165] Watson [224] Mayer [128]. In certain 
districts of KwaZulu, the rate of out-migration by adult males 
exceeded 70 per cent in 1970. 
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In most areas of the world labour migration is a reasonably 
stable process. Individuals migrate with their families from 
one area to another, where they resettle and the wage earners 
seek new occupations. Migrations of this type normally lead to 
a lengthy stay in the host area and, in many instances, to the 
permanent resettlement of the in-migrants. 
In many countries, however, particularly those in Africa, a diff-
erent labour migration phenomenon exists. Migration streams, 
both internal and international, are composed of two different 
classes of individuals: those seeking permanent residence in the 
area that they are entering and those who merely seek work for a 
limited period of time, at the expiration of which they return to 
their homes in the country or region from whence they came. In-
deed, the major proportion of domestic migration by Africans in 
South Africa is made up of such individuals. These men spend 
their working life as oscillating migrants or 'men of two worlds' 
as Hobart Houghton [75] named them. 
As far as the individual migrant is concerned permanent and tem-
porary migration decisions are similar in some respect~ such 
decisions normally arise from the same motives and are often 
differentiated from one another by only the quantitative differ-
ences in the strengths of the motives underlying the migration 
decision; Bell {14]. A period of temporary migration may even 
result in eventual permanent migration as the migrant grows to 
like his new environment. Clyde Mitchell [L33]. 
• 
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On the other hand in many African countries patterns of temporary 
migration have become entrenched as a way of life among certain 
sectors of society. Clyde Mitchell [133], commenting on migra-
tion in Africa, stated that any theory of labour migration that 
is to be adequate in an African context, must set out: 
"to expLain not onLy why men Leave their 
tribal, homes .•• but aLso why they shouLd 
consistently circulate between their tribal 
homes and the labour centres." [133] p.24. 
The social and economic aggregative effects of temporary and per-
manent migration on both the area supplying the migrants and 
the receiving area are, however, likely to be substantially diff-
erent. Miracle and Berry [132] argue that any economic analysis 
of migration should distinguish clearly between t?ese two types 
of migrants, simply on the grounds that permanent migration alone 
implies: 
(a) The transfer of economically inactive persons as well as 
the economically active work seeker. 
(b) That the transfer of capital, both physical and human will 
be substantially greater than will be so in the case of 
temporary migration. 
This study is concerned with the economic effects of the temporary 
migration system that exists amongst the South African Bantu language 
speaking people in South Africa. Consequently, whilst there is 
no doubt whatsoever that the permanent migration of both Blacks 
and Whites has contributed substantially to the growth of South 
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Africa, the role of these permanent migrants will not be dis-
cussed at an empirical level. However, since the theoretical 
approaches to migration have largely failed to distinguish ade-
d . (1) h h quately between temporary an permanent m1grants t e t eore-
tical survey of the literature will include references to both 
types of migrants. 
The first major problem encountered in attempting a study of the 
economic impact of African oscillating migration on the South 
African economy's development path, was the almost total lack of 
any statistical data on domestic migration streams in South Africa. 
Consequently, it was found necessary, as a first step to this 
study, to estimate time series data on the extent of domestic 
temporary migration before any attempt could be made to analyse 
the impact that such migration may have had upon South Africa's 
economic development. 
The data on the size of the domestic migration streams at particu-
lar points in time, namely the census dates in the years 1936, 
1946, 1960 and 1970, was estimated by means of the process of es-
tablishing 'shadow populations' for the areas supplying the mi-
grants, in terms of the number of children present in those areas 
on the census dates. The method of estimation used and the likely 
bias involved are discussed fully in Appendix A of this thesis. 
(1) The contribution of J. Clyde MitchellC133] , Trevor Bell 




This appendix, together with Appendix B3 also contains the first 
consistent sets of estimations that have been made of the nature 
and extent of temporary African domestic migration from South 
Africa's rural areas for these census years, and of the magnitude 
and nature of the migrat ion stream from the rural areas of Kwa-
Zulu for the same periods. Estimating the size of the stream of 
oscillating African migrants by these means proved to be a lengthy 
process, however, in view of the analysis that it was possible to 
undertake, once these magnitudes had been obtained, in retrospect, 
the time seems to the writer to have been well spent. 
The study is in five separate parts. Chapter 2 contains a cri~ 
tical review of the 'received' theory on labour migration and its role 
in development theory, together with a review of the empirical studies 
undertaken by economists, sociologists and anthropologists which 
provide evidence which serves to highlight the major shortcomings 
of the aggregatiye approaches to migration. 
Chapter 3 reviews the theories of Clyde Mitchell [133] and Wilson 
[233] which, in the author's opinion, offer far more scope as a 
tool for analysing the intricacies of the labour migration pheno-
menon. These theories are then critically evaluated. In the 
light of the criticisms the author has made an attempt to gener-
alise this type of approach in order to obtain q theory that is 
less limited in terms of the implicit assumptions that underly 
it, particularly those concerned with the nature of the growth 
path that is implied by the operation of the model. 
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Chapter 4 contains an empirical study which tries to evaluate the 
impact that the migrant labour system has had on the development 
(2 ) 
of the modern sector of the South African economy. The gen-
eral conclusion that emerges from this section of the overall 
study is that the modern sector has successfully adapted to devel-
opment with migrant labour, since the number of migrants in the 
sector have increased at an increasing rate throughout the period 
studied. In addition it appears that the sector's growth pros-
pects were enhanced rather than retarded by its continued reli-
ance upon oscillating migrant labour. 
Chapter 5, on the other hand contains a preliminary analysis of 
the impact that the migrant labour system has had on the areas 
supplying the migrants. KwaZulu is taken as being representa-
tive of such areas and a case study of the effect of the migrant 
labour system upon the development of KwaZulu is undertaken in 
this section. The general conclusion that emerges from this sec-
tion of the study is that the maintenance of the migrant labour sys-
tern can be seen in part as both the cause and the result of the 
increasing levels of underde\elopment that are apparent in the 
KwaZulu domestic economy over the period studied. 
(2) A shortened version of chapter 4 was presented to the 
1975 Conference of the South African Economic Society. 
It was entitled The Migrant Labour System and South 
Africa's Economic Development and is to be published 
in the March 1976 issue of the South African Economic 
Journal. 
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The final chapter reviews the future prospects for development in 
the homeland areas in the light of the predicted future behaviour 
of the domestic migrant labour supply. The predictions as to the 
behaviour of domestic migration streams are made in terms of the 
generalised theory that was developed in Chapter 3. These pre-
dictions are then us~d to generate a set of policy objectives 
which, if implemented would offer the South African gov-
ernment some hope of achieving some of its stated development 
aims, namely those of creating independent, economically viable 
African Homelands and of phasing out the migrant labour system. 
The major conclusion that stems from this study is that the 
migrant labour system has become thoroughly entrenched as a way 
of life in South Africa. This entrenchment, it is argued, is not 
solely as a result of the implementation of government measures 
to control immigration into the cities and to limit Black job ad-
vancement but, more seriously, is the result of both the nature 
of the development path followed by the South African economy 
and of the workings of the market mechanism within that growth 
path. This being so, the situation cannot simply be remedied by 
removing the institutional barriers to in-migration, but any solution 
will require substantial positive government intervention in order 
to change the nature of the growth path itself. 
Any discourse on the nature of a development path has underlying 
it an implicit view of the nature of the social, economic and 
political structure of the economy being stud~ed and, in addition, 
-, 
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the policy conclusions drawn from the analysis are largely, if 
not totally, the result of the analysers personal convictions as 
to how these variables interact with one another. Believers in 
unfettered individual freedom will, for example, opt for policies 
designed to allow the market mechanisms to operate as freely as 
possible, in the belief that the market is objective in its im-
plicit decision making. Hardline Marxists, on the other hand, 
advocate a more limited role for individual freedom, in the be-
lief that the nature of the workings of a capitalist economy 
with a free market, are such that 'the few' will always be in a 
position to exploit 'the many'. These theorists hold out little 
hope of policy makers succeeding in successfully "fettering" 
capitalistic development in order to match the high degree of in-
dividual freedom that such a system offers with a more egali-
tarian distribution of the fruits of economic progress. Conse-
quently, policy suggestions from writers in this school tend to 
favour radical social, political and economic change in the be-
lief that any alternative policies in reality represent no 
change. 
The view of the world that is held by the writer, lies between 
these two extremes. Whilst accepting that capitalist develop-
ment and the operation of a "free" market usually implies a per-
iod of time in which growth is highly uneven and the distribu-
tion of wealth far from equal, the writer does not accept the 
view that it is impossible to force development within the 
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capitalist mode of production onto a growth path which offers a 
more even pattern of development and a more egalitarian distri-
bution of wealth. The ideal view that is in fact being advocated 
here is development with the capitalist system operating within 
the confines of what has come to be accepted as a modern 'welfare 
state' • 
As a result, the implicit view of the world that underlies the 
analysis undertaken in this study is one that retains the capi-
talist mode of production, but that requires that the economic 
system be 'managed' by government in order to ensure, firstly, 
that development occurs in all sectors of the economy and second-
ly, that the development process itself results in a more egali-
tarian distribution of wealth within the economy than would have 
been the case had capitalism been left to follow its own devel-
opment route. 
In the South African context the White South African government 
is at present fully committed to following a policy of separate 
development. If this policy is successfully implemented, it 
will result in the eventual co-existence of what is now the mod-
ern sector of the economy with politically independent and econ-
omically viable African Homelands. 
A development strategy that is designed to correct the uneven 
growth of the economy will, therefore, perforce have to be the 
product of the joint efforts of the White government and the 
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governments of the emerging Homelands. Consultation and concensus 
will be essential both from the point of view of establishing a 
common set of development objectives and from the viewpoint of 
mapping an acceptable strategy aimed at achieving those goals. 
The heterogeneity of the government entity in this situation im-
plies that any development strategy that is implemented must have 
emerged from what is essentially a bargaining situation. This 
being so, it would seem at first glance that since, prima facie 
the bargaining position of the Homeland governments is weak, 
the chances of any strategy emerging that offers 'reformist 
change' as opposed to co-optive change, Macpherson [125], appear 
to be very slight. 
It is, however, the contention of the writer that, as will be 
seen later in this study, the extent of the modern or White domi-
nated sector's reliance upon migrant labour, supplied in the main 
by the Homelands, is now so great that it may well serve to 
improve substantially the relative bargaining position of the Home-
land governments. These governments it appears could be approach-
ing a situation in which they may be able to use the control of 
this source of labour as a lever to force the modern sector to 
divert increasing proportions of its investible surplus to invest-
ment projects within the Black Homelands. These governments may 
also be in a position to bargain for the introduction of measures 
that will indeed produce meaningful social and political change 
throughout South Africa. 
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Largely as a result of the writer's personal 'credo' this study 
has some unusual aspects to it. Analysis has been done in some 
instances in the conventional economic manner and in others, 
using the tools of Neo Marxist analysis. However, the policy 
conclusions that have been drawn from this analysis necessarily 
reflect the writer's personal views of the way in which society 
should operate. Consequently, where the conclusions drawn from 
the evidence presented in this study, support the arguments ad-
vanced by the Neo Marxist analysis, the policy recommendations 
made here do not call for measures designed to ensure that there 
is radical social change instituted from outside the 
present government system. Instead the author argues for sub-
stantial government intervention into both the capitalist system 
itself and into the workings of the market mechanism. 
The set of policy objectives that do follow from the overall con-
clusions of this study reflect the belief that 'reformist' 
change can take place within the framework of a basically capi-
talistic society and that when such changes do occur they are 
achieved at a lower cost to society than those changes that may be 






THE THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
TO LABOUR MIGRATION 
If a theory of labour migration is to have any claim to being 
'eclectic' in nature it should be able both to explain adequately the 
nature of the forces determining labour migration and to offer the 
means to predict the likely level of migration that will result 
from specified values of those forces. In addition, since the 
I 
economic effects of temporary migration decisions differ substant-
ially from those of decisions to migrate permanently, a theory of 
labour migration should also be able to discriminate between the 
causes and effects of both types of migration decisions. 
Although a great deal of work has been done on both the 
empirical and the theoretical aspects of labour migration,no 
eclectic migration theory has yet been produced. Indeed it is 
only very recently that an adequate explanation at the micro level 
has appeared as to why some men migrate temporarily, whereas others 
migrate to settle permanently, or do not migrate at all. Bell (14) 
Attempts to analyse migration have been made in fields of economics, 
politics, sociology and social anthropology. Economists have 
concentrated, as one would intuitively expect, upon the 
predictive aspects of migration and have built a large variety of 
both macro and micro economic models that have this aim in view. 
These models are predictively powerful but low on explanatory value 
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due to their high -degree of over simplification and aggregation. 
On the other hand researchers from the other disciplines have 
concentrated their efforts largely on explaining the migration 
process. 
Cost benefit analysis has also recently been used by economists 
studying labour migration. Sjaarstad [185], Johnson [94], 
Sahota [177]. This has encouraged them to venture forth into the 
territories that were previously the preserves of the sociologist and 
\ social anthropologist. , It would seem that it should be a small 
step to combine these two approaches and to obtain from the 
combination a sound general theory. However, the diversity of 
the explanations, together with the high level of 'abstraction' 
found in the economic models has made the "marriage"of these two 
approaches practically impossible • 
Economists have long been aware of the vital contribution made 
by labour migration to the process of economic growth. Adam Smith 
argued that, in the absence of artificial constraints upon the 
movement of labour,such as those imposed by the poor laws, wage 
I differentials would be determined entirely by differences in the 
nature of employments themselves and that; 
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"The very unequal. price of Zabour which we 
frequentz,y find in Engz,and in pz,aces at no 
great distance from one another is probabz,y 
owing to the obstruction which the z.aw of 
settz,ements gives to a poor man who wou~ 
aarry his industry from one parish to -
another". [186] P. 28 
Economic theorists still believe, in common with Adam Smith, that 
labour migration is basically a reaction to regional wage differ-
entials that result from spatial imbalances in the supply of and demand 
for labour, ,which are themselves a product of geographically unequal 
development. Th,e process of labour migration is seen as an ongoing 
one, which will only cease when regional wage differentials reflect 
the job differences in the eyes of the prospective migrants. 
The majority of modern economic models analysing labour migration 
are based on the concept of a dual economy. In this type of 
economy there are two major economic sectors, the one being 
predominantly occupied with subsistence agricultural pursuits and 
the other comprising a modern manufacturing sector. Labour is 
supplied by the agricultural sector to the modern sector as the 
latter grows through capital accumulation. 
Within this overall concensus, however, there are substantial 
differences in outlook. One major school of thought, the modern 
neoclassical school, sees migration as a more or less instant means 
of obtaining an equilibrium between the supply of and demand for 
labour and of equalizing interregional wage levels. The other 
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main school, the labour surplus, Marxian, or 'classical' school, 
sees migration as a long term phenomenon that occurs when one 
region has a substantial over supply of labour, vis a vis the 
availability of the other productive resources, such that it is able 
to supply a stream of migrants over a long period of time to 
another region without substantially affecting the interregional 
wage differential. The basic differences between these two 
approaches lie in the way each sees the development process working 
through in the initial phases of economic development. In the 
labour limited, neoclassical situation the benefits from develop-
ment spillover to the wage earner at an earlier stage than they 
do in the labour surplus case. 
2.2. Aggregate Economic Models of Labour Migration 
Before discussing the two main classes of aggregate economic 
models in more detail it must be pointed out that the original, and 
indeed the major aim of these models was not to explain fully the 
nature and causes of labour migration but instead those of the 
process of economic growth. Consequently the models are highly 
stylized to illustrate clearly the salient features of the growth 
process in the situation where the supply of labour is limited and 
where it is relatively abundant. 
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2.2.1. The Role of Labour Migration in a Neoclassical World 
Neoclassical aggregative economic growth models assume that all 
(1) 
available labour at anyone moment of time is fully employed. 
Development in this type of world, therefore, requires the 
emerging modern sector of a dual economy to compete with the 
traditional sector for the available labour supply. The wage 
rate is determined by the productivity of labour and, with the 
assumption of suitably "well behaved" production functions in both 
sectors, the intersectoral allocation of labour is then determined 
by the relative sectoral labour productivities and labour migration 
is seen as providing the mechanism for any reallocation of labour 
that may be required. 
As the dual economy evolves over time the size of the labour 
force in the traditional sector decreases in relative terms. 
Development involves capital deepening rather than capital widening, 
as the relative shortage of labour encourages increased specialisation 
in both sectors from an early stage in the development process. 
Jorgenson's model [99] demonstrates that, with the assumptions of a 
standard time dependant, technical progress function, once the rate 
of population growth becomes stabilised at the level desired by 
(1) The best known neoclassical development model is that of 
Dale Jorgenson. [99] 
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members of the society, a surplus of output over bare subsisten~e 
needs will be generated. Providing this surplus is maintained and 
used to establish a modern industrial sector and providing also that 
labour migrates to the newly established sector as it is released by 
the technological improvements in the agricultural sector, then this 
surplus, no matter how small it is initially, will be sufficient to 
generate self sustained economic development. 
Throughout the development phase labour is becoming increasingly 
more productive and, since wages are determined by the marginal 
product of labour in a neoclassical world, wage rates are also 
rising. Conversely as capital accumulates the marginal product of 
capital declines, profit rates, therefore, also declin~except in so 
far as these falls are successfully offset by technological 
advances. In this type of situation the henefits gained from 
economic development do not accrue solely to the capitalists but 
are shared quite rapidly with labour. 
If this situation is . to continue to operate it is essential that 
labour migrates from the traditional sector to the modern sector, at 
a rate dictated by the emergence of the agricultural surplus. If 
the labour simply chooses to remain idle in the agricultural sector 
or is occupied in the sector in non-productive activities (2) the 
surplus output will gradually disappear, the development process will 
(2) Such as members of the armed forces or as personal retainers. 
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come to a halt and a situation of surplus iabour will emerge. 
Jorgensen [99] • Once this bappens the growth path of both areas 
alters to the one followed by a labour surplus economy which is 
discussed in the following section. 
2.2.2. The Role of Labour Migration in a Surplus Situation 
The first economist to use the phrase "surplus labour" was Joan 
Robinson [168] who used it to describe the under-employment that 
occurred in the 'Great Depression', as a result of the failure of 
effective demand i.e. in the 'Keynesian' sense. The term was first 
applied to developing countries by Rosenstein Rodan. [171] He used 
it to describe a situation where the total product of an economy 
could be increased by a reallocation of labour between the rural and 
industrial sectors. It is in this structural sense that the term 
is most commonly used in reference to developing countries. Some 
economists, however, notably Liebenstein [118] Wonnocott [241] and 
Cho [35] discuss a Malthusian version of surplus labour. Here the 
removal of some of the rural population enables the remainder to 
work harder as they now have more to eat, are physically stronger and 
so are more productive. 
The eclectic labour surplus development model put forward by 
Arthur Lewis [115] uses all three concepts of surplus labour. The 
more specific model developed by Fei and Ranis [52] concentrates on 
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surplus labour in the structural sense. Whatever the cause of the 
labour surplus, these models are all built on the assumption that 
there is a significant difference between the low marginal product-
ivity of labour in the traditional sector and the average wage in 
that sector. In the early stages of development, the wage 
differential that exists between the low and the high productivity 
sectors is sufficient to cause labour to migrate from the former to 
the latter. Such is the supply of surplus labour in the low 
productivity sector that this migration takes place without affect-
ing wage rates in either sector. The modern sector faces a 
perfectly elastic supply curve for labour in the tradition of the 
early classical writers such as Smith, Ricardo and Marx. (3) 
Since increased employment in the modern sector does not affect 
the wage rate paid, in the early stages of development all the 
benefits accrue to the capitalists and are available for reinvest-
ment. Only when the institutional wage rate is forced up exogen-
ously will the benefits start to spillover to the wage earners. 
In the Lewis model [115] the wage in the industrial sector is 
determined largely by the average standard of living in the rural 
sector. In this situation three factors operate to drive the 
modern sector wage rate upwards: 
(3) The wage rate "is exogenoUSly determined by institutional 
rather than econom{c forces. 
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, (I) The intersectoral allocation of labour. Once the level of 
labour absorption by the modern sector is such that the . 
population levels in the traditional sector starts to fall, 
average incomes in this sector will start to rise, ceteris 
paribus, and this increase will push up the modern sector 
institutional wage rate. 
(2) The benefits accruing from technical progress in agriculture 
will also increase agricultural incomes, providing they are 
, 
not offset by unfavourable movements in the sector's terms 
of trade, or by increases in the population growth rate. 
(3) The terms of trade between the two sectors may move in 
favour of the traditional sector increasing the level of real 
income in that sector, and the supply price of labour to the 
modern sector. 
Since it is assumed that the level of investment is determined 
by the amount of profits earned by the capitalists, together with 
the relative attractiveness ' of the alternative opportunities for 
investment elsewhere, once the level of wages in the modern sector 
starts to rise it is possible that the rate of growth of the modern 
sector may start to decline. Lewis [115] believed that capitalists 
would simply export their surplus funds rather than reinvesting them; 
thereby maintaining a domestic rate of growth low enough to 
prevent substantial wage rate increases accruing to labour. 
In such a situation migrating wage earners only benefit to the extent 
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of the wage differential that exists between the low and high 
productivity sector. Labour migration may never take place on 
a scale sufficient to increase rural incomes substantially where 
rural population growth rates are high. 
On the other hand, if the rate of labour migration and absorption 
into the modern sector is greater than the rate of growth of the 
labour supply in the traditional sector then continued migration 
will eventually result in the elimination of the inter sectoral 
wage differential. Once the differential has been eliminated, a 
situation that was labour surplus will evolve into one that is now 
labour limited and the growth path will, once again, be that 
described in the preceding section. 
2.2. 3. Labour Migration in Surplus Labour Situation - An 
Alternative View 
The models of economic development presented in the preceding 
sections could be classified as representing the "orthodox" view of 
development, which sees the process as an ongoing one in which both 
sectors of the economy benefit, or at least neither becomes worse 
off as a result of development. These views have been seriously 
challenged by writers in the Neo-Marxian Tradition such as Arrighi 
[7] , Dos Santos [45], Amin [3] and Frank [55], who argue that the growth 
I 
process will alter the values of the growth parameters themselves and 
that, as a result, the economy must deviate from the growth path on 
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which it was travelling. This deviation they believe results from 
the fact that where two regions or countries are linked economically, 
the development of one region, if it is achieved by the capitalist 
mode, requires and generates underdevelopment and poverty in the 
other region. 
The underdevelopment of one region, they argue, is achieved by the 
expropriation of the surplus of the region and its appropriation by 
the capitalist owners of the means of production in the modern 
sector or the developing region. The expropriation of this surplus 
is accomplished by a combination of economic and political methods; 
the latter being used either to reinforce the former, or where the 
former prove to be inadequate. 
As the surplus in the one region is expropriated and appropriated 
by the capitalists in the other region for investment there, the 
growth paths of the two economies alter; the rate of capital 
accumulation increases in the developing sector and declines in the 
sector whose surplus is expropriated. There is no tendency to 
stability and as the standards of living drop in the traditional 
sector, perhaps to as low as subsistence levels, the inhabitants of 
the region become totally dependant upon the sector that is growing. 
Growth with this type of evolution results in very rapid growth 




(4) Modern sector wage rates will not rise and may even fall 
and the gains from development accrue almost exclusively to capital 
in the initial stages. 
If the economy continues to grow, unhindered by its uneven develop-
ment, the modern sector must eventually run against a labour bottle-
neck and the economy will revert to the development path described 
by the conventional labour surplus development model; wages will 
start to increase, despite the underdevelopment of the traditional 
sector and capitalists will be forced to share the fruits of economic 
growth, if they wish to ensure that further economic development 
takes place. 
Writers in this school believe however, that the problems of the 
process of capitalist accumulation such as; the growing concentra-
tion of ownership of the means of production, the lack of mobility 
of capital and the growing inflexibility of the price system will 
affect the growth rate of the economy and push it towards economic 
stagnation rather than to the development path of growth with a more 
egalitarian income distribution. Arrighi [7] Frank [55]. 
Labour migration from the sector that is suffering from increasing 
underdevelopment to the growing sector is again critical if the 
(4) Subject to some subsistence floor to wage levels in the sector. 
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growth process is to continue, but in opposition to the Lewis 
situation, labour migration does not improve living standards in the 
supplying region but instead contributes to their further impoverish-
ment through the effect that the migratory process ha~ upon both the 
generation and allocation of that sector's investible surplus. (5) 
2.3. The Shortcomings of the Aggregate Economic Models as 
Explanations of the Nature and Effects of Labour Migration 
It is a feature of these general classes of models that, although 
they depend entirely upon labour migration for their operation, none 
make any attempt to explain why people migrate, or indeed to predict 
which people migrate. Labour is treated as being composed of a 
group of homogeneous people, all of whom have the same propensity 
to migrate and who react solely to changes in relative wage rates. 
The major specific shortcomings of the aggregative economic model 
approach to labour migration may be summarised as follows: 
(1) The models fail to offer an adequate treatment of the causes 
of migration but simply assume that migration is a 'once off' 
phenomenon that occurs as a result of changes in relative wage 
rates. 
(5) These effects are dealt with more full later in Chapter 5 
Sections 5.5. and 5.6. 
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(2 ) . d" . h b t t (6) d t They fa~l to ~st~ngu~s e ween emporary, an permanen 
migrants. This is a significant omission since it is argued 
later (7) that the resource allocation effects of the two 
classes of migrants are substantially different. 
(3) As resource allocation models they are inadequate due to 
their high level of aggregation, Which makes them unable to 
describe satisfactorily the impact qf migration on either the 
supplying or the receiving area. 
These shortcomings and their implications are discussed more fully 
in the following sections. 
2.3. 1. The Causes6f Migration 
A substantial number of empirical investigations into the causes 
of migration have been undertaken by social anthropologists, socio-
logists and economists and of this a great deal has been done in 
Africa itself. In reviewing this literature, if one divides the 
findings into economic and non economic causes of migration it be-
comes evident that, in the past, economic motives have been 
(6) Temporary or oscillating migrants in this respect are those men 
who leave their families behind, seek work in a new area, but 
do not settle permanantly in the new region but continue to 
regard the area of origin as their home. 
(7) See section 2.4.2. below. 
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the dominant determinants of the migration decision. 
As early a 1935 the Lacey Commission [269] stated that the reasons 
for the migration of labour from the area that is now Malawi were 
overwhelmingly economic. They agreed that it was certainly 
possible for young men to migrate once purely from a sense of 
adventure,but argued that this did not provide sufficient explanation 
for the second, third or subsequent journeys. Similarly Hobart 
Houghton and Walton [78] when discussing migration from the 
Keiskammahoek area said; 
"Povel'ty and economic necessity drive people 
out of the district to sell their labour in 
the urban centres where the remuneration is 
higher and the opportunities of employment 
greater than in the Reserve. There may be 
subsidiary reasons such as the desires of 
young men to prove their manhood 01' of the 
lure of city life for young people of both 
sexes~ but the principle reason is to be 
found in the failure of the Reserve to 
provide an adequate living for its populat-
ion." [78] (P. 112) 
Investigations by Gulliver [63] Hanna [70] Hobart Houghton and 
Walton [78] Jerome [91] Powesland [152] Prothero [153] Read [156] 
Richards [165] Sahota [177] Schapera [178] Paul Schutze [180] and 
Southall [189] all support the hypothesis that economic motives are 
the major cause of an individual's desire to migrate either perma-
nently or temporarily. 
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It should, however, be noted that, whilst concurring with the 
acceptance of this hypothesis, Prothero [154] pointed out that since 
the men in his investigation preferred to migrate to seek work rather 
than adopt more productive agricultural methods at home and grow cash 
crops, traditional reasons for the migration could not be entirely 
ruled out. Along the same lines Gulliver [63] argued that social 
forces may in fact act as the "last straw" in precipitating the 
actual migration of an individual. 
Margaret Read [156] brought out clearly in her work conducted in the 
area now Malawi, that a man contemplating migration must not only have 
a lack of means available to him to generate a cash income, but, in 
addition, must also have the expanded horizons that lead to a desire 
for the goods that the income can bring, before he will actually 
migrate. She found that villages in remote areas that had been 
affected very little by contact with Western culture, had a very 
small percentage of adult males absent as migrant labourers despite 
a lack of adequate cash crops and she attributed this to their 
limited horizons vis a vis additional goods. 
On the other hand studies by Mayer [128] and Winter [239] attribute 
the major role to social and institutional forces rather than to 
mere economic motives. Winter states: 
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"among the Amba... who Left the country 
to seek empLoyment eLsewhere very few 
had monetary gain uppermost in their 
minds. Most of them Left home because 
of troubLe at home or because they 
wanted to see pLaces beyond the bounds 
of their restricted worLd". [239] (P.38) 
Moreove~ as Clyde Mitchell [133) points out, commenting on Winter's 
findings, when one compares the going wage rate in Kampala at 
the time of 527/- with Winter's estimate of family cash incomes in 
the area he studied of 512/- it is difficult to conclude other than 
that non economic forces were the predominant ones in the migration 
decision. 
Powesland (152) quotes from an interview with the Vice Governor-
General of Ruanda Urundi in which the Governor gave as one of the 
reasons for the continual migration of the Ruanda to Uganda; the 
desire to escape the forced labour imposed by Tutsi Chiefs. 
Similarly Richards [165] found that 10 per cent, of one of the 
samples she interviewed from the Ruanda, had left home to avoid 
labour obligations. 
Clyde Mitchell (133) sums up the evidence by suggesting that the 
motivations behind migration operate at three different levels: 
(1) Through the normative systems of the society. Schapera [178] 
and Gulliver [63] both state that migration had become a way 
of life in the societies that they had studied. Similarly 
- 31 -
Mayer [128] Southall [189] and Schapera [178] all found that 
a period of migratory labour had become part of the process 
f ° 0 0 o. h d (8) M th t °t o 1n1t1at10n 1nto man 00 ayer argues a 1 is now as 
much the traditional role of the 'abafana' (9) in the Transkei 
area to earn cash as it is of the old men to provide wisdom 
and ritual. 
(2) Through the interaction of personalities i.e. migration to 
escape arduous duties. 
° (10) Powesland [152] R1chards 1954 [164] 
(3) Through the economic system by means of wage differentials, 
target incomes, Paul Schultz [180] Sahota [177] or to meet 
specific cash requirements for 'bride price' or for taxation 
obligations Southall [189] Richards [164] • 
Mitchell goes on to say that whilst economic motives are a necessary 
condition for migration they may not be sufficient and that the 
social or personal motives may tip the scale. Mitchell's classi-
fication omits all the non normative social forces that it is argued 
are often very substantial elements. 
(8) Senior boys approaching manhood and thosein the transitional 
phase afterwards go to town to show their manliness and earn 
money. This is known as 'ukushintsha' or 'changing clothes'. 
It usually involves a period of migration of 6 - 12 months 
and does not normally contribute cash to the traditional 
household. 
(9) Men between the years of initiation and approximately 40 years. 
(10) For example to escape forced labour obligations as quoted 
earlier. 
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in the migration decision, such as the attractions of the town: 
the 'bright lights', the increased social mobility, and better 
education facilities Schapera [178] Sahota [177] • These 
forces could be included by the , addition of a fourth level 
namely: 
(4) Through individual preference patterns in so far as they 
diverge from the range of goods and services available in the 
home region. Whilst this category will overlap with the third 
category as far as economic goods and services are concerned 
it is sufficiently general to include the non normative 
social forces and non monetary benefits otherwise excluded 
from Mitchell's list. 
Migration, apart from the benefits discussed above, also involves 
the would-be migrant in certain costs. To the extent that migrants 
anticipate incurring costs, migration will be reduced. Sjaarstad 
[185] lists the following as forming the private costs of migration; 
(1) Costs incurred through migration) such as increased living cost~ 
training costs and transport costs. (11) Sahota [177]and Ziph [245] 
both found the intensity of a migration stream between two centres 
(11) Audrey Richards [164] estimated that in Uganda in 1951 the bus 
fare of a migrant was the equivalent of two weeks wages and 
in Northern Rhodesia in the period 1930 - 1936 bus fares to 
the copper mines were equal to one and a half months wages 
on the mines. She poin~out that, as a result,most migration 
in Northern Rhodesia took place on foot or by bicycle. 
(2) 
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varied inversely with the distance between those centres. 
However, as Gulliver [63] pointed out the duration of the 
period of absence is also positively correlated with 
transport costs. 
Income foregone during the migratory period. Schultz [180] 
found in his study of migration in Columbia, that an increase 
in local wage rates reduced the level of out-migration. 
Similarly studies by Read [155] Southall [190] Gulliver [63] 
and Barber [10] show an inverse relationship between money 
income per head from agriculture in the source region and 
the rate of absenteeism amongst adult males. (12) 
A rational individual who is migrating due to economic motives 
will migrate if the discounted returns he .expects from the migration 
are greater than the discounted anticipated costs. Berg [16] 
Harris and Todaro [69] and Bell [14] have gone on from this 
type of analysis of the behaviour of the individual migrant to 
derive an aggregate supply curve of labour for all migrants. How-
ever, the process of aggregation has underlying it the assumption 
of tbe existence of a 'representative individual' whose behaviour 
(12) Here one faces the problem of separating cause and effect as 
one cannot say decisively that low agricultural incomes are 
not the result rather than the cause of out migration by 
adult males. 
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represents that of the community. This technique was developed 
to a high level of competency by neoclassical economists but it 
has been argued by Kuznets [106] and Sjaarstad [185] that this 
technique is not suitable for use in the analysis of the aggregate 
effects of migration in general as the migratory process is one 
that selects particular individuals, rather than one that has a 
random chance of affecting each individual in a particular group. 
The more selective the migratory process then the greater the degree 
of disaggregation required to obtain meaningful results. 
However, since disaggregation poses additional problems of 
identification and specification and even of measurement it is not 
something one embarks upon unless, one is in fact certain, that the 
aggregative approaches of Todaro and Harris [69] and Bell [14] 
will not in fact yield adequate results. 
2. 3.2 The Duration of the Migration 
The second major objection to the aggregative models of labour 
migration is that they fail to distinguish adequately between 
permanent and temporary migrants and that these two classes in fact 
have substantially different economic effects ,both on the overall 
allocation of resources and on the growth path of the economy. 
In economies where the modern sector wage is related to the 
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average standard of living in the rural sector, the greater the 
proportion of pe~anent migrants with families in the total number 
of in-migrants, the greater the upward pressure on the modern 
sector wage rate. A single man moving from the rural to the urban 
sector will move providing he receives as wages the value of his 
share of the rural sector output together with a premium to cover 
the disutility and costs of moving. A man with a family will 
require a higher wage-the equivalent of the family's share of 
subsistence output plus premium- if he is to move permanently to 
the modern sector. 
Since temporary migrants leave their families behind in the 
traditional sector, the level of modern sector wages required 
initially to attract such men will be lower than that required by 
permanent migrants with families. Ceteris paribus, the greater the 
proportion of single in-migrants, temporary or permanent, the lower 
will be the modern sector wage rate. If profit rates are the major 
determinant of investment then the greater the proportion of 
temporary migrants in the total in-migration the higher will be 
the rate of investment and economic growth that can be sustained 
in the modern sector. (13) 
(13) This effect is reinforced when one considers that the diversion 
of investment funds from productive outlets to social overhead 
. capital formation is smaller per worker when the migrant is 
single than it is if he brings his family with him. 
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There are, however, factors that seriously complicate this link 
between temporary migration, urban wage rates and the rate of 
economic growth; if they do not in fact totally invalidate it. 
This type of argument does depend heavily upon the ceteris 
paribus assumption. It is however argued that the product 
ivity of temporary migrants is below that of permanent settlers. 
Hutt [88) If this is so then the decreases in productivity, due 
to the predominance of the temporary migrants, may be more than 
sufficient to offset the gains from the decreased wage levels. 
In cases where the extended family system pervades the urban, 
as well as the rural sector, the relationship between the rate of 
migration and urban wage rates may be fUrther complicated. If 
the rate of in-migration exceeds the rate of growth of urban sector 
employment and the wage rate is institutionally determined, as 
it is in the labour surplus case, the increased pool of unemploy-
, 
ment lnay have the unexpected effect of increasing rather than 
decreasing wage levels,as workers increase their wage demands as 
they strive to maintain their standards of living in the face of an 
ever increasing number of dependants. Here again however, if the 
majority of in-migrants are single individuals this effect will be 
/ 
smaller than is the case if the job seeker enters the new area 
with his dependants. 
Wellisz [226) points out that, where the modern sector worker 
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does not break all ties with the rural sector, the links between 
the rural per capita incomes, the institutional wage rate and 
migration may not be simple. Rural families, aiming to maximise 
total family income, may subsidise a worker moving to the urban 
area up to some amount, less than his consumption in the rural 
area minus any costs of transferring the subsidy, and the lost 
marginal product. Conversely, an urban worker may remit part of 
his earnings to the rural area increasing per capita incomes in 
that sector. 
Arrighi [7) and Trapido [205) both argue that a system of 
temporary migratory labour has adverse effects upon the position 
of the rural peasant. Arrighi [7) believes that a system of 
temporary wage migration leads to an overvaluation of the importance 
of education in the rural sector and consequently to a misallocation 
of resources in the traditional sector,as resources are switched 
from increasing agricultural productivity to acquiring education 
suitable only for use in the modern sector. This misallocation 
reduces the rural standards of living in the long run, thus allowing 
a slower rate of wage increase in the modern sector. 
Trapido [205) approaches the problem from the' viewpoint of the 
modern sector and argues that a system of temporary migration makes 
it practically impossible for any type of worker organisation to be 
formed. This lack of organised labour, he argues, has allowed 
development in South Africa to proceed beyond the point where one 
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would normally expect labour to force an increasein its share in the 
total output of the economy. 
Migration and Resource Allocation 
Labour migration is the means whereby a spatially differentiated 
economy achieves a reallocation of labour resources. Whether or 
not this reallocation will be optimal in any sense will depend 
upon how closely allied the objectives of the individual migrant~ 
and those of society are, and on the efficiency of the mechanism 
creating the signals to which the prospective migrant responds. 
If the migrant is dominated by economic considerations then it 
is reasonable to presume that he will act upon information that he 
receives from the labour market. Even in a strict neoclassical 
world, where one finds perfect foresight and competition together 
with homogeneous factors of production, one will run up against 
allocation problems since, as is well known, such a situation will 
on~y produce an optimal allocation of resources if the original 
income distribution is itself optimal. In a world of imperfect 
markets and heterogeneous factors of production matters become more 
complicated as individual and social costs and benefits are likely 
to diverge still further. 
Migration decisions are typically made in terms of private costs 
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and benefits. These may diverge widely from the social costs and 
benefits. In fact it is frequently argued that this is so in the 
case of temporary migration, Hobart Houghton [75] and Arrighi 
[7]. Similarly Harris and Todaro [69] have shown that if 
the market is imperfect then rational behaviour on the part of 
the individual migrant will lead to an oversupply of labour to the 
urban areas. Resource allocation in this context is suboptimal 
in the neoclassical sense, in that a reallocation of the urban 
unemployed back to agriculture would lead to an increase in 
output in all situations other than the case in which the marginal 
revenue product of labour in agriculture is zero or negative. 
If private costs and benefits differ from social costs and 
benefits then, in order to obtain an allocation of resources that 
is optimal from society's view point, a system of taxes and sub-
sidies may be required to force private and social calculations into 
equivalence. Such a system would not be an easy matter to assess 
or to implement. 
The problem of resource allocation is further compounded by the 
selective aspects of migration. The aggregative models, as has 
been said earlier, assume that migrants are homogeneous and that 
migration is a random process in that each individual has the same 
chance of deciding to migrate as every other individual. 
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Kuznets [106], on the other hand,as has been said earlier, sees 
migration differently and bases his interpretation of the phenomenon 
upon the assumption that individuals are inherently different ,from 
one another and that it is these differences tha~ explain why some 
people migrate whilst others remain; apparently content with less 
favourable economic and social circumstances. Kuznets argues that 
the process of migrations is highly selective, involving those 
individuals who are outward looking, venturesome and by definition 
not averse to change. Migration, . as a result, has a substantially 
greater impact upon the economic growth process in both the supplying 
and receiving economies than the mere weight of numbers would imply~ 
Empirical studies of migration certainly lend weight to Kuznet's 
view of migration as a process of differentiation rather than to 
the aggregate view of the inherent homogeneity of mankind. Studies 
[23J, Bogue and Hagood [24J , by Thomas [198] , 
Wen L. Li [117], 
Bogue and Hagood 
Eldridge [48], Schultz [180J and Caldwell [32J 
all found that the propensity to migrate was highest amongst 
adolescents and young males. Similarly studies by Sahota [177J, 
Comay [39] Miller [131] and Caldwell [31] showed that education 
levels were positively correlated with migration propensities. 
In addition to the costs and benefits to the migrant himself 
discussed in section 2.3.3, migration implies costs and benefits 
to the society in which he intends to settle. These costs and 
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benefits are closely linked to the characteristics of the two 
societies and to the duration of the migration. 
2.3.4 The Effects of Migration on the Supplying Regions 
As was said earlier the economic impact of migration on the 
supplying economy is, as Miracle and Berry [132] point out, a 
function of the economic characteristics of the economy and of 
those of the economies to which it is linke~ such as the relative 
supplies of the factors of production, available techniques etc. 
One can, however, point out some of the major costs and benefits 
that are likely to arise as a result of migration. 
Benefits 
(1) The remittances by migrants can be very substantial both 
in absolute amounts and relative to the gross domestic product 
of the supplying region. Hancock [68] estimated that 
Mexican migr.ants to the U.S.A. remitted up to 55 per cent of 
their earnings. Caldwell [33] argues that remittances by 
Ghanian migrants formed 3 per cent of the National Income in 
1963. Similarly Leistner [113] gives figures for remittances 
of mine workers to the former high commissioned territories in 
1964 showing that they ranged between 21 - 33 per cent of their 
earnings. John Williams [229] in a study of Lesotho estimated 
that migrant remittances typically formed 19 - 20 per cent of 
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Lesotho's estimated national income. Similarly Lombard 
[121] calculated migrant earnings to be three fifths of the 
National Income of the de facto population of the Transkei in 
1966-67 and 25 per cent of the National Income earned by the 
de jure population. He believed that approximately 20 per cent 
of these earnings were remitted to the Transkei. 
(2) If the migrants marginal product in the home economy was 
less than his wage then his absen'ce will cause per capita incomes 
to rise. This impact will be greater if the increase in 
income is channelled towards investment. If this increase is 
consumed it will still increase social welfare and in a Neo 
Malthusian situation such as those propounded by Liebenstein 
1118] and Wonnocott [241] will also increase labour product-
ivity and so output. 
(3) Even if migration does not result in an increase in the per 
capita consumption of food it will increase the availability 
for consumption of durable consumer goods such as shelter, 
clothing, etc. 
(4) Knowledge transmitted by the migrants may also serve to 
increase productivity. In this respect Miracle and Berry 
1132] argue that migration is more likely to result in the 
'adoption of new techniques if conditions in the supplying 
economy are similar to those in the host economy, than would 
be the case if they are substantially different. The extent 
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of the transfer of knowledge between sectors will largely be 
a function of the nature of the job obtained by the migrant 
and of its applicability to the conditions of the home environ-
ment. 
(5) Caldwell [32] advances the view that migrants' remittances 
exert a modernising influence on the supplying area as they 
increase the stock of money in the region and the consequent 
flow, making it easier to send children to school and to 
purchase modern sector products. 
(6) Hume [87] argues that out-migration may be viewed as the 
equivalent of a substantial injection of foreign assistance 
to the extent that it offers employment to those individuals 
who would otherwise be unemployed or underemployed. This 
is a somewhat 'far fetched' analogy since no matter how hard 
the migrant saves to remit his earnings to his old country 
the multiplier and acceleration effects of these remittances 
will be considerably smaller than those of the investment 
that would be required to provide him with an equivalent job 
without migrating. Nonetheless to the extent that out-
migration reduces unemployment and underemployment in the 
supplying region it will be beneficial as was argued above. , 
Costs 
(1) Output and income per head in the supplying area will fall 
on the migrant's departure if his marginal product was 
(2) 
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greater than his wage or if his labour generated substantial 
externalities in the economy. Quoting Miracle and Berry 
(132] once again: 
" •••• the effeat of the migrant's absenae on 
produation in his home eaonomy dependS on how 
aZoseZy the Zength of his absenae is adJusted 
to the time pattern of the home eaonomy's 
demand for his Zabour". P. 1. 
As a result, a stay of a fixed duration will have a larger 
adverse effect on the home economy's output the greater the 
number of production possibilities foregone as a result of 
the migration. 
Migration may result in substantial social costs. Many 
areas ha~ a very low level of masculinity as a result of 
continued out-migration e.g. Ireland and many rural areas in 
Africa. Watson [224] suggested that, amongst the Mambwe, 
the critical ratio was 1 male : 2 females. Any ratio less 
than this, he argued, upset both the social and economic 
relationships in the village he studied. Lombard [121] 
quotes figures that show that in 1960 only 11 per cent of 
the able bodied male Bantu still worked in the reserve areas 
in South Africa. 
If Kuznet's view of migration as a selective process is the 
correct one then the social costs may be even greater as 
particular classes may have a higher propensity to migrate 
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than others. Migration propensities are likely to be 
particularly high among the well educated intelligent young 
males; the class of people one would · expect to make the 
greatest contribution to future output in the home region 
(14) 
had they stayed. 
(3) Arrighi [7) believes that in Rhodesia the habit of migrancy 
altered the use of the agricultural surplus to the detriment 
of the development of the home region and that this also 
represents a substantial social cost to the supplying region. 
Migration he said led to a high value~eing placed on education 
and this in turn led to further migration for wage labour--
exacerbating the situation. 
(4) Arrighi also argued that the advent bf cash labour in 
Rhodesia led to an adverse change in the techniques of pro-
duction in the peasant sector. The peasant farmer substit-
uted maize for millet and adopted the plough shear, both of 
which Arrighi argues increased the degree of soil erosion 
in the area. The peasant farmer in a rational attempt to 
maximise his individual income generated substantial social 
costs for future generations. 
(5) Taxation revenues may fall if output falls as a result of 
migration, or if the taxable capacity of the economy is 
reduced. On the other hand there is no guarantee that the 
demand for government services will be likewise reduced. 
(14) This aspect is discussed further in Chapter 4, section 4.6. 
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(6) There is no doubt that temporary migrations alter consumption 
patterns as the migrants are exposed to a different range of 
commodities in the region to which they migrate. If this 
change in consumption patterns results in a decrease in 
investment in the supplying region then again the migration 
is generating social costs that are external to the migrant 
himself. 
2.as The Effects of Migration upon the Host Region 
Once more the impact of the in-migration upon the host economy 
will largely be a function of the nature of the economy itself and 
of its level of economic development. 
conclusions can be drawn. 
Benefits 
However certain general 
(1) Migration increases the supply of labour and helps to keep 
down wages in the classes of labour that are experiencing in-
migration. As Miracle and Berry [132] point out this effect 
is only unambiguously beneficial providing the total supply 
of labour does not exceed the demand. In African countries, 
where the Harris and Todaro model [69] seems likely to apply, 
one cannot state definitely, therefore, that in-migration has 
increased either the rate of economic growth or the level of 
social welfare, since the increased number of people in the 
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sector may result in increased consumption at the cost of 
reduced investment and economic growth if any substantial 
portion of this influx is not employed and directly contrib-
uting to the output of goods and services in the area. 
(2) The host economy will benefit from any special skills and 
knowledge that the in-migrants may possess. Morgan [135] 
estimated that the contribution of in-migrants to the output 
of the United States over the period 1870 to 1914 was sub-
stantially larger than that made by inflows of foreign 
capital over the same period. 
(3) Migrants may encourage the adoption of new techniques by 
the indige~ous workers. Polly Hill [72] found that migrant 
farmers in Southern Ghana played an active part in getting 
other farmers to take up cocoa farming. 
(4) Migrants may generate additional flows of migrants as they 
transmit information concerning conditions in the host 
economy back to the supplying region. Whether or not these 
increased flows of in-migrants will affect the host region 
beneficially will depend on the supply and demand conditions 
for labour at the time. 
(5) It is usually argued that a system of temporary migration 
generates a low productivity, rootless, labo~ force. Hutt 
[88] Horwitz [86]. The resulting drop in output 
potential reduces the investible surplus and also the incentive 
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to invest, as returns to capital are lower than they would 
otherwise be. Trapido (205), however, as was said earlie~ 
has argued the reverse, namely that the rootlessness of the 
migratory labour force in South Africa has mitigated against 
the development of labour organisations and that, as a result, 
the returns to capital in South Africa and the share of output 
going to capitalists is higher than it would otherwise have 
been. 
In general, when analysing the likely outcome from migration, 
Miracle and Berry (132) conclude that the host economy is mG~t 
likely to benefit from in-migration. 
from; 
The major benefits stem 
(1) An increased supply of labour at low cost in relative terms 
(2) The development of unused resources 
(c) The spread of new technology 
(d) Increased saving from either the increased output and 
capital transferred in with the migrants 
(e) Increased investment f~om the increased ou~ut and 
perhaps from the capital brought in by the migrants. 
Costs 
Although it is generally believed that in-migration is on the 
whole beneficial it does carry with it certain costs that have to 
be borne by the receiving economy. 
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(1) Substantial in-migration may involve a commitment to 
increasing social capital in the form of adequate housing, 
hospitals and schooling facilities to handle the new 
population. 
(2) In-migration involves the migrant in a substantial 
readjustment process. Frequently he comes from a different 
way of life and the presence of a large number of individuals 
in unfamiliar surroundings may result in considerable social 
and even political pressures being built up in the host 
economy. These will be greater when the volume of in-
migration exceeds the supply of job opportunities or where the 
migrants compete with the established labour classes for a 
particular type of job. Joan Nelson [142] however, argued in 
her study that there was no evidence to suggest that in-migrants 
were any less politically stable than individuals who had f 
been born into the community. 
From the wealth of empirical research dealing with the motives and 
the causes and effects of labour migration discussed in the pre-
ceeding sections it seems that in most instances at least one must 
I J 
reject any theory that attempts to explain the migration phenomenon 
in terms of the actions of a 'representative individual'. This means 
that the applicability of aggregate labour supply curves built up 
in this way such as those of Harris and Todaro [69] and Bell [14] ~re 
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severely limited. One is therefore forced to accept the view 
that the three aggregative economic models outlined earlie~ at 
least in their present form, have little hope of offering an 
adequate explanation of the labour migration phenomenon; 
since these models are based on this approach. As a result the 
models are too simplistic and too aggregative in nature to handle 
the many different facets of labour migration. 
A further problem of the aggregative economic models is that they 
are built on differing and at least in the case of the NeoMarxist 
models mutually exclusive views of the world and of the workings 
of the economic growth process. From the empirical data discussed 
above and the interrelationships postulated by the investigating 
researchers it becomes obvious that the growth process itself 
can generate forces, simply through the effects of labour migration) 
that can alter the values of the parameters assumed in the models. 
If one accepts the possibility of parametric change then,firstly the 
economic aggregative models will need to be adapted to handle such 
changes in so far as such adaptionsare feasible and secondly, the 
mutually exclusive nature of the growth paths depicted by the 
various classes of models becomes open to doubt. A more realistic 
description of the world would be one where the nature of the 
growth path changes as the growth process proceeds. 
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An approach that does seem to offer scope for generalisation, is 
the one concerned with analysing the 'interacting forces' that 
exert pressure on migrants. Models attempting to analyse these 
forces have been developed by Clyde Mitchell [133] Wilson [233] 
and Lee [108]. Whilst the models discussed by these authors 
do have an implicit "life cycle" view of the growth process, as 
they have been presente4 the approach itself can be adapted in 
such a manner as to provide a more dynamic and versatile 
analysis of labour migration on any growth path and can handle the 
problems created by the 'non homogeneity' of labour. This 
approach is discussed more fully in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A MORE GENERAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
I~n analysis of labour migration, there-
fore, must set out to explain not only 
why the men leave their tribal homes and 
the causes for this may be more complica-
ted than merely economic reasons - but 
also why they should consistently circu-
late between their tribal homes and the 
labour centres. /I Clyde Mitchell [133] 
p.24. 
3.1 Introduction 
The Clyde Mitchell [133] and Wilson [233] models of labour 
migration are both attempts to offer a generalised method suit-
able for use in explaining the causes of labour migration. The 
method suggested is based upon a systematic consideration of the 
nature of the forces present in a particular area, both social 
and economic, that interact with one another to generate flows 
of migrants from one location to another. 
The models attempt to distinguish between permanent and temporary 
migrants in terms of the relative strengths of the forces present 
at the time. Both authors see an economy that is essentially 
dualistic in nature, in which migrants are subjected to four 
interacting sets of forces, namely: 
a) Pull forces that operate from the modern sector. These 
forces are mainly economic in nature, such as the pull from 
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the increased job opportunities and rising wage rates that 
result from the industrial expansion that is taking place in 
the sector. Some role is, however, given to sociological 
factors such as the attractions of the urban way of life, 
which offers greater social mobility, lower kinship ties, 
better educational and entertainment facilities, etc. 
b) Push factors that arise in the rural sector. These may be 
due to the increasing 'immiserization' of the rural areas 
that results from the failure of agricultural techniques to 
adapt sufficiently to enable the region to accommodate popu-
lation increases. Hobart Houghton [75] . Land reforms may 
create 'landless' peasants forced to look elsewhere for 
means of survival, as was the case after the enclosures in 
Britain prior to the Industrial Revolution. Alternatively, 
there may be pressures put on men to leave the area in order 
to fulfil some legal obligation such as the payment of a 
tax. Economic development in the rural sector itself, once 
it becomes well established, implies a reduction in the land 
man ratio, which will give rise to push influences in the 
sector, as resident farmers find it profitable to reduce 
the size of their labour force. 
c) The third force acting on migration streams is the force pro-
vided by the rural pull effects. This force is stronger in 
traditional subsistence farming than it is in a commercial-
ised rural sector. The rural areas represent security to 
the would-be out-migrant, who knows the ways of his people 
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and, more important, is known by them. In many rural areas 
'the migrants' kin will provide for him should he fallon 
hard times. In most developing countries social services 
and social security are almost totally lacking in the grow-
ing modern sector and these functions are linked to those 
provided by the subsistence sector. 
d) Finally, in some instances at particular development levels 
one finds modern sector push forces operating. These occur 
in cases where it is more profitable for employers to employ 
circulating migrants than to establish a stabilised work 
force, whose families must be housed, fed and educated. As 
long as this is the case, Wilson [233] argues that employers 
actively encourage workers to leave their families in the 
rural area and to return to visit them at regular intervals, 
even though this process implies a high labour turnover and 
a low level of skill acquisition amongst workers. These in-
creased labour costs, he argues, are more than offset by the 
lower wages that employers are able to pay due to the fact 
that these workers and their families are not totally depen-
dent upon the migrant's earnings. 
Wilson [233] and Clyde Mitchell [133] see the level and direction 
of the migration stream as being dependent upon the outcome of 
the interaction of these four sets of forces. 
/ 
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"So 'long as the demand pun and the 
supp'ly push3 reinforcing each other and 
moving peop'le to the urban p'lace of work 
are counter-ba'lanced by the supp'ly pu'l'l 
and the demand push pressurising workers 
in the opposite direction back to the 
rura'l area3 so 'long wi'l'l the economy -
whose boundaries mayor may not be the 
same as the po'litica'l ones - have workers 
osciHating backwards and forwards." 
Wilson [233] p.l49. 
Clyde Mitchell [l33] draws a loose framework together in terms of 
the competing nexi of centripetal and centrifugal forces. Centri-
fugal forces are mainly economic in nature and ar.e the forces 
that draw the migrant away from home to the urban area. The 
centripetal forces on the other hand are the forces that cause 
him to return home and are seen only in terms of rural pull forces, 
such as the familiar social system, the security of land holding 
in the rural area etc. 
If the centrifugal forces are dominant, then the man will migrate 
from the rural area. Once he reaches the town, however, and 
starts to accumulate cash, the strength of the centrifugal forces 
will start to diminish; this process will continue until the cen-
tripetal forces become dominant and the migrant returns once 
again to his home. 
Once the migrant . is back in the rural area, the forces operating 
to drive him into the town, once again slowly assert their domi-
nance; usually as a result of a growing need for a cash income. 
As the centrifugal forces become stronger than the centripetal 
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forces, the migrant once more returns to town. This oscillating 
process Mitchell sees as continuing until the chain of events is 
broken at some point. 
The 'centrifugal forces' can be reduced by the substitution of 
another form of cash income for the wage income in the town. If 
the chain is broken into in this manner then the oscillating 
migration ceases and the migrant will settle permanently on the 
land. On the other hand, should the migrant continue to migrate 
to the town, he will gradually build up social relationships 
within the urban area. As this happens so the magnitude of the 
'centripetal force' diminishes and may be reduced to the point 
where the migrant settles permanently in the town. 
Wilson [233] has a more sophisticated view of the migration pro-
cess as he believes that the relative strengths of the push and 
pull forces, from both the rural and the urban area are not con-
stant, but are a function of the level of economic development. 
I~S the economy develops so the relative 
strengths of the forces alter as weU" 
Wilson [233] p.149. 
Wilson attributes the duration and magnitude of the changes in 
the forces to the fOllowing: 
1. The differing income elasticities for food and other goods 
and services that lead to changing relative intersectoral 
output levels and demands for labour, and 
- 57 -
2. The economies of scale that can be achieved in the manufac-
turing sector and the agricultural sector - and that give 
rise to increased specialisation and an increase in the 
demand for labour in the urban agglomerations. 
"Hence over time the process of economic 
growth serves to strengthen both the demand 
or urban pull as well as the supply or 
rural push. By the seane process, however, 
the opposing two pressures become lighter 
and lighter; the supply pull back to the 
rural areas derives its strength primariLy 
from the fact that sociaL security is better 
than in town; but as an economy deveLops, 
the cities become richer, workers' wages 
rise and society is abLe to afford sociaL 
security against sickness, accidents, unem-
ployment and oLd age ... the push by empLoy-
ers exists onLy where the losses inherent 
in high (labour) turnover are outweighed by 
the gains of the Labourers famiLy being 
ruraLly based. But as an economy deveLops 
the cost of turnover becomes higher and 
higher until such time as it is no Longer 
profitable for employers to have a labour 
force consisting of osciLLating migrants 
Wilson [233] p.15l. 
" 
One can raise two major objections to this view of the nature of 
the evolution of the forces acting upon migrant workers with 
economic development; the first of these comes from Lee [108], 
who argues that the links between the migrants and the "push and 
pull" forces may not be simple ones. He points out that every 
stream of migrants creates a counter stream of return migrants 
and he believes that the size of this counter stream will itself 
be related to whether the migrants were responding predominantly 
to "the push" or "the pull" factors when they made their initial 
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migration decision. The greater the strength of the push forces 
vis-a-vis the pull forces in the emigration, the smaller will be 
the counter stream of immigrants. 
Lee [l08] introduces a further complication into this type of 
model when he argues that, although migration is a selective pro-
cess, it is one that selects both positively and negatively and 
that the migrants will react differently to the push and pull 
forces depending upon whether they were positively or negatively 
selected initially. An increase in the strength of the push for-
ces will tend to increase the number of migrants who were nega-
tively selected, as the supplying area will seek to push out the 
less productive of its members first. On the other hand an im-
provement in the job opportunities in the destination area will 
have the effect of increasing the degree of positive selection 
among the out migrants, as the more productive will have a better 
chance of finding employment in the new area. 
The second major difficulty with the Wilson [233] view of the 
push-pull model is that, when one recalls the differing predic-
tions of the growth models that were discussed earlier, it be-
comes difficult to accept his view of the evolution of the power 
of the push and pull forces as being in any way a 'preordained' 
destiny of all the sets of forces affecting migration streams. 
CertainlY, should the economy being investigated, ~e traversing 
a Lewis [ll5]or rei and Ranis [54] type of labour surplus devel-
opment path then, in terms of the argument developed in Section 
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2.3, one would expect the push and pull forces acting on the 
migrants to evolve in the manner outlined by Wilson [233] 
However, if on the other hand the economy was growing along a 
Neoclassical full employment path or along a Frank [55] Arrighi 
[7] underdevelopment path, then there would be no a priori 
reason to expect that the labour migration streams would behave 
in the same manner over time as the predicted by Wilson [234] • 
Migration streams may increase or decrease with development. 
They may commence where no stream existed previously, either as 
a result of the accelerated growth in one sector of the economy 
or simply because the development process has altered the size of 
one or more of the development parameters so that the rate of 
labour absorption is less than the rate of growth of the labour 
supply in that particular area at that time. 
It will be argued below that the evolution of these forces is a 
function of the nature of the devlopment path being followed by 
an economy and furthermore that it is possible for the migration 
process itself to affect the size and nature of the parameters 
of the growth path, causing the economy to deviate to another 
quite different development path. 
3.2 The Evolution of the Push and Pull Forces with Economic 
Development. 
Continued economic development along any growth path requires 
the generation or appropriation,or both, of output surplus to the 
- 60 -
subsistence needs of the community. It is argued here that the 
size and the allocation of this surplus is a major determinant 
of the relative strengths of the push and pull ; orces that are 
exerted upon migrants. 
Surplus output may be extracted for investment in either the mod-
ern sector or the rural sector of the economy. It may also be 
used to finance higher levels of consumption or, as is indeed 
more likely, used for some combination of all the above three 
possibilities. It is this pattern of the allocation of the sur-
plus that is seen as determining the evolutionary pattern of the 
push pull forces acting upon the stream of migrants. It is 
possible to isolate certain relationships: 
1) To the extent that the allocation of the surplus increases 
the probability of a migrant obtaining a job in the modern 
sector, Todaro [203], the investment of the surplus in the 
modern sector will act to increase the extent of the urban 
pull force. This effect will be even greater if the addi-
tional investment results in increased real wage rates in 
that sector. Investment in social capital such as the pro-
vision of housing, education or social security will also 
act to increase the power of the modern sector pull force 
and at the same time may reduce the strength of the rural 
pull. 
2) Should all or part of the investible surplus be used to 
finance additional investment or consumption in the area 
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supplying the out-migrants, then to the extent that this 
allocation of surplus reduces the absolute level of poverty 
in these ' areas, it will reduce the rural push forces. How-
ever, if the investment in the rural areas is accompanied by 
more capital intensive techniques of production in these 
areas, then this investment may actually have the reverse 
effect and act to increase the size of the rural push forces. 
3) . If this surplus output is used, not to generate investment, 
but instead to finance additional consumption in the modern 
sector, it will, other things being equal, reduce the rate 
of investment in the sector and so decrease the size of the 
urban or modern sector pull forces. However, should the gains 
in productivity that result from the economies of scale poss-
ible in the consumption goods i ndustry, be sufficient to off-
set this decline in investment, increased consumption may not 
act to reduce the urban pull on migrants. This type of re-
lationship will be found in economies where the growth of 
the economy is limited by the size of the market. Eltis [50]. 
In the case where the economy is limited by the rate of capital 
accumulation, however, the use of surplus output to finance addi-
tional consumption is likely to lower the level of investment 
and so reduce the force of the modern sector pull effects by re-
ducing the rate of growth of employment opportunities in that 
sector. 
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3.3 The Migration Process and the Evolution of the Forces 
Affecting the Migrants. 
The migration process itself is likely to affect the evolution of 
the forces acting upon the migrants through the impact that the 
system has on the level of incomes in the supplying economy, on 
the rate of growth of incomes and upon the would-be migrants' ex-
pectations. 
3.3.1 The Migration Process and Income Levels in the Supplying 
Economy. 
On the theoretical level the relationship between out-migration 
and the standards of living of those who remain in the supplying 
economy is not a simple one as there are a number of different 
influences at work and the end result will be the net outcome of 
the inter-action of some, or all, of these influences. One can, 
however, identify some of the more simple possibilities as a 
starting point: 
1. In cases where the marginal product of the worker is below 
his consumption level and, on his departure, the remaining 
work load is not redistributed amongst his fellows, the 
total output of the area will fall but output per head will 
increase. In such instances, ceteris paribus, those who re-
main behind in the supplying economy gain from the mere ab-
sence of the migrant. 
2. If one assumes that the migrant's contribution to output is 
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again below his consumption level, but on the migrant's 
departure the work load in the supplying area is reallocated 
so that the level of the total output of the area is main-
tained. The people who remain behind will benefit, in terms 
of an increase in their share of the output of the economy, 
in two ways. Once again they will benefit from the migrant's 
absence, but in addition they will also gain from the output 
that results from their increasing their individual contri-
butions to the economy's total work input. In extreme cases 
of over-population, where the marginal product of labour in 
the supplying region is actually negative, out-migration 
could result in a work reallocation that increases the total 
output of the area and not merely output per head. 
3. It is possible that the level of out-migration is negatively, 
rather than positively correlated with movements in labour 
productivity. If out-migration results in a shortage of 
labour of a particular type or at a particular time, then 
the migration may result in downward shifts in labour produc-
tivity in the area following from such things as capital 
consumption in the form of the neglect of drainage facilities, 
fencing etc., that are concomitant with a high male absentee 
rate, or from a drop in the availability of human capital in 
cases where the more dynamic and better educated members of 
the work force migrate. These effects are likely to take 
time to manifest themselves and so are particularly difficult 
to isolate. 
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4. Out-migrants usually send a portion of their earnings in 
their new area back to their relatives in the supplying 
economy. These remittances can be quite substantial. 
Leistner [113] found that foreign migrants to the South 
African mines typically remitted between 21 and 34 per cent 
of their cash earnings. Hancock [68] estimated that Mexican 
migrants to the United States remitted at least 55 per cent 
of their earnings to their families and Caldwell [33] 
states that in 1963 remittances by rural urban migrants in 
Ghana were as high in total as 3 per cent of the nation's 
national income for that year. Remittances can be used to 
finance either consumption or investment by the recipients, 
but in either case, although the long-run implications of 
the uses differ, the remittances add to the present income 
levels in the economy receiving them. 
In terms of the effect on present income levels, the existence of 
a substantial stream of migrants will decrease the rural push 
forces to the extent that the out-migration itself relieves rural 
poverty levels. If, however, the process of migration lowers the 
level of income generated within the supplying economy through 
its effects on the available labour and by doing so makes those 
who remain behind increasingly dependent upon the remittances 
sent in by the migrants to maintain their standards of living, 
then the out-migration will generate increases rather than de-
creases in the rural push forces arising in the supplying economy. 
3.3.2 
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The Migration Process and the Growth of Income in the 
Supplying Economy. 
The migratory labour system will affect the future rates of growth 
income in the supplying economy through the impact that it has on 
capital accumulation, technical progress and the choice of tech-
niques in domestic production. 
As far as the relationship between out-migration and capital acc-
umulation in the supplying economy is concerned, there are two 
different and quite distinct views, namely those of the Neo-
classical economists and those of the Neo-Marxists. 
The Neoclassical view of labour migration and its role in the 
process of capital accumulation is that migration is likely to 
increase income levels in the supplying economy as a result of 
firstlYJthe more efficient allocation of labour to available 
land and, secondl~ the remittances sent in by migrants. Higher 
incomes will lead to higher levels of domestic savings and hence 
to higher levels of domestic investment. An example of this type 
of relationships is given by Waters [233] who argues that in 
West Africa migrant earnings provide a substantial proportion of 
the working capital requirements of peasant farmers. Similarly 
Miracle and Berry [132] quote studies by Hancock [68] Ardener et 
al [5] Gulliver [63] and Schapera [178] in support of the view 
tpat out-migrants, who intend to return, have a higher propensity 
to save than that of the population of a developing country as a 
whole. Miracle and Berry [132] also argue that returning migrants 
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represent accumulated human capital, in so far as they have 
acquired skills that will enable and encourage them to increase 
the stock of physical capital in their home economy. 
The alternate view of labour migration and its relationship to 
capital accumulation is that of Arrighi [7] and Amin [4] who 
argue the following; 
1. Since the out-migrants decisions to migrate are made within 
the system in which they live, one cannot say that because a 
man decides to migrate and then continues to do so he must be 
better off as a result of the migration. These writers see 
the individuals as being so much part of the total system 
that their decisions become so circumscribed that they may 
in fact have no alternative available to them. 
2. The migration process alters the values of the society 
supplying the migrants to the point where migration becomes 
'institutionalised' as a way of life. Once this happens it 
is argued that the investible surplus in the community, 
whether it be generated domestically or sent into the economy 
by the migrants in the form of remittances, is reallocated in 
such a way as to be detrimental LO the long term development 
of the supplying economy. Investment is channelled into 
labour saving techniques and into education, both of which 
tend to reinforce the pattern of out-migration;thus reducing 
the range of viable alternatives open to the adult work 
force. 
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3. The migration process leads to a misallocation of labour in 
the supplying area and so contributes to the consumption of 
capital through neglect. This misallocation arises because 
the overall development patterns in both the economy supplying 
and that receiving the migrants are seen to generate distor-
tions in relative prices and it is argued that these distor-
tions favour the continued export of labour vis-a..-vis the em-
ployment of labour in the supplying economy. 
4. The export of labour power is seen as generating output that 
is surplus to the immediate needs of the population in the 
area employing the migrants rather than in the area supplying 
the migrants and it is argued by Amin [4] that this loss of 
the creation of surplus substantially hinders the accumula-
tion of capital in the supplying area. 
Turning now to the relationship between out-migration and the 
degree of technical progress in the supplying economy, one again 
finds two differing views. The first, described earlier, is the 
view that returning migrants bring with them investment in the 
form of enhanced human capital. Miracle and Berry [13~ Hill [72] 
Kuznets [106]. Consequently these writers argue that the return-
ing in-migrants tend to further the advance of technical progress 
in the supplying economy on their return. Similarly, as was said 
previously, it is also argued by Caldwell [31] that migrants' 
remittances in the form of cash have a modernising effect on the 
supplying region, which will also make the climate in the economy 
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more favourable for technical change. 
On the other hand, although one might accept the view of Kuznets 
that it is the younger more venturesome men who migrate, this does 
not imply that these same men will necessarily foster technical 
progress in their home economies when they return. Indeed, 
Gulliver [63] Arrighi [7] Watson [22~ and Gluckman [58] argue the 
reverse, namely that; 
(i) the absence of the male workers puts such pressure on 
the remaining work force that they lack the opportunity 
to adopt new ways of production; 
(ii) that the returning migrants' experiences in the re-
ceiving economy are such that they tend to strengthen 
the migrant's ties with their traditional beliefs 
which in turn mitigate against technical progress in 
the supplying economies. 
It was argued in chapter 2 t hat one of the costs of the migrant 
labour system to the supplying economy was that the institution-
alisation of the system was likely to lead to the 'incorrect' 
choice of techniques in production due to the fact that the 
migrant makes his decisions within a set of private costs and 
benefits and that this set may differ substantially from the set 
of social costs and benefits. Arrighi's [7] arguments in con-
nection with the reallocation of investment in the rural African 
areas of Rhodesia away from uses that would improve agricultural 
productivity towards uses that increase the rate of out-migration 
were quoted in support of this view. A similar finding is re-
ported by Gulliver [63] who stated that the Ngoni that he studied 
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changed their techniques of production to accomodate the out-
migration by their men and by doing so maintained subsistence 
production in the area at the expense of cash crop production. 
It would appear that the relationship between out-migration, 
technical progress and the choice of techniques in the supplying 
economy is no more clear cut than that between migration and 
capital accumulation. It is, however, perfectly clear that the 
migration process itself can affect the performance of these 
variables and through them the size and direction of the push 
and pull forces that aff'ect the migration streams themselves; 
consequently it is unwise to postulate a particular pattern of 
evolution for these forces in a development situation as was 
done by Wilson [233]. 
A better and more feasible approach appears to be one that en-
deavours to identify the relationship between capital accumula-
tion, technical progress and economic development on the one 
hand and then to look at the reverse of the coin and to attempt 
to identify the relationship between the growth path being 
followed and its effects on the evolution of the push and pull 
forces affecting the migrat i on streams. 
3.4 The Relationship between the Development Path and Labour 
Migration. 
It was argued earlier that the evolution of the forces acting 
upon the migration streams that was postulated by Wilson [234] 
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represents the type of evolution that would occur if the economy 
was developing along a Labour Surplus development path of the type 
described by Lewis and Fei and Ranis[115] [52]. This being so, then as 
development proceeds and the supply of labour gradually becomes 
absorbed, the migration stream will first cease to oscillate and 
then eventually almost disappear, only reappearing as a reflec-
tion of any imbalances that may occur in the growth of the diff-
erent sectors of the economy as a result of continued development. 
If the growth path of the economy experiencing the migration 
streams is similar to the Development-Underdevelopment path of 
Frank [55] Arrighi [8] Dos Santos [45 and Amin [3] the situa-
tion is substantially different from that described by Wilson [234]. 
It is also possible that in this situation, the process of migra-
tion itself makes the situation worse, particularly if the migra-
tion takes the form of oscillating rural urban migration. 
In this context it is argued here that oscillating migration it-
self is a major contributor to the underdevelopment of the supply-
ing region, as it is likely to have a substantial effect on the 
numerical values of such growth parameters as population growth 
rates, labour force growth rates and, probably most important of 
all, the rate of technical progress. In addition the system con-
tributes to the misallocation of such surplus as is generated in 
the sector. Arrighi [7]. 
The causal links between oscillating migration and underdevelop-
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ment in the supplying region are seen as operating in the 
following manner: 
1. The impact, of a system of oscillating migration, on the 
supplying region is very different from that of permanent 
migration. A permanent migrant leaves the area with his 
immediate dependents. The home country loses the benefit 
of the migrant's contribution to output in the area but it 
gains by the increased availability of consumption goods and 
services previously taken up by the migrant and his depen-
dents. 
An oscillating migrant, on the other hand, migrates alone, 
leaving his family in the supplying region. In such in-
stances the supplying economy is a double loser; output. 
drops by the migrant's contribution, 'but consumption levels 
are hardly affected, as the family, apart from the migrant 
himself, remains dependent upon the resources of the region. 
In cases where the migrant's contribution to output is 
greater than his consumption, on his departure per capita 
incomes generated in the region will acutally drop, if it 
is not possible for the remaining residents to adapt the 
techniques of production sufficiently to compensate for his 
absence. 
2·. The initial contact between modern technology and capital, 
and a backward, traditional community normally results in 
the introduction, in the latter, of social health services 
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and educational facilities. These act to reduce mortality 
rates and increase population growth rates in the sector. 
Population pressures on land, other things being equal, are 
likely to generate innovation as people are driven to search 
for new techniques in an attempt to maintain or improve their 
previous living standards. Clark [36] Hirschman [73]. 
Technical progress in the traditional sector is, therefore 
critical at this stage, to counteract the effects of both 
the absence of the migrants and the increased number of de-
pendents, if locally engendered income levels are to be main-
tained. However, it is argued here that it is precisely this 
link, namely the adoption of new techniques that falls victim 
to the process of oscillating migration. 
3. Temporary migration impedes technical progress in the tradi-
tional sector in two ways. Innovation requires initiative 
and investment. Oscillating migration in a capitalist econ-
omy acts to reduce both and so makes the adoption of the 
badly needed new technology almost impossible. 
a) Firstly, as had been said previously, migration as a 
process is education and age selective. Practically 
all the studies on migration have found that young males 
and those with above average educational levels have a 
higher than average propensity to migrate. Thomas CL98] 
Bogue and Hagood [23] Li D.17]E,ldridge [48 ] Suval and 
Hamilton [66] Browning and Feindt {29] Herrick [71] 
Pascau1 [151] Zachariah I244]. As youth is the initiator 
of most change, a high rate of absence . amongst those aged 
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under forty years means that it becomes increasingly 
difficult to introduce new techniques. In an African 
context, where the man is traditionally the decision 
maker, this effect is reinforced and the decision making 
process becomes increasingly cumbersome as the proportion 
of males absent from the area rises. 
b) Migrant workers lacking permanent roots in the indus-
trial region are particularly prone to exploitation. 
The _tem.Q.orar-Lnature of their employment makes it diffi-
cult for them to organise themselves as ~ bar~gaining 
force in labour ~oli tics. Trapido [205l 1 ) Consequently 
migrants wa e rates are likely to be lower than those of 
their permanently urbanised colleagues. In addition the 
lack o~an established urban base is likely to increase 
their Jiving costs. Low wage rates, coupled with high 
-E2~ts_of living, lead to low remittance to their families. 
In opposition to the findings of Hancock [68] in Southern 
Africa at least, the typical rate of remittance by a 
migrant is twenty per cent of his earnings. Leistner [113J To 
,a family already struggling to subsist this increase in income 
will not be sufficient to allow for much above bare 
essential spending. Innovation in agricult~e re~ires 
investment, investment means saving and low incomes are 
not likely to permit the generation of sufficient saving 
to finance a substantial change in agriculture techniques. 
4. The agricultural situation frequently worsens as oscillating 
migration may imply labour shortages at certain times of the 
(1) However it should be noted that Nattrass and Duncan [141] 
found tha~ in the eyes of the employers of that labour 
at least)there was no evidence that suggested that the 
migratory labour system in fact made 'it more difficult 
to organise labour. 
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year. The absence of a large number of adult men means that 
the ploughing is often late and, even worse that agricultural 
maintenance jobs are neglected, threatening the future pro-
ductivity of the soil. 
5. Oscillating migration slowly becomes accepted as a way of 
life in the traditional sector. Once this happens the value 
systems of individuals in the sector are altered. The changes 
in values cause a reallocation of whatever surplus output is 
still generated in the sector. Arrighi's [7] argument 
quoted in Section 2.4 is relevant here; namely that oscilla-
ting migration in Rhodesia led to the over-valuation of edu-
cation by peasants or would-be migrants, and that this trans-
fer of surplus from agricultural investment to investment in 
human capital increased the deprivation of the traditional 
region as the peasants sought education that fitted them to 
work in the modern sector rather than that which would have 
improved rural productivity. 
The evolution of the push pull forces on migrants is different 
in this type of development. All four types of forces, urban 
pull, urban push, rural pull and rural push increase as a result 
of the interaction of the continuing lowering of standards of 
living in the rural region and the combination of the expansion 
of the capitalist sector and the capitalists' desire to keep 
labour costs down. 
There is no tendency to stability in the system; oscillating 
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migration continues and indeed the rate of migration increases as 
the general impoverishment of the rural areas rises, intensifying 
the problem. 
Investment in agriculture all but ceases, past capital accumula-
tion is consumed by neglect and traditional agriculture stagnates. 
The inhabitants of the region become totally reliant upon the 
growing sector; even their very existence depends upon the remit-
tances received from the oscillating migrant. 
In the modern sector of the dual economy the degradation of the 
traditional economy results in the establishment of a large sur-
plus army of workers. Far from being pushed up by rising rural 
standards of living, modern sector wage rates may even fall during 
some phases of development as more men are forced out of the 
traditional sector to look for work.(2) 
Under such circumstances the migration process itself generates forces 
that lead to further migration,since the out-migration adds to 
the impoverishment of the rural areas and makes their inhabitants 
more dependent upon the remittances from the out-migrants. 
The conventional Neo Marxist school Frank [55] Arrighi [7] argue 
that development within the capitalist mode of production implies 
that the problems of the process of capitalist accumulation will 
(2 ) Wage rates in m1.n:l.ng and commerc ial agr icul ture in Sout h 
Africa fell in the early 20th century. Wilson [232] in 
Wilson and Thompson [238]. 
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affect the growth of the economy and push it towards economic 
stagnation rather than onwards towards further development. 
It is however,possible that stagnation is not the inevitable con-
comitant of capitalist development. It was postulated in an 
earlier paper by the author, Nattrass [138],(3) that the behaviour 
patterns of the groups making the investment decision~ in a capi-
talistic economy, that is developing in the early stages of in-
dustrialisation, are likely to be such that the capitalists will 
make use of all the means at their disposal to create a labour 
supply and indeed will endeavour to increase the supply of 'free 
labour' vis-~-vis the demand as development proceeds. Irt order 
to do this in the initial stages of development the capitalist 
decision makers will make use of both the political system and 
the market mechanism to further proletarianize agricultural wor-
kers, petty traders, 'feudal serfs' etc. Bundy [30]Davies [41] 
In addition in an attempt to reduce the rate of growth of the 
demand for 'free labour' capitalists will seek after increasingly 
capital intensive methods of production. Since the growth of the 
capitalist sector in the initial stages will be most rapid on the 
development through underdevelopment path it is most likely that 
the decision makers, so long as their goal is capital accumula-
tion and growth, will choose policies that enable the economy to 
continue to grow in a highly uneven manner. 
(3) A copy of which is attached to this thesis as Appendix E 
for the convenience of the reader ". 
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However, providing the rate of growth of employment is greater 
than the rate of growth of the labour supply, a situation must 
eventually be reached in which the surplus labour becomes 
finally absorbed. Once this happens the bargaining position of 
labour vis-~-vis the capitalist decision makers, becomes very 
much stronger, wage rates will start to increase and labour may 
be in a position to force a change in the development strategy 
to one that favours the underdeveloped areas, as their price for 
continuing to contribute to the further growth of the developing 
sector. At .this stage the decision making body in the growing 
centre is faced with the alternatives of stagnation or of con-
tinued growth by means of their acceding to the demands made by 
labour. It is postulated here that providing these decision 
makers are not limited by the actions of other competing groups 
in the social economic and political hierarachy they will choose 
to behave in the traditional manner attributed to capitalists 
and will opt for continued economic expansion despite the in-
(4) 
creasing costs. 
This being so then as the supply of free labour begins to dry up 
the supplying area is in a position to improve its position in 
(4) See for example the words that Marx believed would be 
uttered by the "good Dr. Aiken" if he had been able to 
rise from his grave and revisit the Manchester of Marx's 
era, namely 




Firstly the relative shortage of labour will force 
J 
wage rates up and, ceteris paribus with this increase the level 
of remittances to the supplying region should rise; increasing 
incomes in the area. Secondly)as labour becomes in short supply so the 
bargaining position of the region supplying the labour improves 
, 
vis-a-vis that of the receiving economy. It may well be possible 
for the supplying area to use this increased power to force the 
receiving economy to transfer part of the surplus created in 
that economy by the in-migrants, to the supplying region for in-
vestment there. 
In this view of the world the development process itself must, 
once it commences and providing it is coninuous, guarantee that 
the final result of development is that of full employment of 
factors of production in the economy, irrespective of the level 
from which development starts. This view will however only be 
J 
correct, as was stated earlier, if the rate of growth of labour 
absorption is greater than the rate of growth of the labour 
supply. 
In terms of this argument, one needs to obtain answers to cer-
tain specific questions before one can be certain firstly, that 
the growth parameters themselves are sufficiently strong to 
enable the growth process to continue and secondly, that con-
tinued growth will indeed lead to the final elimination of large 
supplies of surplus labour. These questions are the fOllowing: 
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1. Is the economy approaching full employment? 
2. What are the determinants of the level and rate of growth 
investment? 
3. Is there any substantial movement towards the adoption of 
more capital intensive t echniques of production? 
4. Which groups of individuals who have a role to play in the 
economic scene have a vested interest in maintaining their 
existing status and do they feel threatened by any further eco-
nomic progress and so will oppose policies designed to further growth? 
5. How much influence do such groups in fact exert over the 
major policy making groups in the economy? 
6. To what extent is it possible for the capitalist decision 
.makers to create additional supplies of labour either by 
further use of the economic or political machines or by 
means of extending the area from which they draw their 
labour? 
7. To what extent is the growth process itself generating the 
emergence of new decision making groups with power and the 
incentive to accelerate change in th~ development strategy? 
Even if all the answers to the above questions indicate that the 
growth path will indeed evolve from a development with under-
development path to one that offers development in all sectors 
of the economy, it is still essential to consider the time scale 
that is involved. It is apparent that no peasant economy trapped 
in an underdevelopment situation by its fast growing neighbour 
can take any comfort from the fact that things should improve 
in a century or so. More relevant in such a situation is a 
search for policy measures designed to reduce the degree of 
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imbalance between the two sectors and to this end every attempt 
should be made to reduce the level of dependency of the satellite 
region supplying the migrants, on the fast developing centre. 
Since it has been argued that oscillating migration is both the 
cause and the result of the underdevelopment of the region 
supplying the out-migrants, it follows that, where oscillating 
migration is substantial, any strategy that is designed to reduce 
the undesirable effects of dependency in the satellite region 
must include measur~to reduce such out-migration as far as is 
practically feasible. 
Howeyer, where the rates of out-migration by oscillating migrants 
are substantial such as is the case in Kwa-Zulu, where out-
migration rates amongst adult males can be as high as 70 per 
cent in some rural districts, it will not be a simple or a short 
term project to reduce migration rates. Out-migrants have to be 
provided with some alternative viable means of employment within 
the supplying area before the rates of out-migration can be ex-
pected to decrease, since present consumption levels in the 
supplying region may be almost total~dependent upon the remit-
tances received from the out-migrants in such cases. 
One has here, once again, the classic conflict between private 
costs and benefits and social costs and benefits and also be-
tween the costs and benefits of present and future generations. 
Government intervention becomes imperative if one is to attempt 
to drive these conflicting sets of values into equivalence. In 
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cases where it becomes apparent that the growth process is such 
that development will either cease altogether or lead to further 
inequalities in the levels of development of the different sec-
tors in the economy, the need for a successful government stra-
tegy aimed at driving the economy on to a more egalitarian devel-
opment path becomes even greater. 
3.5 Conclusions: Migrant Labour and Economic Development in 
South Africa. 
In terms of the arguments presented in this section, it seems 
that one can draw the following general conclusions: 
1. That the level, direction and rate of growth of the migra-
tion stream is a function of the interaction of four forces 
acting upon it: the urban or modern sector pull forces, of 
job opportunities, increased rewards, etc.; rural push forces 
\ 
arising from relative poverty or labour reallocation in the 
area; urban push forces in the form of the desires of em-
ployers to minimise their responsibi,lities to their labour 
force and the rural pull forces arising from the social, 
political and economic ties that are maintained by the 
migrant with his home region. 
2. That these forces are themselves a function of the nature of 
the development path that the economy is following. 
3. That the critical variables that determine the nature of the 
growth path and so the evolution of the forces acting upon 
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the migration stream and the behaviour of the stream of 
migrants itself, are the relative rates of growth of labour 
absorption and of growth of the supply of labour in both the 
area supplying and the one receiving the migrants. __ 1 
In terms of these general conclusions any investigation into the 
economic impact of the migrat ory labour system in South Africa 
must look at the role played by the system in both the supplying 
areas, which are predominentl y the rural areas of the Black home-
lands, and in the development of the modern sector of the South 
African economy. The study should aim at identifying the effects 
of the system on both areas i n order to enable some assessment to 
be made concerning the nature of the overall development patterns 
in the economy, together with an estimate of the most likely 
future outcome, since without such an assessment any policy re-
commendations could be totally incorrect. ' 
The remainder of this thesis is devoted to an attempt to under-
take such an exercise and the following chapter considers the 
economic effects that the migrant labour system has had on the 
development of the modern sector of the South African economy. 
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C HAP T E R F 0 U R 
THE MIGRANT LABOUR SYSTEM AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN SECTOR OF 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY. 
"Migrant Labour is nothing new in South Africa. 
One hundred years ago, a decade before the birth 
of the Witwatersrand gold mining industry, gener-
ations before the evolution of the policy of 
Apartheid, the system whereby men oscillated 
between their home in some rural area and their 
place of work, was already fir,mly established as 
part of t :ze country's traditional way of Ufe." 
Wilson [233] P.l. 
4.1 A Brief Introductory BaCkground 
The initial years of conflict between the European Settler popu-
lation and the African tribes culminated in the resettlement of a 
major portion of the tribesmen on areas of land too small to 
enable them to support increasing numbers of people with their 
traditional agricultural methods. There seems no reason to doubt 
the views of scholars such as Wilson [232] and Van der Horst [216] 
who argue that the policy of settling Africans on land areas too 
small was a deliberate one, in that the general view of the policy 
makers in South Africa in the 19th century is adequately summar-
ised in the following excerpt from a dispatch written by Earl 
Gray in 1849. 
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" .. . it wouLd be difficuU or impossibLe to 
assign to the natives such Locations of an 
extent sufficient for their support as a 
pastoraL people depending mainly for support 
on their fLocks and herds. I regard it on 
the contrary as desirable that these peopLe 
shouLd be pLaced in circumstances in which 
they shouLd find regular industry necessary 
for their subsistence." p.48(1) 
and to quote Sheila van der Horst [216] " •• this attitude was 
maintained", and subsequently reinforced by the imposition of 
taxes on Africans and the further resettlement of tribesmen 
following the Zulu Wars. 
BundYI30] argues that the African peasantry that did succeed in 
establishing themselves in competition with the White farmers in 
the late 19th and early 20th Century were actively discouraged 
and finally "proletarianised" by measures which culminated in the 
1913 Native Land Act. 
The adverse land man ratio in the Reserves, coupled with the poor 
quality of a good deal of the land and the ever increasing tax 
burden, drove increasing numbers of Africans to seek work in the 
developing South African mining and industrial areas, but whereas 
in most other countries labour migration implies a reduction of 
the numbers of people remaining on the land, this was not the 
(1) Quoted from Parl. Pa ers 1850XXXVlll [1292] Ca e 
Correspondence 1849-50 p.198 in S.T. 
p.48. 
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case in South Africa. Here we developed a system of oscillating 
migration(2) where the migrant left his family, sought work in a 
distant region, worked for a period of time, returned to his 
family for as long as he felt was economically feasible and then 
once again migrated to seek work. The system of oscillating 
migration was actively encouraged by the early entrepreneurs, par-
ticularly those in the mining industry presumably because it was 
profitable for them to do so, and it was supported by South 
African legislators. As far back as 1929, Smuts, whilst present-
ing the Rhodes Memorial Lectures at Oxford, summed up the current-
ly prevailing viewpoint: 
tIthe natives of Africa have been subject to 
a stern, even ruthZess discipZine and their 
sociaZ system has rested upon the despotic 
authority of their chiefs. If this system 
breaks down, the native society wiZZ be re-
soZved into its human atoms with possibiZi-
ties of universaZ BoZshevism and chaos." 
Smuts p.56(3) 
Smuts felt that the loss of tribal ties was due not to the employ-
ment of males in white areas, but rather to "the abandonment of 
the native tribal home by the women and children" which he felt 
should be prevented by law; which should also only allow the 
(2) For the purpose of this study an oscillating migrant is 
defined as a man who leaves his family in the rural area 
whether or not he sets up a second 'family' in the modern 
sector. 
(3) Quoted from J.C. Smuts 'African Settlement' in Africa and 
some World Problems. Clarendon Press, 1930, p.56 by 
Brett [26] p.46. 
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residence of adult native males in white areas for limited periods 
and for the purpose of employment among whites. Brett [26] 
Oscillating migration was finally entrenched as a way of life in 
South Africa by the laws encouraging the separate development of 
the different race groups. 
One of the anomalies of the South African scene is that - despite 
the fact that the migratory labour system has persisted for over 
a century, no systematic attempt to assess the size and charac-
teristics of the stream of migrants has yet been made, although 
some 'once off' estimates have been made by Wilson [233] and 
Lombard and van der Merwe [122]. In the following sections 
attempts are made to estimate the size and the nature of various 
black domestic migration streams in South Africa and by so doing 
to try and fill one of the gaps in our knowledge of the variables 
operating in the South African economic system. 
4.2 The Basis of the Estimate 
An estimate of the behaviour of migration streams from various 
regions in South Africa over a period of time in the past, is by 
nature somewhat unreliable, due to the lack of adequate statis-
tical data. In this study the migration estimates have been made 
by using the characteristics of the global South African Bantu 
,language-speaking popUlations to create a standard population, 
exhibiting the same characteristics, for the area from which out-
migration is to be estimated and then deducting the actual adult 
population from the estimated standard to obtain the number of 
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migrants. Table 4.1 gives an estimate of the number of migrants, 
both male and female, from the Homeland rural areas, to which has 
been added the net out-migration from the other rural areas in 
South Africa and the foreign Black migrants. The estimates have 
been based upon 1970 population census data and detailed explan-
atiomof the basis of the estimates together with the detailed 
calculations are presented in Appendix A. 
As the basis for the estimates of migrants includes only net out-
migration, the total number of migrants in Table 4.1 of 1 490 000 
men and 260 000 women understates the total size of the migration 
stream, since some migrants choose to work in agriculture and 
rural industries. Despite this immigration, however, all the 
rural areas remain net suppliers of out-migrants. 
In order to assess the estimate made in Table 4.1 in terms of its 
relative magnitude, Table 4.2 compares this estimate with some 
others that have been made. 
Estimates 2, 4 and 5 in Table 4.2 include only legal migrants as 
is explained in Appendix A. In the light of this, an estimate of 
total temporary migration of 1 750 000 people seems reasonable. 
Such an estimate implies that of the total number of migrants 
from the Homelands, 80 per cent migrate and seek work through the 
normal institutional channels set up by the government and 20 per 
cent are probably illegal migrants. 
TABLE 4.1 
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AN ESTIMATE OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MIGRANTS IN 
THE MODERN SECTOR OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
AT THE CENSUS DATE IN 1970. (4) (5) 
Age Homeland Rural Other Rural Foreign Total Migrants 
Group 
Areas Areas Migrants 
Males Females Males Females Males Males Females 
A A A A B 
15-19 117 000 36 000 11 000 11 000 22 000 150 000 47 000 
20-24 192 000 36 000 19 000 19 000 98 000 309 000 55 000 
25-29 192 000 36 000 20 000 35 000 78 000 290 000 71 000 
30-34 168 000 35 000 17 000 28 000 59 000 244 000 63 000 
35-39 112 000 4 000 15 000 45 000 157 000 19 000 
40-44 87 000 5 000 33 000 120 000 5 000 
45-49 62 000 26 000 88 000 
50-54 50 000 18 000 68 000 
55-64 50 000 14 000 64 000 
11030 000 147 000 67 000 113 000 393 000 1490 000 260 000 
A Detailed calculations for these estimates are presented in Appendix A 
Table A9 and its supporting tables. 
B Foreign migrants have been estimated on the basis of adult males 
adult females = oscillating migrants for age groups 15-64 years; 
from Report 02-02-02 above note 4. 
(4) Based on data contained in Report 02-02-02. Population Census 1970 
Bantu Age, Occupation, Industry, School Standard, Birthplace. 
Department of Statistics. Pretoria 1973. 
(5) For a detailed explanation of the basis of the estimate see 
Appendix A. 
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TABLE 4.2 A COMPARISON OF THE ESTIMATIONS OFTHE NUMBER 
OF MIGRANTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY. 





Jill Nattrass, Estimate 
in Table 4.1 
Jill Nattrass, Low Estimate 
based on actual masculinity 
rates, not Sadie's ideal 
masculinity rates. 
Jill Nattrass, High 
Estimate Table 4.1 
Estimate adjusted for an 
estimated 20% under-
enumeration of children 
0-5 years in 1970 census. 
Francis Wilson, 
Estimated from data in 
Race Relations Survey 
1971. 57% of registered 
labour assumed to be 
migrant. 
5) The Department of 
Statistics Male 
Migrants from Homelands 
only. Excludes females 
and migrants who leave 
rural areas for Homeland 









1 750 000 
1 465 000 
2 021 000 
1 305 000 
631 200 
(6) If one adjusts estimates 2 and 5 so that they are 
made on the same basis they differ by only 5 per cent 
from one another. 
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4.3 The Migrant Labour System and the Labour Supply 
4.3.1 The Magnitude of the System 
An estimate of one and three quarter million oscillating migrants 
in the modern sector of the South African economy, implies that 
the. economic significance of these migrants to both the modern 
sector and the supplying Homeland regions will be substantial. 
Exactly how substantial the impact is on the modern sector of the 
economy can be seen from the magnitudes in Table 4.3, which shows 
the economic significance of migrant labour in terms of the South 
African Economy's labour supply. 
The modern sector's reliance on labour supplies from outside is, 
in fact, greater than these statistics imply, since to these 
figures must be added the Homeland commuter work force, which, 
although it is part of the modern sector labour supply, consists 
of men who live permanently i n the Homeland areas and so were 
enumerated there in the 1970 census count. If an estimate of 
the number of such commuters is made, based upon the ratio of 
the estimates of commuter to migrant income in 1967, made by 
Lombard and Van del' Merwe [122] and added to the total number of 
male migrants, it seems as though of every ten Bantu modern 
sector workers as many as eight may be normally resident outside 
the sector. (7) 
(7) As the policy of separate development gains momentum, the 
political control of a large number of these workers will 
presumably pass to the Homeland government authorities in 
fact and not simply in theory. If this is indeed the 
case, control over a large percentage of the modern 
sectors' Bantu labour supply will greatly enhance the 
bargaining position of these governments vis a vis that 
of the White government. 
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TABLE 4.3 THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF MIGRANT LABOUR IN 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY IN 1970. (8) 
. All Domestic Foreign Migrants 
Male migrants as a percentage 
of all economically active 
males in South Africa 20 8 28 
Male migrants as a percentage 
of economically active Bantu 
males in South Africa 32 11 43 
All migrants as a percentage 
of the economically active 
Bantu population 27 8 35 
Male migrants as a percentage 
of the economically active 
Bantu males in White Areas 43 16 59 
Male migrants as a percentage 
of economically active Bantu male~ 
in White areas outside agri-
culture I( 9 ) 63 22 85 
Male migrants from Homeland 
rural areas as a percentage 
of the economically active 
males still in the Homeland 
areas 120 - -
Unemployment of Bantu males 
in White areas as a percen-
tage of migration 
(10) 7 19 5 
(8) Estimated from data in Table 4.1 and from Report 02-02-02. 
Population Census 1970. Bantu Age, Occupation, Industry, 
School Standard and Birthplace. Department of Statistics, 
Pretoria, March 1973. 
(9) Workers in the modern sector consist of economically 
active African males in White areas apart from those 
employed in agriculture from Report 02-02-02. 
(10) Unemployment of Bantu Males estimated at 49% of unemployed 
and unspecified Bantu Males in White areas. 49% is the 
percentage "unemployed" to "unemployed and unspecified" 
for all Bantu Males in South Africa in 1970. Report 
02-02-02. Table 6. 
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From the Homeland viewpoint, on average, for every five econ-
omically active men in the Bantu Rural Homeland areas, there 
are six more absent from home, working as migrant labourers. 
In some districts, such as Nkandla and Msinga in KwaZulu, the 
ratio of migrants to economically active males in the district 
is as high as seven to three. The existence of such a large 
stream of out-migrants is obviously of substantial economic 
significance to these areas and will be discussed in a later 
chapter. 
Since economic development implies structural change and such 
change results from the existence of imbalances in the economic 
forces, in a development situation one might accept an im-
balance in the labour supply, even one of the size suggested by 
the statistics given above, if it was felt that it would be 
only of a temporary nature. Unfortunately in South Africa this 
is not the case. The data in Table 4.4, which gives estimates 
of the number of migrants from the rural areas of South Africa 
on the census dates in 1936, 1946, 1960 and 1970, shows clearly 
that the situation has grown steadily worse as South Africa has 
developed. Far from a.general reallocation of the population, 
in response to changing geographical demand patterns for labour, 
continuing development in South Africa has meant a continued 
growth in the size of the stream of temporary migrants. 
Over the thirty four year period covered by the estimates in 
Table 4.4 the number of migrants from South Africa's rural areas 




AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF AFRICAN TEMPORARY MIGRANTS 
ABSENT FROM SOUTH AFRICA'S RURAL AREAS ON THE CENSUS 
DATES IN 1936, 1946, 1960 AND 1970. 
Number Male Growth Rate per Annum 
of Migration Migration from Economically 




in South Africa Population 
E F 
1936 476 000 25 (A) 
,,21 I 
t3 00 ::: / ( 1,9 
(A) 
1946 537 000 22 (B) 
(B) 
3,6 f 6 ~3'7 , 29 (C) r 1960 887 000 2,1 ( (C) 2,8 J 3,0 1970 1 295 000 34 (D) 3,9 3,7 (D) '" 
A From Tables AB.l and AB.2 in Appendix A which show the estimations of 409 000 
male migrants and 67 000 female migrants in 1936. The Tomlinson Commission [263] 
estimated this figure to be 447 000 persons. 
B From Tables A7.1 and A7.2 in Appendix A which show the estimation of 415 000 
male migrants and 122 000 female migrants in 1946. 
C From Table A6.l and A6.2 in Appendix A which show the estimates of 671 000 
male migrants and 216 000 female migrants in 1960. 
D From Table A5.1 and A5.2 in Appendix A which shows the estimates of 1 035 000 
male and 260 0,00 female migrants in 1970. 
E Estimated from data contained in the 1960 and 1970 Population Census Reports 
reported in the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Dec. 1973. Department of 
Statistics, Pretoria. Note - as there was a change in the basis for estimating 
the economically active Bantu Population during this period, this growth rate 
may be biased slightly upwards. 
F Growth rate of population in the rural areas on the census dates + migrants 
from the area in column 2. Population from South African Statistics 1974. 
Department of Statistics, Pretoria, 1974. [249] 
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addition, the male migration rate rose by 36 per cent; from 25 
per cent of the males aged 15-64 years to 34 per cent of this age 
group. Over the period 1946-1970 the number of migrant workers 
grew faster than did the number of economically active Bantu; 
3,7 per cent: 2,8 per cent. In the ten years 1960-70 the rate 
of increase in migration was 1 per cent greater than that of the 
economically active Bantu. 
It is also interesting to note that the rate of out migration by 
temporary migrants has exceeded the rate of growth of the Bantu 
population in the rural areas in all periods apart from the ten 
year period 1936-1946, when they were identical. Over the 34 
year period 1936-1970 the rate of out migration by temporary 
migrants was 1 per cent higher than the rate of growth of the 
rural population. 
Apart from providing a substantial portion of South Africa's 
modern sector labour force, the large number of migrants mater-
ially alters the structure of that work force. It is a well 
known and frequently observed fact that migration, as a process, 
is age, sex and educational level selective, in that the propen-
sity to migrate is higher amongst young adUlt males with above 
average levels of education. Browning & Feindt [29] Eldridge[48] 
Herrick [7l] Schultz [180] . 
4.3.2 Education Selection among South African Domestic Migrants 
Unfortunately there is a lack of direct evidence which would 
permit a comparison of the educational profile, of those 
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individuals who migrate to the modern sector, with those remaining 
in the rural districts. However, if one compares the educational 
profiles of the populations of the two areas with the school-
going populations, one can obtain some data which supports the 
hypothesis, that migrants are drawn from those individuals, who 
enjoy above average educational levels in the supplying region 
Speare [191]. Table 4.5 shows a comparison of the educational 
profiles of Africans in the White Areas of South Africa and those 
resident in the Homeland regions, and compares them with the 
African school-going populations in the two regions. 
The data in Table 4.5 implies that the rate of migration, amongst 
the higher educated, is greater than it is amongst individuals 
with less schooling. The number of African children enrolled in 
primary schools in White areas is almost the same as the number 
in the Homeland Regions. It appears, therefore, that out of every 
twelve African children who receive full primary school education, 
six are educated in schools in the White areas and six in Homeland 
schools. Of these twelve children two continue their education, 
one in each area, and ten seek work; three in the Homelands and 
six in the White areas of South Africa. As the level of educa-
tion increases, so the rate of out-migration from the Homeland 
areas among the education cohort rises. Out of every fourteen 
children completing primary school plus two additional years, 
seven are educated in Homeland schools, one of these continues 
his education further, three seek work in the Homeland and three 
migrate to the White areas. At the educational level of primary 
school plus four years, the rate of out-migration from the Home-
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TABLE 4.5 A COMPARISON OF THE EDUCATIONAL PROFILES OF 
AFRICAN 'MALESIN HOMELAND 'ANDWHITE 'REGIONS 
OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE SCHOOL GOING 
POPULATIONS IN THE AREASIN 1970. (11) 
Ratio of individuals out Ratio of school 
of school with the stan- enrolments at 
Standard dard to those in school the standard in 
attained in that standard in 1970 white areas to 
Bantu White that in Homelands 
Homelands Areas 
A B C 
3 full years 
of primary 
education ,62 ,S 1,1 




education ,95 1,8 1,2 
Full pr imary 
education 2,6 6,3 1,0 
Primary 
school plus 
2 years 3,2 8,8 ,9 
Primary 
school plus 
4-5 years 1,2 20,0 ,2 
A From column D in Table A.IO in Appendix A. 
BFrom column H in Table A.IO in Appendix A. 
C Estimated from data given in the Department of Bantu 
Education Annual Report 1971 RP3l/1973. {268] 
(11) Estimated from the number of individuals in the two regions 
that had attained the level of education at the census date 
1970, from Population Census Report 02-02~2 Department of 
Statistics, [260] ' School enrolments in the regions 
" from the Department of Bantu Education Annual Report 1971. 
[268]. Pretoria. Details of these calculations are 
contained in Table A.IO in Appendix A. 
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land, hy memhers of the. cohort reaches. ninety per cent. 
If the provision of schooling facilities in the Homeland areas in 
recent years bas grown more rapidly than the provision of schools 
for African children in White areas, which indeed seems to be the 
case, this type of analysis overstates the extent of out-migration 
from the echelons of the better educated. Nonetheless, it is un-
likely to affect the general conclusion that will remain valid, 
namely that , although sixty per cent of all African children in 
school are in schools in the Homelands; seventy five per cent of 
the African men with primary school education and two further 
years are resident in the White areas ~ The proportion of this 
educational cohort that is working outside the Homelands will be 
still greater. Out-migration of such levels must drastically re-
duce the social rate of re.turn on investment in education in the 
Homelands. If the system of migratory labour is to be maintained 
and with the present magnitudes, there is 'clearly no alternative: 
education in the Homelands should be financed directly by the 
central government as the social rate of return on investment in 
education to the Homelands themselves is likely to be so low that 
any cost benefit analysis undertaken to rank projects will prefer 
almost any other project to investment in education. This would 
however not be the case either if consumption was valued highly 
per se or if the contribution of the educated, who remain, was 
sufficiently high to compensate for the loss of the men who 
migrate. 
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4.3.3 South African Domestic Temporary Migration as an Age 
Selective Process 
It has been found in nearly all studies of the phenomenon of 
labour migration that the process is highly age selective and that 
the propensity to migrate is highest amongst young adult males, 
for example Schultze [180] Lee [108] • Table 4.6 gives the age 
specific migration rates and the cumulative age distributions of 
the streams of temporary migrants from South Africa's rural areas 
in 1936, 1946, 1960 and 1970. The data in Table 4.6 again confirms 
the overall conclusions that young adults have a high propensity 
to migrate but it is interesting to note that this propensity does 
not in fact decline very rapidly. In 1970 for example in the age 
cohort 20-24 years, 44 out of every 100 men in the age cohort were 
away on the census date, however, amongst the men aged 35-39 -
fifteen years older on average - there were still 38 out of every 
100 absent from home. This is an indication of the fact that 
migration in South Africa has become institutionalised as a way 
. of life among the men in the black rural communities, and is no 
longer viewed as an "adventure" or even a challenge. 
The other interesting feature of the data presented in Table 4.6 
is the way that the age specific migration rates have altered as 
the system has become institutionalised. In 1936 the age spec i-
fic migration rate reached a peak of 42 per cent in the age 
cohort 20-24. By 1970 the maximum age specific rate had in-
creased to 50 per cent, and this rate was reached in the age 
cohort 25-29, and was still as high as 49 per cent in the age 
cohort 30-34 years. In addition if one compares the ratios for 
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TABLE 4-.6 TIME TRENDS IN AGE SPECIFIC MIGRATION RATES FOR AFRICAN 
MALES FROM SOUTH AFRICA'S RURAL AREAS FOR THE 
PERIOD 1936-1970(12) 
Age Specific 0 Cumulative Age Age Migration Rate 70 
Cohort 
1936 194-6 1960 1970 1936 194-6 
A B C D A B 
15-19 10 13 24- 20 7 11 
20-24- 4-2 39 4-4 44 35 39 
25-29 33 32 39 50 52 59 
30-34 38 32 4-0 49 72 77 
35-39 24 18 34 38 82 85 
40-4-4 25 17 28 31 91 92 
45-4-9 7 21 94 
50-54 1 14 . 7 27 100 98 
55-65 8 12 100 
Average 25 22 29 34 
A from Table A8.1 columns 7 and 9 respectively. 
B from Table A7.1 columns 7 and 9. 
C from Table A6.1 columns 7 and 9. 













(12) Estimated on the basis outlined in Appendix A using the detailed 
tables in the Appendix A8.1, A7.1, A6.1 and A5.1 which are based 
on data obtained from Report 02- 02-02, Population Census, [260] 
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the 1936 and 1970 census estimates, the two censuses that are 
quoted as being the most accurate, one can see that in all age 
cohorts the migration rate has increased, but the greatest diff-
erences lie in the youngest cohort where the propensity to migrate 
has doubled, and the age groups over 40 where in 1936 almost no-
one migrated whereas in 1970 26 out of every 100 men in the age 
group 40-65 were absent as migrants. 
Over time it seems that the migration stream has grown partly 
because populations have grown, partly because more young men 
migrate and partly because the period of migration has increased 
substantially. In 1936 the average time spent away from home by a 
migrant was 13 years; by 1970 this period had increased to 19 years. 
The migration stream has grown by 3 per ce.nt per annum but the 
length of absence has grown by a further 50 per cent over the 
period 1936 - 1956. This means that the average potential supply 
of man years by the migrant labourers has increased from 
6 188 000 in 1936 to 24 605 000 in 1970(13) which is an annual 
compound growth rate of four per cent against three per cent for 
the growth in the number of migrants alone. Of the total increase 
in the supply of labour from the migrant labour system, therefore, 
3 per cent can be attributed to an increase in the number of in-
dividuals entering the system and a further one per cent is due 
(13) The average potential labour supply is estimated by 
mUltiplying the number of migrants in 1936 from Table 4 
by the average length of stay estimated in 1936 
i.e. 476000 x 13 = 6 188 000. 
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to the fact that the migrants remain in the modern sector for 
substantially longer periods on average than was the case in 1936. 
The effect that the migrant labour force has on the modern sector 
will be tempered by the characteristics of the proportion of the 
sector's labour force that are not migrants. Table 4.7 compares 
the age structures of several different component parts of the 
labour force in the modern sector. 
The high proportion of young men among the migrants, coupleq 
with the large absolute size of the stream of migrants vis a vis 
the size of the African work force, means that the migrants have 
a substantial impact on the overall age distribution of South 
Africa's labour supply. This can be seen in the data contained 
in Table 4.7. 
The statistics in Table 4.7 are not wholly consistent as the 
basis on which the estimates of the stabilised labour force have 
been made includes the unemployed and unemployable African males 
who are not migrants, in the labour force. However, so long as 
unemployment is not age selective, i.e. the unemployed are 
equally distributed percentage wise throughout the age distribu-
tion, some useful inferences can be drawn from this data. It is 
evident that the percentage age distribution of the domestic 
migrants differs significantly from that of the permanently 
(14) 
settled worker. Eighty one per cent of the domestic migrant 
(14) A X2 test on the data in the first two columns of Table 
4.7 gives the following result: 
X2 = 25,75 (8 d.f.) significant at all levels. 
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TABLE 4.7 THE COMPARATIVE AGE DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN MALE 
MIGRANTS: PERMANENTLY SETTLED AFRICAN WORKERS AND 
THE TOTAL AFRICAN LABOUR FORCE IN 1970(15) 
Percentage of Group in Each Age Category 
Age Zulu Total 
Group Permanently Domestic Foreign Homeland African Settled Migrants Migrants Rural Male Work Workers Migrants Force 
A B C D E 
14-19 13 12 6 13 12 
20-24 15 20 25 18 17 
25-29 12 21 20 18 16 
30-34 10 18 15 16 13 
35-39 12 10 11 10 12 
40-44 11 7 8 11 10 
45-49 10 4 7 5 8 
50-54 7 5 5 5 6 
55-64 10 3 3 4 . 6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
A from column 8 in Table A.ll in Appendix A. 
B the age distribution calculated from the population estimated in 
column 3 Table A.ll in Appendix A. 
C Age distribution of the population estimated in column 4 of Table 
A.ll. 
D From Table A .13 column 4 in Appendix A. 
E From column 7 in Table A.llin Appendix A. 
(15) Estimated ,from data contained in Report 02-02-02-
[260], and The Department of Bantu Education Annual Report 
1971, [268]. Details of the estimations of the data on 
which the age distributions in Table 7 are based are 
contained in Table A.1I and Table A,13 in Appendix A. 
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labour population is under forty years of age, whereas only 62 
per cent of the stabilised work force is under forty. The 
weighted average age of the domestic migrant labour force is 25 
years, whereas that of stabilised labour is 35 years. 
It is also apparent from Table 4.7 that migrants on average 
retire from work in the modern sector earlier than do the stabil-
ised workers. Of the migrants entering the labour force at 20 
years of age, half will retire before they reach 40 years of age 
and three quarters by the age of 50 years. T~e average length 
of the working life in the modern sector of- a migrant labourer 
is 19 years, whereas that of his stabilised colleague is 23 years, 
a. difference of 20 per cent. 
The fact that the migrant retires to his homeland at an earlier 
age than an urbanised worker means that this practice will result 
in a wastage of potential output in all instances where the mar-
ginal product of labour in the modern sector exceeds that in the 
homelands. In addition, the increased labour turnover rate, that 
is implied by the shorter working life of the migrant, is likely 
to result in additional resources being allocated to the training 
and recruitment of labour. It is this aspect of the migratory 
labour system in South Africa coupled with the heavy investment 
of time and physical resources in transport that the system im-
plies, that has lead to it being labelled "wasteful" by economists 
such as Hobart Houghton [77J p.87-91 and Hutt [88J who goes as 
far as to say; 
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"Had the Africans been aUowed - let alone 
encouraged - to develop as a normal town 
community there can be little doubt that 
their contribution to the value of the work 
performed would have been incomparably 
larger. The nwnber of days worked would 
have increased and output per head have 
been improved". [88 ] P. 93. 
This type of static allocation of resources analysis will seldom 
yield the correct answer to a problem in a dynamic setting be-
cause it assumes perfect knowledge, foresight and mobility, all 
of which are lacking in the real world. Whether or not the aban-
donment of the migratory labour system would increase output or 
not will depend upon the effect that this change has on invest-
ment levels, labour productivity and changes in techniques and 
cannot be answered simply. A general investigation into this par-
ticular aspect of. South Africa's developm~nt is both highly fas-
cinating and long overdue, but it is unfortunately beyond the 
scope of this present research project and although a later sec-
tion of this chapter will be addressed to this question it will 
·be limited to a few general observations. (16) 
However, it should be noted t hat as long as the Homelands are 
unable to support their adult male population on a standard that 
compares with the wage rates paid in South Africa's modern sector 
. , 
this difference between the work habits of the m1grant and non-
migrant labourer serves as a means of distributing the total wage 
(16) See Section 4.5. 
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payments to migrant workers amongst a larger number of Homeland 
recipients. Thus the migratory labour system as it is at present 
ensures a more egalitarian income distribution in the Homeland 
areas than would be the case had a smaller number of men migrated 
for a longer average period. 
4.4 Regional Migration Patterns 
As individual decisions to migrate are made in terms of the rela-
tive strengths of 'the variables in the migration equation and 
the strengths of the variables are likely to be common to par-
ticular age cohorts and to particular regions, it is quite likely 
that migration patterns will show substantial variations, both of 
a quantitative and a qualitative nature, between regions. 
Occupations taken up by migrants may also show a regional bias. 
Men from a specific area may show a preference for work in a 
particular industry or for a specific destination. This is in-
deed likely to be the case, since it is argued by Lee [108] and 
others, that migration streams set up counter streams of informa-
tion and so tend to reinforce the size and direction of the 
initial stream of migrants. Similarly, differences in the loca-
tion of popUlation groups and of industries imply that there will 
be inter-regional variations in the behaviour patterns of the 
migrants. 
Differences of this nature imply that the impact of migrants from 
anyone area will vary between supplying regions from both the 
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demand and the supply viewpoint. A detailed analysis of this 
type of impact would require fieldwork amongst the migrants them-
selves but some initial groundwork working towards isolating 
such differences can be done from the aggregated data. Table 
4.8 shows the age specific migration rates for the four major 
African groups as a first step towards isolating any regional 
differences. 
One striking feature of the data in the table is the remarkable 
degree of consistency in the behaviour patterns of the age 
cohorts of migrants from the four major supplying language 
(17) .. h f . groups. The probablllty t at a young man rom KwaZulu In 
the 20-24 year age cohort, will migrate from his home regions is 
much the same as that of a similar young man from Bophutswana. 
Similarly the average migration rates of adult males from the 
rural districts do not differ significantly from the mean rate of 
52 per cent, (standard deviation 2,87) neither does the average 
time spent, throughout the adult working life span, in the modern 
sector by each group differ f rom the mean of 19,98 years (stan-
dard deviation ,21). However, it should be noted that the 
(17) X2 tests were performed on the propensities to migrate 
among the different age groups and they did not y,ield 
significant results. The greatest deviation in behaviour 
patterns occurs between the Xhosa and the Pedi. The 
value of X2 in this case is 13,02 (9 degrees of freedom) 
















AGE SPECIFIC MALE MIGRATION RATES FROM THE HOMELAND 
RURAL AREAS FOR THE XHOSA, THE ZULU, THE PEDI AND 
THE TSWANA PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN 1970. 
Age Specific Percentage of Migrants in 
Migration Rates Age Category or Younger 
Xhosa Zulu Pedi Tswana Xhosa Zulu Pedi Tswana 
(Ciskei (Kwa (Leb- (Bophut-
and Zulu) owa) hat swan a 
Trans-
kei) 
A B C D A B C D 
% % % % % % % % 
26 34 23 26 10 13 8 11 
60 60 69 65 29 31 28 31 
67 67 78 71 47 49 48 49 
63 67 72 68 62 65 62 63 
61 59 72 69 75 75 76 75 
58 61 61 59 86 86 85 84 
42 42 58 48 93 91 93 90 
33 47 35 56 97 96 96 97 
19 29 25 23 100 100 100 100 
49 52 56 52 
the 
A Estimated from migration estimates made on the basis outlined in 
Appendix A from data in Report 02-02-02. Population Census 1970. 
Bantu Age, Occupation, Industry, School Standard and Birth Place. 
Department of Statistics, [260] Details of the estimate are con-
tained in Table Al.2 in Appendix A. 98 per cent of Xhosa in 
homeland rural areas in 1970 were resident in the Transkei or 
Ciskei rural areas. 
B From Table A13 in Appendix A. 96 per cent of Zulu resident in 
homeland rural areas in 1970 were in KwaZulu rural areas. 
C From Table A14 in Appendix A. Pedi in Homeland Rural Areas. 90 
per cent were resident in Lebowa rural areas in 1970. 
D From Table A15 in Appendix A. Tswana in rural Homeland areas. 
98 per cent were resident in Bophuthatswana rural areas in 1970. 
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migrants from the Homeland areas appear to spend on average at 
least one year longer in the modern sector than do the migrants 
from the other rural areas. The average length of stay for the 
population migrants from South Africa's rural area is 19 years 
against the average of 20 years for the migrants from the Home-
land rural areas of the four main Bantu language groups shown in 
Table 4.B. 
An analysis of the distribut i on of migrants by industry, however, 
does reveal that some regional or ethnic group preferences exist. 
Table 4.9 gives an estimate of the industrial distribution of 
migrants in the modern sector of the economy. 
Subject to the reliabilities of the surrogates used in Table 4.9, 
some interesting facts emerge. Apart from the Zulu and the Pedi, 
who have been assumed to behave in the same manner due to a lack 
of alternative data, there is a significant difference in the in-
dustrial distribution patterns of all the populations shown in 
Table 4.9. (19) The migrants from each of the groups not only 
differed in their industrial distribution from that of migrants 
from other groups, but also from the distribution of all Repub-
lican Africans, indicating firstly that men from particular 
groups have their specialised work destinations in the modern 
sector and secondly that the migrants as a group find different 
industrial job locations from the urbanised African workers. 
(19) The relevant X2 values for Table 4.9 are given in 






ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANTS BY INDUSTRY OUTSIDE 
(18) 
HOMELAND AREAS IN SOUTH AFRICA IN 1970. 
Percentage of Group Employed in the Industry 
Xhosa Zulu Tswana Pedi Foreign All 
Africans Repub-
Trans- Cis- lican 
kei kei Africans 
A B C D E F G 
26 29 27 4 27 8 13 
44 13 1 11 1 80 9 
Manufacturing 11 25 15 11 15 3 20 
Construction 8 15 17 21 17 2 10 
Trade & ) 
Finance ) 3 2 8 2 1 8 
) 4 
1 1 2 1 1 Transport -
) 
Services ) 7 24 35 24 3 26 
Public 
Sector 8 7 13 8 13 3 13 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Low wage 
sector H 70 49 52 50 52 91 48 
High wage 
sector I 30 51 48 50 48 9 52 
A Estimated from data in the Transkei Government Department of Interior. 
Statistical Labour Report, 1971. Umtata 1972. [271] 
B Estimated from data in the Annual Report of the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development 1971. Xhosa from the Ciskei placed in 
employment outside the homeland by the district labour bureaux in 1971. 
P.68. RP.41/73. [267] 
(Notes on Table 4.8 contd. overleaf ... 
(18) Migrants here include male and female migrants but since the 
percentage of females who migrate is approximately 10 per cent of 
the males their inclusion is not likely to distort the patterns 
significantly. 
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C The occupational distribution of the Pedi migrants has 
been used as a surrogate for that of the Zulu 
The Pedi distribution was chosen as there 
was not a significant difference between the occupa-
tional distribution of all Pedi males and that of all 
Zulu males. (X2 6,81 8 degrees of freedom which is 
not significant at the 50 per cent level.) This simi-
larity in work patterns was assumed to hold also for 
the migrants from each group, as no other data for the 
Zulu migrants could be located. 
D Estimated from data in the Annual Report of the Depart-
ment of Bantu Administration, RP.41/1973 [26] P. 31. 
E Estimated from Report RP.41/1973,[267] P. 42. 
F Taken from a reply by the Minister of Bantu Affairs to 
a question in the House of Assembly on 5th March, 1971. 
Hansard col. 5 384-386 quoted in Survey of Race Rela-
tions in South Africa 1971. Vol. 25. S.A.I.R.R. 
January 1972. [81] 
G As A above. 
H Agriculture, Mining and Service Sectors. 
I Manufacturing, Commerce and the Public Sector. 
If, however, one reduces the job opportunities in the modern 
sector to two categories, jobs in the high wage sector, manufac-
turing, commerce and the public sector and jobs in low wage sec-
tor, agriculture, mining and services, a somewhat different pic-
ture emerges. Migrants from the Transkei and foreign migrants 
are predominantly found in the low wage sector and these distri-
but ions both differ significantly from the overall distribution 
of all South African Africans. Migrants from the Ciskei, 
Bophuthatswana, Lebowa and KwaZulu (by assumption) are found to be 
spread almost equally between the two sectors and in no case do 
migrants from these populations show a significant deviation from 
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the job distribution of all domestic Africans. 
Oscillating migrants from the Transkei and the areas outside the 
Republic make a substantial contribution to the labour supply of 
the mining industry, 44 and 80 per cent of the migrants from 
these groups being found in that industry, but otherwise migrant 
workers fit into South Africa's labour supply in much the same 
way as their settled counterparts l glthough the high level of 
aggregation in the data may conceal some inter-industry differ-
ences. Similarly migrants, apart from the foreign migrants and 
(19) 
those from the Transkei area, appear to have the same chance of 
obtaining a well-paid job as the urbanised settled worker. This 
indicates that, at least as far as the employers of labour are 
concerned, apart from the mining industry, there seems to be no 
marked preferences for or prejUdices against migrant labour. 
Further indirect evidence supporting the view that employers 
have adjusted almost totally to the migrant labour system is pro-
vided by the survey of Nattrass and Duncan [141] which found that 
the attitudes of employers towards Black Trade Unions and Works 
Committees did not differ depending upon whether they were em-
ployers of migrant labourers or not. 
(19) Transkeian migrants together with foreign migrants do appear 
to be concentrated in the lower paid jobs, to a significant-
ly greater degree than the migrants from the other Homelands. 
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4.5.1 The Impact of the Migrant Labour System on Capital 
Accumulation in the Modern Sector. 
Any impact that the migratory labour system has had upon the 
growth path followed by the South African economy will have oper-
ated through the influence exerted on both the size and distribu-
tion of the economy's investible surplus. There are two main 
schools of thought on this matter; the school comprising the 
"liberal" or free market views of economists such as Hobart 
Houghton [77] and Hutt [88] referred to earlier and the Neo ' 
Marxist School whose opinions are represented by the writings of 
Legassick [109] [110] and Wolpe [240]. The views of these two 
schools will be outlined briefly below. 
4.5.1 The Migratory Labour System and Capital Accumulation -
the Neoclassical View. 
Economists working within the Neo - Classical paradigm agree that, 
from an economic standpoint, the maintenance of the migratory 
labour system and indeed the wider controls on labour productivity 
in general in South Africa, are 'irrational' from an economic 
standpoint. The migratory labour system and its attendant legis-
lation they see as the result of the interaction of both economic 
and social forces, such as the market forces resulting from econ-
omic growth; the cultural forces that act to tie sections of the 
African population to their tribal lands and racial distrust that 
has resulted in pressure on successive governments to keep cer-
tain areas and jobs as the preserve of the White. 
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Since the system is a reaction to forces apart from simple market 
forces, economists in this school see it as representing a major 
market imperfection and consequently they believe that the system 
has acted to retard the rate of growth of the modern sector. 
Should it be eliminated they argue, this would result in an in-
crease in the overall level of output. This increase would come 
from two major sources; firstly it would result from the transfer 
of resources currently tied up in running the system, such as the 
maintenance costs of the labour bureaux and the additional trans-
port requirements, to more productives uses and secondly output 
would increase because the stabilisation of the labour supply 
would increase the productivity of labour· Stabilisation would 
facilitate the acquisition of skills by those who are at present 
inhibited by the 'footloose' nature of the migrant labour system. 
As the migrant labour system is seen as a ·force that reduces out-
put, it is also seen as a force reducing the rate of capital 
accumulation in the economy and so is viewed as acting to reduce 
not only the present level of output but also the future rate of 
growth. 
4.5.2 The Migrant Labour System and Capital Accumulation -
The Neo-Marxist View. 
The Neo- Marxist school argue, on the other hand, with some indi-
vidual variations, that the successful development that has 
occurred in the modern sector, far from being hampered by the 
migratory labour system, is both the direct result of and the 
cause of its maintenance. In terms of this paradigm economic 
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development by the capitalist mode requires the. generation of a 
labour supply. The lower the cost at which it is possible to 
generate this supply of 'free labour' the greater the surplus 
value that can be expropriated by the capitalist class, the 
greater the investible surplus in the economy and consequently 
the greater the rate of economic growth in the capitalist sector. 
Wolpe[240] and Legassick[llO] argue that the migratory labour 
system was established by the early capitalists after the dis-
covery of diamonds and gold and was maintained by successive 
generations of capitalists, White agricultural interests and the 
'state' by means of deliberate interference with the market 
forces operating on the supply of labour, as it represented the 
means by which it was possible to maximise the investible surplus 
in the modern sector. These writers go on to argue that the 
policy of 'separate development' emerged as a means to maintain 
the supply of 'cheap labour' beyond the point where under 'normal' 
economic development, labour's bargaining power would have grown 
sufficiently to force an increase in its share in output. 
Far from being a market imperfection that hinders South Africa's 
economic growth the migrant labour system is seen as being one of 
major forces of growth. Wolpe [240] argues that the system 
facilitates the expropriation and appropriation by the modern 
sector of the traditional or pre-capitalist sector's investible 
surplus. The system, by maintaining the pre-capitalist mode 
of production, enables the modern sector to pay its labour at a 
rate below that required for the "reproduction of labour" and 
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this would not have been possible if the modern sector had 
had to pay wages at a level necessary to support their workers and 
their dependents. Legassick [110] argues that by maintaining the 
separation of the working class by 'artificial' means, separate 
development offers a way of keeping down labour costs. The main-
tenance of the Homeland social structure has a retarding influence 
on the rate at which labour's "horizon's"expand and so reduces the 
rate of growth of the cost of 'necessary labour' to the capitalist 
sector. 
"The perrpetuation of separate b "lack and 
white societies in South Africa~ even under 
conditions where the precapita"list economic 
base of b"lack society has eroded must~ there-
fore~ be seen as an attempt by capita"l to re-
tain the "lowness of the 'necessary wants' and 
therefore the 'va"lue' of b"lack "labour power" 
Legassick [110] p . 19. 
In addition, by separating out the functions of government the 
capitalist sector is able to transfer some of the 'proper cost' 
of labour such as portion of the costs of the provision of social 
security and education to the Homeland governments. 
In addition, as this analysis is carried out within a Marxist 
framework, labour's share of output is seen as being determined 
by the relative strengths of the classes who share in the output. 
The migratory labour system i t is argued, encourages a footloose 
labour force and so has mitigated against attempts to organize 
migrant labourers. Trapido [205]. This lack of organization has 
reduced black labour's bargaining power and consequently its 
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(20 ) 
share of the local output of the economy. 
Writers in the Neo-Marxist tradition deny the arguments advanced 
by Hobart Houghton [77] and Hutt [88] , namely that the migrant 
labour system is wasteful due to the fact that it reduces 
labour productivity, but argue instead that, whilst capital 
accumulation is normally accompanied by an increase in the capi-
tal labour ratio and so by a concomitant increase in labour pro-
ductivity, this does not necessarily imply an automatic need for 
a more highly trained labour force. These writers point out that the 
adoption of more capital intensive techniques has a tendency to 
'de-skill' workers, and so may in fact require a lower level of 
labour training and skill than the more labour intensive tech-
niques of production that are likely to have a far higher 'craft' 
component. 
4.5.3 The Magnitude of the 'Trade Off' between the Two 
Paradigms. 
There is no easy way of assessing the impact that the migratory 
labour system has had upon capital accumulation and growth in the 
modern sector of the economy in terms of these two opposing and 
mutually exclusive paradigms. In fact since the wages paid, the 
productivity levels currently prevailing and people's outlooks, 
(20) The migratory labour system is not the only factor nor 
even the major factor working against the emergence of a 
powerful Black Union Movement in South Africa. Black 
Trade Unions whilst not illegal, have been a continual 
focus of antagonistic action by the State. 
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opinions and decisions are in any case largely - if not wholly -
determined by the set of economic, social and political forces 
within which they operate, one can perhaps question the validity 
of even attempting to undertake such a comparison. 
It would appear however,that a valid course of action would be 
one that attempted an indirect assessment of the relative posi-
tions postulated by the two opposing paradigms by means of a com-
parison of the relative sizes of the ~radeoffs implied. One 
could, for example, attempt to measure the magnitude of the gains 
that accrue from certain aspects of the migrant labour system and 
then compare these gains with the costs implied by the alternative 
paradigm. 
One of the more obvious benefits that the modern sector of South 
African economy has received from the continuance of the migrant 
labour system is that it was not forced to divert investment from 
directly productive activities to social overhead investment to 
provide for the additional cost of housing and educating the 
migrant worker's family in the modern sector. (21) 
(21) In cases where labour is paid a wage well above the 
subsistence level it may be possible for the firm to 
pass on the cost of housing its workforce to the worker 
himself in part. Where wages are very low; however, 
this possibility no longer exists and the firm has 
either (1) to provide the housing itself, or (2) to 
increase wage rates to allow the worker to provide 
housing, or (3) appeal to the State to take up the 
burden in which case the capitalist may be able to pass 
on some portion of his labour costs to other tax payers 
but will still bear a large part himself in the form of 
tax payments. 
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If one estimates the size of such savings, it is then possible 
in terms of a 'growth model to assess the contribution that 
savings of such magnitude would make to the growth of the output 
of the sector in which they are invested. This would then give 
one ~ yardstic~ with which one would be able to answer a question 
of the following nature: 
By how much can the productivity of a migrant 
worker fall below that of a settled labourer 
without the economy being any the worse off 
than it would have been if it had developed 
with a settled work force? 
In other words it will enable some attempt to be made to 
establish the relative sizes of the 'trade offs' implied by 
the two paradigms. 
Table 4.10 contains an estimate of the size of the contribution made 
to South Africa's Gross Domestic Product over the period 1934 -
1970 by transferring investment funds from, housing to directly 
productive investment. Such an estimate is of necessity tenta-
tive and is highly sensitive to the assumptions that are made in 
its calculation and should consequently be treated with caution. 
The data in Table 4.10 is drawn from the differences in costs of 
providing single and family housing in the relevant years. De-
tails of the sources of the data and of the assumptions under- I 
lying the calculations are contained in Table A17 of Appendix A. 
Briefly these calculations are based on the following assumptions. 
(1) That the savings on housing resulting from the migrant 
labour system are invested and not consumed. 
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TABLE 4.10 AN ESTIMATE OF THE CONTRIBUTION TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT THAT HAS 
RESULTED FROM THE PERPETUATION OF THE MIGRATORY LABOUR SYSTEM(22) 
Saving on Migrant Capital Increase in Gross Domestic Output Per Annum 
Labour System Output + Re Investment Year 
Assuming Migrants Ratio 
cent f eight are Housed three per cent five per per cent 
A B C D 
, 
E , 
1936 71 400 000 3,0 65 000 000 125 000 000 I 326 000 000 
1946 43 920 000 2,03 30 000 000 50 000 000 137 000 000 
1960 402 500 000 2,3 180 000 000 219 000 000 378 000 000 
1970 612 000 000 2,22 276 000 000 276 000 000 276 000 000 
1 129 820 000 551 000 000 670 000 000 1 117 000 000 
per cent of Gross 
Domestic Product 6% 7% 12% 
1970 at 1963 
prices 
A From the end column in Table A.17 in Appendix A. 
B 1936 capital output ratio taken on 3 Capital Output Ratio for 1946, 1960 and 
1970 were obtained from B.L. de Jager 'The Fixed Capital Stock and Capital 
Output ratio of South Africa 1946-1972'. 
Bulletin - June 1973. 
South African Reserve Bank Quarterly 
C Compounding at 3 per cent implies a rate of reinvestment of 9 per cent of 
output with a capital output ratio of 3. 
D Compounding at 5 per cent implies a rate of reinvestment of 15 per cent with 
a capital output ratio of 3. 
E Compounding at 8 per cent implies a rate of reinvestment of twenty four per cent 
with a capital-output ratio of 3. 
(22) In every case the contribution to 1970 output made by failing to stabilise the 
migrant labour system has been estimated by the following method. 
Savings on Housing in 
Year T 
Capital output ratio 
where n = 1970 - t 
I n 
(1 + V) = 6Y¥170 
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(2) That every new migrant into the modern sector would have 
required family housing eventually in the modern sector. 
(3) That the housing would have been provided in 1936 for all 
migrants in the sector in that year, in 1946 to all new net 
migrants between 1936-1946; in 1960 for the increase be-
tween 1946 and 1960; ' and in 1970 for the increase between 
1960 and 1970. 
The basis of the calculations made in Table 4.10 implies an under-
lying growth model of the Harrod Domar type namely 
l:i.y 1970 = 





in 1970 that results from the savings on housing due 
to the migrant labour system in the year t. 
I is the amount transferred to Investment from 
t 
housing in the year t subject to the assumptions 
made in Table A17. 
Vt 
is the capital output ratio in the South African 
economy in year t from de Jager [42] . 
I is the assumed rate of reinvestment. 
V is the assumed capital output ratio for the re-
investment taken as 3 in all cases which when com-
pared with de Jager's [42] estimates is conservative. 
6) n is the number of years between t and 1970 where t 
is taken as 1936, 1946, 1960 and 1970. 
SUbject to these assumptions,compounding the data in Table 4.10 
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at 3 per cent per annum is the equivalent of assuming a constant 
rate of reinvestment of nine per cent per annum. Compounding at 
5 per cent implies a reinvestment rate of 15 per cent and at 
8 per cent a rate of reinvestment of 24 per cent. Since gross 
capital formation in South Africa was the equivalent of 24 per 
cent of Gross Domestic Product in 1946, 20 per cent in 1960 and 
" (23) 29 per cent 1n 1970, the most reasonable of the three estim-
ates given in Table 4.10 appears to be th~ one in which the 
savings are compounded at 8 per cent per annum. 
This implies that if one assumes a rate of reinvestment of 24 
per cent per annum together with a capital output ratio of 3 over 
h "d(24) h "d" h h 1 1 f h . t e per10 t e~ prov1 1ng t at t e on y resu tot e m1grant 
labour system was to effect this reduction in the amount of 
necessary social investment, South Africa's Gross Domestic 
Product in 1970 valued in 1963 prices was 12 per cent greater 
than it would have been had the economy developed with a settled 
labour force, .assuming the levels and rates of growth of labour 
productivity were the same on both development paths. 
Looking at the estimation from the other view point one could say 
that providing that, the migrant labour system has had no other 
(23) Estimated from data in Table 21.15 South African 
Statistics 1974 [250J 
(24) de Jager's 142] estimates of the value of the average 
capital output ratio in South Africa were - 1946 2,0~ 
1960 2,3 1970 2,22. 
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reallocative effects on the economy the migrant labour work force 
could be as much as twenty eight per cent less efficient in out-
put terms than the stabilised work force before the Gross Domes-
tic Product was reduced to the level that it would have been 
without the transfer of investment from housing to productive in-
vestment. 
In order to place the size of the savings from housing in a 
broader perspective, it is interesting to note that in 1970 these 
"savings" amounted to fifty per cent of the capital invested in 
the railways in South Africa, and twelve per cent of the total 
public sector capital apart from the capital of the public cor-
. (25) 
poratl0ns. 
Although this type of evidence is incomplete it does seem from 
the relative sizes of the magnitudes discussed here that,even if 
the migrants are paid the same wages as the settled labour force 
and have been throughout the development phase in South Africa, 
the existence of the migrant labour system is likely to have 
encouraged economic growth rather than to have retarded it. 
Indeed, if Wolpe and Legassick are correct in asserting that the 
system has acted to keep Black wages down,then the evidence in 
favour of the migrant labour system as an engine of growth seems 
to be substantial, particularly when one remembers that South 
(25) Estimated from the capital stock figures given in de 
Jager [42] . 
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Africa's Gross Domestic Product in current prices has grown at 
over eight per cent per annum compound throughout the period 
1936 - 1970. 
4.6 Summary of the Main Findings in this Chapter 
The main findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows: 
1) On the basis of the estimates of domestic migration made for 
the years 1936, 1946, 1960 and 1970, which are included in 
Appendix A, it would seem that the size of the migration 
stream has grown continuously over the period. The number 
of men migrating from South Africa's rural areas grew by 
3 per cent per annum compound over the thirty four year 
period, which was one per cent greater than the rate of 
growth of the rural African popUlation over the period. 
2) In 1970 Migrant African men, including foreign migrants, 
formed 59 per cent of all economically active African men 
resident in white areas on the census date. Over the 
period 1946~1970 the rate of growth of migration from South 
Africa's rural areas was approximately one per cent greater 
than the rate of growth of the economically active Africans 
in South Africa;signifying that the migrant labour system is 
growing in importance in the overall labour supply rather 
than declining as would have been the case had the migrants 
been allowed to settle. 
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3) Evidence suggests that the migrant labour system in South 
Africa is heavily selective of the better educated men~ 
and further, that the rate of out-migration is highly posi-
tively correlated with increased educational levels; the 
rate of out-migration being as high as 90 per cent amongst 
men who have at least full primary school education plus 
four additional years of schooling. 
4) Out-migration of such magnitudes amongst the better educated 
must lead to a drastic drop in the social rate of return on 
investment in education by the Homeland governments. This 
implies that since the White sector benefits from such in-
vestment, education in the Homelands should be financed by 
the central government, quite apart from any general devel-
opment grants that are made to the Homelands. 
5) The migration process is also age and sex selective concen-
trating, as has been found in many other studies,on the 
young adult male. However, the propensity to migrate in 
South africa reaches its highest value in the age cohort 
24-29 years which is slightly older than has been found in 
other studies and declines much less rapidly than is usually 
the case. In 1970 the average propensity to migrate amongst 
the age cohort 30-34 years was still as high as 49 per cent. 
6) Throughout the thirty four year period studied here the pro-
pensity to migrate increased in all age cohorts but increased 
fastest in the youngest age group 14-19 years and in the age 
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group 40-65 years. This implies that the impact of the 
migrant labour system on South Africa's labour supply is in 
fact greater than the mere growth of numbers imply since the 
migrant labour supply has grown in two ways: 
1) In terms of simple numbers; more men were absent in 1970 
than in 1960 and in 1936. 
2) In terms of the number of years spent in the modern 
sector; men migrated at a younger age in 1970 than they did 
on average in 1936. Similarly they returned to their 
rural homes at an older age than they did in 1934. 
7) Migrant workers had a younger average age than the permanent 
urban African workforce on the census date in 1970 and in 
addition,appear to have a shorter average working life in 
the modern sector; 19 years as against 23 years. At present 
since the Homeland areas are unable to support their popula-
tions the shorter average working life of a migrant 
means of distributing the opportunity to work in the modern 
sector amongst a larger number of Homeland men seeking work. 
8) The migration patterns amongst populations from different 
regions and ethnic groups are remarkably similar but men 
from the Homeland rural areas appear to spend slightly 
longer in total in the modern sector than do men from other 
South African rural areas. 
9) Whilst there does appear to be evidence that migrants from 
particular regions favour, or are favoured by particular 
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industries,apart from the foreign migrants and those from 
the Transkei,there appears to be no evidence that migrants 
are concentrated more heavily in the low wage sectors of the 
economy. This indicates that the South African economy has 
'institutionalised' the migrant labour system in its develop-
ment and employers have now become almost totally adjusted 
to the system,to the point where they do not distinguish 
between migrants and urban settled workers. 
10) If one compares the contribution made to the growth of the 
modern sector that has accrued as a result of the migrant 
labour syste~simply in terms of the savings on the provision 
of housing for migrants,with the possible loss of labour 
productivity that it is argued results from the system, it 
seems that the migrant labour force could be as much as 28 
per cent less productive than the settled labour force and 
the modern economy be no worse off. 
4.7 Conclusions 
From the evidence presented here it becomes apparent that the 
modern sector has benefitted considerably from the transfer of 
labour that has resulted from the migrant labour system. Since 
as many as two out of every three modern sector workers may be 
migrants it is obvious that without this transfer of labour, 
output levels would be substantially lower in the modern sector. 
What are not certain, however, are the answers to the following 
questions : 
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1) Whether total output would have been greater had the 
migrants been encouraged to settle permanently in the modern 
2) 
sector? Here what evidence that is available, whilst not 
conclusive, does suggest that this output would probably not 
have been greater, as without the migrant labour system a 
larger proportion of investment would have had to be 
channelled to social overhead investment. 
Whether the impact that the system has had on the supplying 
areas offsets any gains or losses experienced by the modern 
sector as result of the institutionalisation of the system 
in South Africa? This latter point will be taken up in the 
following chapter which is concerned with analysing the 
effects that the persistance of the migrant labour system has 
had upon the economies of the supplytng areas which are now 
predominantly the rural areas of the African Homelands. In 
order to do this a case study of KwaZulu has been done and 








THE IMPACT OF THE SYSTEM OF OSCILLATING MIGRATION 
ON THE SUPPLYING REGION - A CASE STUDY OF KWAZULU 
5.1 Introduction 
Zulu men and women have been migrating to the modern sector of the 
South African economy on both a temporary and a permanent basis 
since the laying of the foundation stones of the present modern sec-
(1) tor of the economy. 
As far as the individual migrant is concerned permanent and temporary 
migration decisions are similar in many respects. These decisions 
usually arise from the same set of motives and may be differentiated 
only by the qualitative differences in the strengths of the motives 
d . h d" (2) H fr h . " un erlYlng t ese eC1Sl0ns, owever, om t e macroeconO'lnlC Vlew-
point the social and economic effects of temporary and permanent 
migration in both the new host economy and the economy supplying 
the migrants are likely to differ considerably. In an economy, 
such as KwaZulu, where per capita incomes are low and it is likely 
to be the most productive member of the family who migrates to the 
modern sector on an oscillati ng basis, the costs to the economy 
of temporary migration are l i kely to be considerably greater 
(1) Sheila van der Horst [215] quotes figures of new 
employees on the Kimberley Diamond diggings in 1884 
which includes 814 Zulu men. 
(2) This viewpoint is well argued by Bell [J4]. 
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than that of permanent migration. These differences arise from 
the fact that whereas the permanent migrant takes his family with 
him, freeing additional resources for those remaining behind in the 
supplying economy, the temporary migrant leaves his dependants 
still reliant upon the supplying economy. 
This chapter is concerned with the discussion of the effects that 
the system of oscillating migration has had on the areas that now 
form KwaZulu. 
5.2. The Size and Nature of the Stream of Oscillating Migrants 
over the Period 1936-1970. 
During the period 1936-1970 the number of men who migrated from 
these areas increased almost threefold, the annual compound 
growth rate over the period being 3.25 per cent, compared with an 
overall growth rate of the Bantu population of South Africa over 
this period of 2.45 per cent per annum. As Table 5.1 shows the 
rate of growth in the number of migrants absent from home on the 
census date accelerated most sharply over the period 1960 to 1970, 
although the degree of undercounting in the 1960 census will have 
undoubtedly inflated this estimate of the rate of acceleration. 
In 1936, on the census date one out of every three males in the 
age cohort 15-64 was absent from home; by 1970 this proportion had 
increased to more than one out of every two and in certain regions 
TABLE 5.1. 
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AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF MALE AFRICAN 
MIGRANTS FROM THE RURAL AREAS THAT NOW FORM 
KWAZULU RURAL AREAS FOR THE CENSUS DATES IN 
1936, 1946, 1960 AND 1970. 
Age 
Number of Male MigranLs from the 
Rate of Area in the Year 
Group . Growth 
1936 1946 1960 1970 D/o 
A B C D E 
15-19 7 000 11 000 14 000 42 000 5,4 
20-24 25 000 25 000 34 000 56 000 2,4 
25-29 22 000 23 000 24 000 56 000 2,8 
30-34 20 000 22 000 26 000 50 000 2,7 
35-39 10 000 13 000 19 000 33 000 3,6 
40-44 10 000 12 000 15 000 35 000 3,8 
45-49 3 000 6 000 3 000 16 000 5,0 
50-54 4 000 5 000 5 000 17 000 4,4 
55-64 6 000 4 000 4 000 12 000 2,1 
Total 107 000 121 000 144 000 317 000 3,3 
Growth % 
Rate 0 1,2 1,3 8,2 
4,1 
A. From Table B4.1. Column 6. 
B. From Table B3.1. Column 9. 
C. From Table B2.1. Column 6. 
D. From Table Bl. Column 6. 




was as high as eight out of every ten. Another interesting 
feature of the migration stream through time is the way in which 
the age structure of the stream has changed as the system has 
become 'institutionalised'. Table 5.2. gives details of the 
changing age structure. 
TABLE 5.2. AN ESTIMATE OF THE MIGRATION PATTERNS OF MIGRANT 
MEN FROM THE AREAS NOW RURAL KWAZULU FOR 
1936, 1946, 1960 AND 1970. (A) 
Age Specific Percentage of Migrants in the 
Age Migration Rates Age Category or Less 
Group 
1936 1946 1960 ~970 1936 1946 1960 1970 
D/O 0/0 % 0/0 
15-19 13 18 20 34 6 9 10 13 
20-24 50 48 53 60 29 30 34 31 
25-29 49 49 46 67 50 49 51 49 
30-34 50 52 57 67 69 68 69 65 
35-39 31 41 48 59 78 79 82 75 
40-44 34 38 43 61 87 89 92 , 86 
45-49 15 21 13 42 90 93 94 91 
50-54 24 26 23 47 94 97 97 96 
55-64 25 16 13 29 100 100 100 100 
Average 
Rate 34 36 38 52 
A. The estimates in Table 5.2. have been made using the basis 
outlined in Appendix A. The population in 1970 used for this 
estimate was the Zulu population in Homeland Rural areas in 
in 1970, 96 per cent of whom were resident in KwaZu1u rural 
areas. The population for 1960, 1946 and 1936 have been 
estimated on the assumption that 72 per cent of each age cohort 
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resident in Natal rural areas were in fact resident in the areas 
now the rural areas of KwaZulu. This percentage in 1970 was 
76 per cent. The estimate for 1960 and earlier was reduced 
to 72 per cent to make some allowance for the resettlement of 
the Zulu population that took place in 1960-1970. The growth 
of new rural townships in KwaZulu over this period alone 
accounts for 3 per cent of the 4 per cent reductions. 
Detailed estimations are contained in Appendix B, Tables Bl.l., 
B2.1., B3.1. and B4.1. 
The data in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 shows clearly that whilst the rate 
of outmigration in every age cohort increased over the thirty four 
year period, the extent to which the migration rate increased varied 
quite substantially between the different age groups. In 1936 by 
the time a man from the KwaZulu rural areas reached thirty five 
years of age there was a better than two to one chance that he would 
have returned and been resident in the domestic economy. By 
1970 nearly half the men aged 50 to 54 years of age were still absent 
from home. Similarly the rate of outmigration amongst the young 
age groups 15 to 19 years, whilst still below the average rate, has 
risen dramatically during the period,increasing from 13 per cent to 
34 per cent. It seems,from this evidence at least, that firstly 
outmigrants from KwaZulu now leave home at a younger age than they 
did on average in 1936, secondly they leave in larger numbers · and 
thirdly they remain away from KwaZulu on average for a longer period. 
The overall rate of growth of outmigration amongst adult Zulu men 
was nearly one per cent higher than the rate of growth of the male 
population of KwaZulu over the period. 
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Table 5.3. gives the estimated number of women who migrated from 
KwaZulu rural areas during the period 1936 to 1970. 
TABLE 5.3. ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBERS OF FEMALE MIGRANTS 
FROM THE RURAL AREAS OF NATAL THAT NOW FORM 
THE RURAL AREAS OF KWAZULU ON THE CENSUS 
DATES IN 1936, 1946, 1960 AND 1970 
Age Number of Female Migrants Rate of from Area in the Year Group Growth 
1936 1946 1960 1970 % 
A B C D E 
15-19 1,000 1,000 1,500 8,000 
20-24 9,000 5,000 7,500 9,000 
25-29 7,500 5,500 2,500 13,000 
30-34 2,000 6,500 5,500 12,000 
35-39 1,500 2,500 2,000 




Total 19,500 · 19,500 21,500 52,000 2.9 




A. From Table C4.2. Column 6. 
B. From Table C3.2. Column 6. 
C. From Table C2.2. Column 6. 
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D. From Table Cl. Column 5. 
E. Compound rates of growth for the separate age cohorts have 
not been calculated as the recorded age data appears to be 
unreliable. 
As can be seen from the Table the number of female migrants is 
considerably smaller than the number of men who migrate. In 
1970 six men migrated for everyone woman. The rate of growth 
of female migration is however similar to that of the men over 
the period 1946 to 1970, and again exceeds the population growth 
rate of the area. It is interesting to note how the migration 
patterns of the women differ from those of the men. In 1970 
in the age cohorts over forty four years of age there was no 
net female outmigratio~whereas nearly half the men in the age 
cohorts 45 to 49 and 50 to 54 were still absent from home as 
migrant workers. Not only do fewer women migrate than men, as 
one would expect with the burden of family raising, particularly 
in the child bearing years, but the women who do migrate also 
return from the modern sector on average very much earlier than 
the men and show no apparent tendency to return to the modern 
sector work force once they have raised their children. 
5.3. The Demographic Effect on the Supplying Economy 
There is no doubt that the major impact that the migratory labour 
system has on KwaZulu operates through the effect that the system 
- 139 -
has upon the population age distribution. 
TABLE 5.4. COMPARATIVE AGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF SOUTH 
AFRICAN POPULATIONS IN 1970. 
Percentage of the Population Aged 
Population 
0-14 15-64 Over 64 
.The Republic as a Whole 43 53 4 
All Africans in the R.S.A . 44 52 4 
All Zulus 44 52 4 
KwaZulu 49 46 5 
White S.A. 31 62 7 
Table 5.4. shows clearly how the migratory labour system operates 
to reduce the percentage of the population in the working age 
groups in the sup~lying region. Firstly if one compares the 
relevant percentages of the population "All Zulu People in South 
Africa" with those of the population in the rural areas of KwaZulu 
only, one finds that, whereas in the former population 52 per cent 
of the population falls into the age cohort 14-64 years and conse-
quently is potentially capable of contributing to output, only 46 
per cent of the rural population of KwaZulu falls into this category. 
Secondly the ratio of economically active adults to the remainder 
of the population among Zulus as a group in 1970 was 1:2,86 whereas 
in the rural areas of KwaZulu this ratio was as high as 1:3,85; a 
difference of 35 per cent. This increase in the dependency ratio is 
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due to the relative increase in importance of both the young 
age groups 0-14 years, and t he older age groups - over 65 years. 
Thirdly the masculinity ratio amongst the age cohort 19-64 years 
in the rural areas is also extremely low being 1:3, consequently 
homeland families in these rural areas lack sufficient of the 
masculine influence - children grow up in a fatherless world and 
a large number of women shoulder the burden of raising a family 
alone, with only economic assistance from their men folk. 
Apart from the demographic maladjustments that result from the 
continued absence of a substantial proportion of the adult work 
force, the economy has developed some striking economic imbalances. 
Table 5.5 shows the distribution of the economically active male 
~1attOll of KwaZulu and illustrates graphically how important 
a place employment outside the Homeland holds in the economic 
structure of KwaZulu. If permanent migration had taken place in 
response to the changes in the geographical demand for labour, 
the family would have moved t o the new region. With the main-
tenance of temporary migration however, 50 per cent of the male 
work force find work outside the Homeland and the men migrate 
alone, leaving their families in the subsistence sector. 
The data in Table 5.5 understates the degree of economic depen-
dency that now exists between KwaZulu and White South Africa; 
even so far as employment opportunities are concerned, since 
individuals who work in the modern sector but live permanently 
in the H.omeland, i.e. commuters, have been treated in the 1970 
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TABLE 5.5 DISTRIBUTION BY AGE GROUP OF ADULT MALE WORKERS 
IN KWAZULU IN 1970. (3) 
Percentage of Age Group in Industry 
Under 20 20-24- 25-34- 35-4-4- 4-5-54- 55-65 
Agriculture 4-1 22 19 22 34- 4-7 
Manufac- 5 8 
turing 
8 7 6 4-
Construc- 2 4-
tion 
4- 5 5 4-
Connnerce 2 3 4- 4- 4- 3 
Transport 1 2 2 2 2 
Services 3 4- 4- 5 6 8 
Migrants (A) 4-7 58 59 55 4-3 32 











(A) Migrants here have been estimated on the basis explained in 
Appendix A using the population. Zulus in KwaZulu and not 
Zulus in KwaZulu rural areas, as some migrants migrate from 
the latter to the urban areas of KwaZulu . itself. 
census count as if they were employed in the Homeland areas. If 
one assumes that the connnuter work force has the same age and job 
distribution as the migrant work force, then it would appear 
from the ratio of estimates of commuter earnings to those of 
migrants in 1967 made by the Department of Economics, Pretoria 
U · . (4-) h 60 f h d n~vers~ty, t at as many as per cent 0 tea ult males of 
(3) Calculated from data in Table B 13 in Report 02-02-02, 
Population Census 1970. Department of Statistics, Pretoria, 
1973, and data covered in Note (3). 
(4-) J.A. Lombard and P.J. van der Merwe [122] 
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KwaZulu were employed in the White Sector of the South African 
economy in 1970. A further 28 per cent were in subsistence agri-
culture, implying that jobs in sectors other than agriculture and 
situated in KwaZulu were only available for 12 per cent of the 
economically active men who would normally be resident in the 
economic region. 
5.4.0 Temporary Migration and the Standards of Living in the 
KwaZulu Rural Areas 
It was argued in Section 2.4 . 4 that out migration affected the 
standards of living of those remaining in the supplying economy 
through the effect that it had upon the supply of labour and 
through the income transfer into the economy in the form of remit-
tances from out migrants. 
The relationship between the migrants average consumption and his 
marginal product in the supplying area,together with the regions' 
ability to reallocate work effort,was seen as determining the 
likely size and direction of the change in the output resulting 
from a reduction in the potential supply of labour. It was also 
argued that consumption levels in the domestic economy could rise 
as a result of the increased consumption by individuals financed 
the remittances received from migrants, quite apart from any in-
creases that may result from the redistribution of income in the 
area consequent upon the reallocation of work effort. 
5.4.1 The Migrant Labour System and the Labour Supply of KwaZulu 
The first effect that will be considered is the impact of out-migration 
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u.pon KwaZulu's labour supply, and its consequent impact upon 
the levels of domestic output. Unfortunately it was not possible 
to obtain an accurate estimate of the size of a "representative" 
migrant's marginal product in the subsistence sector, prior to 
his migration, vis a vis his average consumption level in that 
sector as there was not sufficient data available on the agricul-
tural output, the distribution of output per worker or on the 
distribution of land between families in KwaZulu. If, however, 
one uses the behaviour of the ratio, subsistence output to econ-
omically active workers in KwaZulu, as a surrogate for the be-
haviour of the average product per worker in the subsistence 
sector, then one can at least obtain some indicative evidence as 
to the most likely trend in the marginal product of workers in 
the subsistence sector. 
Average subsistence output per economically active worker in 
KwaZulu in 1960 was R56(5) and by 1970 it had fallen to R51, 
measured in current prices. From this, subject to the validity 
of the usual Neoclassical assumptions of homogeneity amongst 
workers, working conditions and general production conditions, 
it seems likely that average consumption levels in KwaZulu are 
above the marginal product of labour in the subsistence sector, 
even when one excludes consumption from remittances. 
(5) Estimated from data in South Africa 1974. P. 293. 





Falling average products indicate that the marginal products, 
apart from being lower than the average product,are also falling 
and indeed far more rapidly than the average product. Robinson 
[167] p.30. This being so, it seems that it is likely that the 
average consumption levels of the potential migrants from Kwa-
Zulu are indeed above the contribution that they make to subsis-
tence output levels. Consequently, providing that the migrants' 
absence does not alter the nature or the relative position of 
the production function of t he supplying region in an adverse 
manner, the departure of the out migrants seems likely to in-
crease average consumption levels in the KwaZulu rural areas. 
Unfortunately, this is not a forgeone conclusion because, as 
it was argued earlier, the extent to which consumption levels 
can rise will depend upon t he following factors: 
1) Whether or not those who remain behind in the area supply-
ing the migrants are successful in reorganizing the work 
load to compensate adequately for the migrants absence. 
2) The size and nature of the flow of remittances received 
from the migrants, together with the purpose to which these 
remittances are put in the region i.e. consumption levels 
can be affected by whether these remittances are invested 
or consumed. 
3) The extent to which the absence of the migrarits has detri-
mental effects on the overall productivity levels in the 
area that cannot be countered by the efforts of those who 
remain behind. 
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It has been argued and documented by many writers in the field 
of migration, notably Kuznets [106], Thomas [198], Herrick [71] 
and Zachariah [244], that migration is essentially a selective 
process and consequently the overall effects are directly depen-
dent upon the degree and nature of the selection that takes 
place among the migrants. 
One can say that out migration is more likely to be beneficial 
in consumption terms in areas where there is unemployment than 
it is in areas where there is a shortage of labour. Similarly 
Miracle and Berry [132] argue that temporary migration will be 
less detrimental to the supplying region if the periods of 
migration are dove-tailed to fit in with the labour requirements 
of the domestic economy. 
Similarly migration is more likely to be beneficial, measured 
again in terms of the consumption levels of those who remain, if 
the migrant is negatively rather than positively selected, ' Lee 
~o8] that is if the least productive workers migrate rather than 
the more productive members of t he community. 
As far as the selective nature of the migration process is con-
cerned the KwaZulu rural economy seems to be no exception. 
From the data presented in Table 5.1 and 5.3 one can see that 
the migration process is heavily selective of adult men, par-
ticularly of those under forty years of age. This, coupled 
with the fact that indirect evidence was presented earlier to 
suggest that even among these age groups there is a further 
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degree of selection in that the better educated men appear to 
have a higher propensity to migrate than those with less educa-
tion,(6) implies the following; 
1) It may well not be a simple matter for those who remain 
behind in the supplying area to reorganize their work allo-
cation in order to suppl y the effort previously provided by 
.the migrants. With so very high a male absentee rate such a 
reallocation would imply that the very young, the very old, the 
women who have the burden of child raising, and the less 
educated are expected to be able to provide the work load 
of a very large percentage of the young adult male popula-
tion in the area and indeed the most productive members of 
that group. 
2) The long run effects of migration on the region's produc-
tivity could quite possibly be negative simply because of 
the magnitUde of the degree of the out migration. There 
may not be sufficient remaining hands in the home economy 
to be able to perform the necessary maintenance tasks. 
Those hands that are available may not be sufficiently 
strong to perform the work required of them or sufficiently 
educated to make the correct decisions. 
This being so, it appears that the benefits that accrue to those 
(6) Evidence to support thi s contention was presented in Table 
4.5, and in the discussion on the data in the Table. 
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who remain behind, that result from the mere absence of the 
migrant, will be considerably less than would accrue to them had 
the supplying economy been able to maximise the sum of all the 
possible net gains that could accrue in this manner. Indeed 
these gains could be negative over time, once the results of 
capital consumption start to make their presence felt. 
5.4.2 Remittances from Migrants and the Domestic Standards 
of Living 
As average productivity levels are very low and have fallen in 
recent years it appears that remittances from migrants are of 
critical importance in KwaZulu's rural areas. The level of domes-
tic subsistence per capita production of R51 in 1936 suggests that 
the economy is now incapable of supporting its population with-
out these transfers of remittances from the modern sector by the 
area's out-migrants. Remittances, as can be seen from the data 
in Table 5.6, which gives an estimate of the size of the remit-
tances made to the KwaZulu rural areas, are indeed now a major 
source of consumption funds and in addition one that has grown in 
importance in the economy over recent years. 
The estimate given in Table 5.6 is based upon the estimates of 
the migrants from the area, given earlier, their estimated inter-
sectoral job allocation, the wage rates they earn and the pro-
portion of their earnings that they remit. Details of the basis 
of this estimate and of the assumptions upon which it is based 
are given in Appendix C. 
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TABLE 5.6 THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF MIGRANTS' EARNINGS 
AND REMITTANCES TO KWAZULU IN CURRENT PRICES. 
Number 
Migrants' Remittances as a Percentage 
Year of 
of: 
Male Earnings Remi ttances Gross Subsis- Agri-
Migrants Domestic tence cultural 
ROOO ROOO Product Income Output 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (E) 
1936 107000 5879 1077 
1946 120000 15129 2798 
1960 144000 33804 6318 21 36 64 
1970 317000 132319 25103 41 88 142 
Notes on Table 
A. Total number of migrants has been estimated on the basis 
outlined in Appendix B. Detailed estimations are as follows. 
1936 from Table B4.1, 1946 from Table B3.1, 1960 from Table 
B2.1 and 1970 from Table Bl in Appendix B. 
B. From Table C3 in Appendix C column I, estimated on the 
basis outlined in this Appendix. 
C. From Table C3 in Appendix C column J. 
D. From South Africa 1974 [250]p.292. 
E. Estimated from data in South Africa 1974 [250] p.292 and 293. 
Over the thirty four year period the size of the annual stream of 
remi ttances into the rural areas of KwaZulu grew at an average 
annual compound rate of 9,7 per cent. This increase was the 
result of the interaction of three factors, namely: 
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1) The number of out-migrants from the area tripled, growing at 
an average annual compound rate of 3,25 per cent. 
2) There was an increase in the rate of growth of job opportunities 
for migrants in the high wage sector of the modern economy rela-
tive to those available in the low wage sector and, 
3) There was an increase in the average annual money wages paid to 
African men of 5,7 per cent per annum, compound over the period. 
In 1960 on these estimations the average rate of remittance by 
migrants was 19 per cent of their earnings and these remittances 
were the equivalent of 36 per cent of subsistence output in that 
year. By 1970 migrant remittances had grown to the point where 
they were the equivalent of 88 per cent of subsistence income 
and 142 per cent of the agricultural output of KwaZulu. This 
means that for everyone rand generated in the subsistence sec-
tor, a further 88 cents were sent home by the migrants and for 
every rand earned from the soil, a further Rl,42 was sent into 
the area by the out-migrant men. Of even greater significance 
is the fact that over the period 1960-1970 whilst average output 
per worker in the subsistence sector of KwaZulu appears to have 
fallen, the average level of remittances per migrant rose from 
R44 to R79 per annum, which is an average compound growth rate 
of 6 per cent per annum. 
In 1970 the Bureau of Market Research of the University of 
Pretoria undertook a series of income and expenditure surveys, 
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one of which covered the income and expenditure patterns of 
single Bantu households [210]. The total number of households 
covered by the report was 367 and of these individuals 219, that 
is 60 per cent, appear to have been migrant workers in that they 
entered the Durban area when they were eighteen years of age or 
older [210] p.24. Since such a large proportion of the data 
applied to migrant labourers in Durban it was decided to make a 
second estimate of the size of the total earnings of the migrants 
from KwaZulu rural areas and of their remittances for 1970 based 
upon the data contained in the Bureau's report, as a check upon 
the validity of the estimate presented in Table 5.6. These two 
estimates are presented for comparison in Table 5.7. 
TABLE 5.7 A COMPARISON OF THE TWO ESTIMATES OF KWAZULU 
MIGRANTS' EARNINGS AND REMITTANCES TO KWAZULU 
IN 1970. 
Estimate 1 based Estimate 2 based 
one Table on B.M.R. Expen-
in Appendix diture Studies 
Average Earnings 
per Migrant R417 (A) R562 (G) 
Remi ttance Rate 19% (B) 18% (H) 
Remittance in Cash 
per Migrant R79 (C) RIOI (1) 
No. of Migrants 
from Table 317,000 (D) 317,000 (D) 
Estimate of 
Total Earnings R132 319 000 (E) Rl78 154 000 (J) 
Remittances R 25 103 000 (F) R 32 067 720 (K) 
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Notes on Table 
A. Total earnings estimated in Table C3 in Appendix C • Number 
of Migrants in 1970 from Table Bl in Appendix B. 
B. Total Remittances from Table C3 in Appendix C ~ Total 
earnings of migrants from the same Table. 
C. Total Remittances ~ Total number of migrants. 
D. From Table Bl in Appendi x B. 
E. From Table C3 in Appendi x C column I. 
F. From Table C3 in Appendi x C column J. 
G. From Bureau of Market Research[2l0]P.25 Table 3.7a male 
incomes. 
H. From Bureau of Market Research [210] p.42 Table 3.21. 
Payments in support of relatives ~ average male incomes in 
Table 3.7 of the same report. 
I. From Bureau Report [210] p. 42 . Payments in support of 
relatives - Average. 
J. = G x D. 
K. = H x J Note K 4 I x D due to rounding errors. 
The second estimate of earnings and remittances contained in 
Table 5.7, namely the estimate based upon the Bureau of Market 
Research data is 35 per cent higher in respect of migrants' 
earnings and 28 per cent higher in respect of remittances, than 
the first estimate that is based on the assumptions contained 
in Appendix C. This difference can be attributed in a large 
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part to the fact -that the Bureau's job distribution of single 
households understates the number of migrants in the low wage 
categories, since their survey excluded migrant agricultural 
workers living on White farms. 
The cash remittance rate of the single households studied by 
the Bureau was only 18 per cent of total household expenditure. 
However, if one adds the percentage of total income saved to 
the cash remittances, on the grounds that savings by migrants 
will ultimately be remitted to the rural area, the per cent of 
expenditure remitted rises to 21 per cent, suggesting that, if 
-anything, the estimate based on the assumption that migrants in 
the high wage sector remit only 19 per cent of their income is 
too conservative. A mean estimate of migrants' cash remittances 
lying between the two made i n Table 5.7 gives an amount of 
R28 585 360, which is an increase of 14 per cent over the low 
estimate in the table. As the degree of accuracy of the esti-
mates is unlikely to be less than 10 per cent in either case the 
two estimates serve as a useful back up for each other, as they 
are based on data obtained from sources that were independent 
of one another, apart from their common dependence on the esti-
mate of the number of migrants away from the area on the census 
date in 1970. 
In addition to the cash that they remit to their families, 
migrants also purchase goods which they take home on their re-
turn and pay for certain services for their families in the 
rural areas, such as visits to urban hospitals made by members 
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of their family and education. Estimates of remittances in kind 
are difficult to obtain but one can obtain a rough estimate of 
the relative size of such remittances from the expenditure sur-
veys of single African households made by the Bureau of Market 
Research. [210] Such an estimate is presented in Table 5.8. It 
. should however, be treated with caution as it is of necessity 
sensitive to the validity, or otherwise, of a number of arbitrary 
assumptions that have had to be made in presenting the Table. 
TABLE 5.8 REMITTANCES BY MIGRANTS INCLUDING THOSE IN KIND 
IN 1970 ESTIMATED FROM THE BUREAU OF MARKET 
RESEARCH STUDIES. (8) 
Amount Percentage 
R Earnings 
Average cash remittance per 
single household per annum 101 18 
Remittances in kind 
Food (A) 31 
Clothing (B) 17 
Education (C) 1 
Medical Expenses (D) 3 
Furniture & Household 
Expenses (E) 3 10 
Savings (F) 18 3 
Total Maximum Remittance 174 31 
Notes on Table 
(A) Food purchased for consumption away from horne or work. 
of 
(8) · All the data in the Table is taken from Bureau of Market 
Research Report on the Income and Expenditure of Non White 
Urban Households Durban Survey of Single Bantu Households. 
[210] 
- 154 -
(B) Expenditure on baby clothing, childrens clothing plus half 
the expenditure by single households on adult female 
clothing assumed to be remitted to the rural family. 
(C) 100 per cent of single family expenditure on education. 
(D) 50 per cent of single household expenditure on medical 
expenses assumed to be expended on behalf of the rural 
family. 
(E) One quarter of the expenditure on furniture and household 
appliances assumed to be on behalf of the rural family. 
(F) Savings have been included here on the grounds that when 
the migrant returns to his rural home he will take his 
savings with him. 
On this evidence it would seem that migrant workers could quite 
possibly remit as much as 10 per cent of their total earnings to 
the rural areas in the form of goods and services in addition to 
the amounts that they remit in cash. 
If one accepts that typical rates of remittances by male migrants 
from KwaZulu could be as high as 30 per cent of their earnings, 
20 per cent in cash and a further 10 per cent in the form of 
goods, then in 1970 remittances to KwaZulu rural areas might 
well have totalled as much as R39 371 000 on the basis of the low 
estimate in Table 5.6. Remittances of such a magnitude would be 
the equivalent of 66 per cent of the economy's Gross Domestic 
Product, 140 per cent of income generated in the subsistence 
sector and 225 per cent of the agricultural output of the economy. 
No matter whether one accepts the lowest estimate of remittances 
or the highest, the conclusion remains the same; namely that the 
present welfare levels of individuals resident in KwaZulu, 
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particularly those of residents in the rural areas, is heavily 
dependent upon the remittances that they receive from the 
region's out-migrants. In 1970 subsistence incomes per head of 
the rural population of KwaZulu were approximately R15. (9) Re-
mittances per head of the rural population on the low estimate 
were R15 in cash and a further R8 in . goods and services. In 
other words of a total per capita income of R40 in the rural 
areas, 50 per cent is provided from the export of labour services 
(10 ) 
and only 40 per cent generated locally. 
Since it is not a simple nor a short term task to provide employ-
ment 'opportunities for nearly half a million men, nor to provide 
the alternative of housing and social facilities for their 
families in the urban areas, one must conclude that the continued 
existence of the many women, children and senior citizens in Kwa-
Zulu is dependent upon the maintenance of the migratory labour 
system at least in the immediate future. 
This argument does not however, imply either that the community 
as a whole benefits through time from the continued maintenance 
of the situation, nor that the system, should it prove to be bene-
ficial to all parties, is necessarily the optimal solution, in 
(9) Subsistence income from South Africa 1974 [250] p.292. 
Rural population from the 1970 Census Report 02-02-02 
p.58. 
(10) Clarke and Ngobese [37] in a study of 150 families in the 
Ngutu district of KwaZulu give an average monthly income 
per family of R14,87 of which R9,90 was in the form of 
~emittances. In other words 67 per cent of the family's 
~ncome was not generated within the district on average 
in terms of their findings. 
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that it is superior to the alternative of the provision of em-
ployment opportunities with the KwaZulu economy for those men 
who at present migrate. 
~ It will be argued that the major economic disadvantages of the 
migratory labour system vis a vis the provision of alternative 
employment within KwaZulu are the following. 
1) The migratory labour system affects family welfare levels 
as it causes a redistribution of income within the family 
itself and this redistribution is detrimental to the 
overall welfare levels of the f amily. 
2) The low level of remittances means that the income genera-
ting effects of the migrantstearnings are smaller within 
KwaZulu than the earnings of individuals who are employed 
within the area itself. 
3) The long run effects of the migratory labour system on 
capital accumulation and technical progress are also detri-
mental and have contributed substantially to the continuing 
underdevelopment of the rural areas. 
The first of these disadvantages could be considered as the con-
sumption effects of the migratory labour system and the latter 
two as the effect that the system has upon the production capa-
bilities of the supplying economy and they are discussed more 
fully in the following section. 
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5.5 The Consumption Effect of the Migratory Labour System 
On the consumption side it is argued that the migratory labour 
system alters the consumption patterns of the migrant and further 
that these alterations can be detrimental to economic welfare 
should they represent a transfer of f~ds, either from investment 
to consumption,or from individuals with a high marginal utility 
of expenditure to those with a lower utility. 
In this section an attempt will be made to investigate the ex-
tent to which temporary migration alters family spending patterns. 
To do this further use will be made of the Bureau of Market Re-
search's Household Expenditure Surveys in order to compare the 
expenditure patterns of urban settled workers with families 
(multiple households) with those of the migrant worker, taken to 
be represented by the single households in the Bureau's survey. 
It is often asserted that the migratory labour system affects 
family consumption patterns on two levels: 
1) The migrant man consumes a greater proportion of his income 
in the form of entertainment, alcohol and cigarettes than a 
man who lives with his family, simply as a result of the 
unnatural existence that the migrant is forced to lead in 
the towns. Clarke Ngobese [ 37] Wilson [233]. 
2) That the migrant consumes a far higher proportion of his 
family's total income than does the man who lives with his 
family. Consequently the migrants' family is not as well 
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cared for as that of the family living with their parents 
in the town. Wilson [233], Clark and Ngobese [37] . 
Since commodities have different income elasticities one can 
only expect families to exhibit similar expenditure patterns if 
they are on similar expenditure levels. If the migrant worker, 
for example, typically fills the lower paid positions in the 
work hierarchy and the stabilised worker the better paid jobs, 
one would expect their expenditure patterns to differ simply as 
a result of the differences in their income levels. 
Table 5.9 compares the expenditure levels of multiple and single 
households found to exist in the Durban Pinetown Area by the 
Bureau of Market Research in their 1970 survey. [213] 
TABLE 5.9 A COMPARISON OF THE EXPENDITURE PATTERNS OF 
MULTIPLE AND SINGLE AFRICAN HOUSEHOLDS IN 
THE DURBAN PINETOWN AREA IN 1970.(11) 
Multiple Households Single Households 
Cash Expenditure R909 R298 
Receipts in Kind 54 146 
Savings 42 18 
Remittances in Cash 27 101 
1032 563 
Savings rate 4 per cent 3 per cent 
Remittance rate 3 per cent 18 per cent 
Expenditure per Earner 
1 earner per household 1032 563 
1,4 earners 737 
1,7 earners 607 
(11) Calculated from data presented in Research Report No. 34. 
Bureau of Market Research, Pretoria. [213] 
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It can be seen from the data presented in Table 5.9 that, al-
though family expenditures of multiple households exceed those 
of single households by as much as 83 per cent, once an adjust-
ment has been made to allow for the fact that on average the num-
ber of earners per multiple household is greater than one, earn-
ings per worker (measured in terms of expenditure) are much more 
similar; dropping to as low a differential as 8 per cent on the 
assumption that there are 1,7 earners 
and to 31 per cent in the case of 1,4 
per multiple household, 
(12 ) 
earners per household. 
When one considers that the jobs in the highest income echelons 
are far more likely to be filled by men who live permanently in 
the area than by migrants, this implies that the income spread 
amongst the former workers is likely to be substantially greater 
than that of the. migrants. This will have the effect of pushing 
up the value of the mean level of expenditure of the multiple 
household. It is therefore quite possible, that due to the 
greater income dispersion among the multiple households the 
modal values of expenditure per worker of the two groups are 
more similar to one another than is implied by a simple com-
parison of the mean incomes. If this is the case then one is 
justified in assuming that the differences in the expenditure 
patterns of the two types of household that do exist, once 
adjustments have been made to exclude the stabilised workerts 
(12) The average number of earners per household in the Bureau 
of Market Research I s survey of inc'ome and expenditure 
patterns of multiple Bantu households in Durban [211] 
was 1,6 earners per family. 
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family expenditure, are indeed a reflection of the differences 
in the life styles of the migrant and the settled urban worker. 
The problem is however, further complicated by the fact that 
single households, amongst which are the migrant workers, were 
shown to receive as much as 26 per cent of their incomes (expen-
diture) in kind, whereas multiple households received only 5 per 
cent. On this evidence the migrant worker's ability to allocate 
his total income, according to his personal preference set, is 
quite heavily circumscribed, as he only has direct allocative 
control over three quarters of his total personal expenditure~ 
Subject to these problems an attempt has been made to compare 
the spending patterns of migrant men and the men living in towns 
with their families. A large number of arbitrary assumptions 
have been made in obtaining this comparison the most important 
b · h f 11 . (13) elng teo oWlng. 
1) That single Bantu household expenditure patterns are a 
reasonable reflection of a typical migrant worker's spending 
patterns; 67 per cent of these households were in fact 
migrant workers. 
2) That the mean income levels per worker are not signficantly 
different from one another. 
(13) The other assumptions that have be.en made are listed 
as Table footnotes on Table 5.10. 
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TABLE 5.10 A COMPARISON OF THE SPENDING PATTERNS OF 
PERMANENTLY SETTLED AFRICAN URBAN MALE 
WORKERS AND THOSE OF MIGRANT LAEOURERS(14) 
Item Purchased Permanent Workers Migrant Workers 
Amount Per cent of Amount Percentage 
Spent Total Spent of Total 
Expenditure Expenditure 
R R 
Food Consumed (A) 130 32 202 51 
Adult 
Clothing (B) 96 ' 23 40 10 
Housing (C) 36 9 36 9 
Fuel & Light (C) 11 3 2 1 
Transport (D) 37 9 22 6 
Furniture (E) 26 6 14 3 
Alcohol (F) 35 8 41 10 
Cigarettes & 
Tobacco (G) 20 5 13 3 
Cosmetics & 
Medicines (H) 5 1 7 2 
Dry Cleaning (I) 8 2 8 2 
Miscellaneous (J) 10 2 12 3 
Total 414 100 397 100 
Notes on Table 
(A) Multiple Household expenditure on Food consumed has been 
allocated to the male on the assumption that he consumes 
one quarter of the total expenditure of a family of six 
and 100 per cent of all food received in kind. 
I 
(14) The data in the Table has been estimated from data con-
tained in "Market Potentials of Consumer Goods and Services 
for Non White Population Groups in the Five Main Metro-
politan Areas of the Republic in 1970" Research Report 
No. 34, Bureau of Market Research, Pretoria. [213] 
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(B) Expenditure on clothing by single households has been 
allocated on the assumption that 100 per cent of the 
male clothing bought is for the worker himself and that 
50 per cent of the expenditure on female clothing is in 
fact a remittance to the rural family, the remaining (50 
per cent of the single households expenditure on female 
clothing being taken as representing clothing purchased 
by female migrants for themselves) and so is excluded 
from the estimation. 
(C) Housing and Fuel and Light expenditure by multiple 
households has been allocated 50 per cent to the male 
worker on the assumption that if multiple families were 
to live as migrants two households would be required. 
(D) Transport expenses incurred by multiple households have 
been allocated on the assumption that the male worker 
incurs 50 per cent. 
(E) Furniture purchases by multiple households have been 
allocated two fifths to the male, two fifths to the 
female and one fifth to the children. 
(F) It has been assumed that the male worker consumes two 
thirds of the total expenditure on alcohol. 
(G) On the assumption that the male in the household consumes 
100 per cent of the purchases of cigarettes and tobacco. 
(H) It has been assumed that half of the single households 
expenditure on medicines is on behalf of the rural family. 
(I) 75 per cent of the multiple households expenditure on dry 
cleaning is assumed to be on behalf of the adult male 
worker. 
(J) 100 per cent of the mUltiple household's expenditure on 
miscellaneous items is assumed to be on behalf of the 
adult male worker. 
Subject to the acceptability of the assumptions that have been 
made in arriving at the estimates presented in the Table, the 
following differences in expenditures emerge: 
1) Migrant workers spend a larger absolute amount on food than 
settled male workers and a far greater proportion of their 
total personal expenditure; 51 per cent as against 32 per cent. 
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2) Migrants appear to spend more in both absolute and relative 
terms on alcoholic beverages, medicines and cosmetics. 
3) On the other hand migrants spend a lower proportion of their 
income on adult clothing, fuel and light, furniture, trans-
port and tobacco. 
However, when one considers that, with the exception of alcohol it 
is precisely these goods and services that the migrant receives in 
kind it seems unwise to attribute too great a significance to these 
differences. 
A far more interesting feature of the data presented in Table 
5.10 is the degree of similarity present in the absolute levels 
of expenditure of the two classes of individuals, implying that 
the standards of living of the settled worker and the migrant 
in the urban area are much the same the stabilised worker 
spending R414 per annum on average on personal maintenance and 
the migrant R397 per annum. It would seem, therefore, that 
since presumably the migrants, prior to entering the urban 
region, were accustomed to a different way of life, once in the 
town these men either choose, or are obliged, to maintain living 
standards equivalent to those of the settled male labour force. 
Since the migrant workers also appear to earn much the same as 
the stabilised workers, the fact that the migrant men live as do 
the men who have their families with them should not unduly pre-
judice the living standards of their families in the rural areas, 
ceteris paribus. However, if the migrant, by maintaining rela-
tively higher standards of l iving in the town, is consuming a 
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substantially greater proportion of his family's total income 
than does the man who lives with his family in town, then the 
migrant's urban consumption may well prejudice the welfare of 
h ' f '1 'h 1 (15) 1S am1 y 1n t e rura area. 
Table 5.11 contains three estimates of family incomes for 
families resident in the KwaZulu rural areas but living in diff-
erent circumstances and compares them with the living standards 
of our urbanised family. The first rural family is assumed to 
have land, a worker to work that land and a migrant away from 
home who remits a portion of his earnings to the family. The 
second family is dependent. entirely on migrant remittances and 
subsistence activities apart from agriculture,whilst the third 
family has no migrant worker away. These estimates are likely 
to understate the degree of disparity in the living standards of 
families in the rural areas however, as they have been made in 
terms of average earnings in the three categories. 
(15) This is further supported by the conclusions of the 
economic sections of the Keiskammahoek rural survey 
which argued that the best insurance for a reasonable 
standard of living for the family was for the bread-
winner to have a job outside agriculture but within 
the reserve itself. Hobart Houghton and Walton [78]. 
\ 
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TABLE 5.11 ESTIMATE OF AVERAGE RURAL FAMILY INCOMES IN 
KWAZULU IN 1970 AND A COMPARISON WITH THOSE 
OF AN URBANISED AFRICAN FAMILY. 
Family with Family with Family with 
land - one no land and land and no 
agricultural one migrant migrant 
worker and 
one migrant 
Agricul- (R) (R) (R) 
tural out-
put per 




worker (B) 31 31 31 
Modern 
Sector 
Earnings (C) 417 417 
Family 
Income (D) 499 448 82 
Single 
Male Con-
sumption (E) 296 296 -
Disposable 
Family In-
comes 203 152 82 
Per Capita 
Family of 









A. Agricultural Output data from South Africa 1974. [250J 
Agricultural Labour Force from 1970 Census Report 02-02-02 
[260J. This implies the assumption that no members of the 
commuter work force are employed in agriculture, i.e. that 
all agricultural workers enumerated in the 1970 census as 
resident in Kwa Zulu rural areas and employed in agri-
culture were employed in subsistence agriculture. 
t 
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B. Subsistence income has been estimated in terms of the ratio 
of subsistence income to agricultural incomes given in 
South Africa 1974.[250] p.293. 
C. Migrants' - earnings have been estimated from Total Earnings 
of Migrants and the estimated number of migrants contained 
in Table C3. 
D. Urban family incomes from Table 5.9. 
E. Migrants' consumption has been estimated from the proportion 
of expenditure of single households in Table 5.10 to the 
Average Total Income of those households given in Table 5.9 
i.e. it has been assumed that the migrant consumes 71 per 
cent of his income and remits the remaining 29 per cent to 
his family. Urban Male Consumption from Table -5.10. 
The data in Table 5.11 shows that there is indeed a substantial 
gap between the living standards of the families of the settled 
workers and those of the rural urban migrant. On the high esti-
mate, the average per capita gap between the members of the families 
in the urban areas and those in the rural areas is as large as 
202 per cent. It seems that whereas the migrant worker consumes 
at approximately the same absolute level as the settled worker, 
the latter's family consumption per head on subsistence items 
is more than twice as great as the per capita consumption of a 
rural family. In addition, whereas the male worker in the urban 
family has an estimated per capita consumption three times 
greater than the family average, the migrant worker's absolute 
consumption level is seven times greater than that of his family. 
It appears from the data presented in Table 5.11 that migrant 
workers do indeed consume the major proportion of their family's 
total income and, as a result, whereas the living standards of 
the migrant worker and the settled workers are similar, those 
- 167 -
of their families are substantially different. However, since 
the earning rates of the two classes of workers are not very 
different, it seems that, although undoubtedly a contributory 
factor, the low rate of remittances and earnings of migrants is 
not the major cause of the gap between urban and rural family 
living standards: more significant is the difference in the earn-
ing potential of the family's second worker. Whereas the second 
worker in the rural family, working on the land, if the family 
still holds the right to land, brings into the family income an 
additional R82 per annum, the second urban worker contributes on 
average R350 per annum, suggesting that there is a four fold 
difference in the labour productivity between the sectors. 
It is often argued that it is indeed this low level of labour 
productivity in the homelands that drives migrants away from 
their homes to seek work in the more productive modern sector. 
However, the following section argues that this link may not be 
as simple as it appears and that the low labour productivity of 
the homelands is as much a result of, as it is a cause of the 
migrant labour supply. 
5.6 The Migrant Labour System and Production in KwaZulu 
It was argued earlier that there are two different and quite dis-
tinct views of the production effects of out-migration, the one 
seeing migration as a positive force in economic growth and 
development, the other arguing that out-migration results in the 
further impoverishment of the supplying economy. 
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If out-migration is to affect production in the home economy it 
will do so through the effect that it exercises upon the 
following: 
1. The rate of capital accumulation in the area. 
2. The choice of techniques in the home economy. 
3. The rate of technical progress experienced. 
5.6.1 Migrant Labour and Capital Accumulation in KwaZulu 
Ideally if one wishes to seek out the effects that the continuance 
of the migratory labour system has had upon the KwaZulu economy 
over the years, one needs infromation concerning the modes of pro-
duction in the economy, the overall levels of productivity of both 
capital and albour and any changes that have occurred. However 
as there is very little data on the process of production and on the 
changes that might have occurred in the production modes over time 
in KwaZulu, one if, therefore, forced to rely on indirect indicators 
of the trends in productivity and growth in the rural areas supply-
ing the migrants. Table 5.12 shows the behaviour of certain selected 
indicators in KwaZulu. 
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TABLE 5.12 SOME INDICATORS OF INVESTMENT IN THE KWAZULU 
RURAL AREAS FOR THE PERIOD 1936-1970~ SELECTED 
INDICATORS ONLy(16) 
Index of the Number of: 
Year Cattle Woolled Ploughs Culti- Wagons Children 
Units Sheep vators and in 
Trolleys School 
(A) (A) (B ) . (B) (B) (A) 
1936 100 100 100 100 100 
1946 102 103 132 100 108 184 
1960 104 101 156 201 127 451 




Year 0 - ,2 ,43 ,76 2 ,47 - 1,00 6,22 
Com-
pound 
A. Data used to create these indices refers to all Bantu 
Reserve Areas and not simply to Natal or Kwazulu. 
B. Data here refers to Natal Rural Bantu Reserve Areas for 
the years 1936, 1946 and to KwaZulu for 1960 and 1970. 
C. From Table 5.6 column 6 . 
(16) Data on which the indices in Table 5.12 are based is 












The data presented in Table 5.12 paints a depressing picture. 
Investment, apart from investment in cultivators and in educa-
tion appears to be almost non-existent in the KwaZulu rural 
areas. This lack of net investment in subsistence agriculture, 
apart from the labour saving investment in cultivators, when 
coupled with the rapid growth of investment in education is cer-
tainly indicative of a change in the underlying social values 
of the community. The evidence in Table 5.12 suggests that 
this change does indeed represent a movement away from the pur-
suit of subsistence agriculture towards an increasing depen-
dence upon the migratory labour system supporting the arguments 
advanced by Arrighi [6] and Amin [4] 
Low levels of investment in agriculture, particularly when 
coupled with acute shortages of particular forms of labour must 
lead to little or no growth in the output of the sector. Evi-
_ dence of this being the case is given by the behaviour of the 
the index of maize output per head in the African Reserve areas 
of South Africa which has fallen from 100 in 1936 to 83 in 1970. 
Over this same period the total maize output of these areas grew 
(17) at an annual compound rate of 1.26 per cent. It seems from 
(17) See Table D2 in Appendix D for the data on which these 
indeces are based. 
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this data that the level of investment and technical progress in 
subsistence agriculture in these areas was not sufficiently high, 
therefore, to enable the community to maintain their living stan-
dards in the face of an expanding population. 
It is possible to argue that the low level of investment in sub-
sistence agriculture vis a vis that in education simply reflects 
the relative returns on such investments. This is· undoubtedly 
true but the more interesting question is why is there such a 
gap in the prospective returns on these two types of investment? 
Merle Lipton [119] has argued that the Transkeian rural areas 
would be capable of supporting a much larger population than they 
do at the moment if they were intensively farmed. Presumably 
this would also be true of the KwaZulu rural areas, particularly 
in view of the fact that large areas are suitable for the culti-
vation of sugar. 
(18) 
The view was advanced in Chapter Three that the selectivity 
of the migration process mitigates against investment and tech-
nical progress in the supplying area and consequently acts to 
increase the gap between the returns on investment in agri-
culture and those from migrant labour rather than acting to in-
troduce conditions that would act to equalise the returns on 
migrant labour and peasant farming. The relationship is seen as 
operating in the following manner. 
(18) See Section 3. 
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Firstly, as was shown earlier, the migration process in KwaZulu 
is age and education selective in nature with the migration pro-
pensities being higher than average amongst the young and the 
better educated. 
As youth is the innovator of most change, a high rate of absence 
amongst those aged under forty years means that it becomes in-
creasingly difficult to introduce new techniques in an area so 
denuded of men in those age groups. In an African context where 
the man is traditionally the decision maker, this effect is re-
inforced and the decision making process becomes increasingly 
cumbersome as the proportion of males absent from the area rises. 
Secondly, innovation in agriculture requires investment. The low 
level of remittances by migrants to the rural areas, coupled 
with the low levels of productivity in those areas which are in-
tensified by the drain imposed by the continued residence of the 
migrant's dependents, means that rural family incomes are too 
small to permit any substantial savings to be made out of these 
incomes as is evidertced by the data in Table 5.12. 
Thirdly, the massive transfer of labour power from the homeland 
rural areas to the urban areas alters both the economic and 
social relationships in these communities. Schmookler [179] 
argues that innovations follow, rather than generate, changing 
demand patterns and that consequently innovation is a function 
of the level of socio-economic change. It is in this regard 
that one can explain the relationship between migration, the 
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pattern of investment in KwaZulu rural areas and the change in 
techniques. Development in South Africa as a whole has not been 
accompanied by development in these rural areas; the changing 
relative rewards to be gained from peasant agriculture and migrant 
labour has led to a growth in the demand for the latter by work 
seekers. Changing demand patterns in the job market have en-
couraged innovations and changes in techniques that will facili-
tate the acquisition of jobs in the modern sector. Hence one 
finds a substantial growth in investment by the rural family in 
education and in labour saving equipment on the farm such as cul-
tivators and ploughs in order, firstly to fit the emergent worker 
for a job in the modern sector and secondly, t .o free him from his 
traditional tasks in order that he can take up the desired occu-
pation. 
In terms of this argument, development with a system of oscilla-
ting migration distorts the social and economic relationships to 
the point where the market acts to reinforce the imbalances in 
the system rather than to correct them. There is no tendency to 
stability in the system; oscillating migration continues and in-
deed the rate of migration increases as the general impoverish-
ment of the rural areas rises, intensifying the problem. Invest-
ment in agriculture all but ceases, past capital accumulation is 
consumed by neglect and traditional agriculture stagnates. The 
inhabitants of the region become totally reliant upon the growing 
sector; even their very existence depends upon the remittances 
received from the oscillating migrants. 
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Although there is no hard, grass roots evidence that would sup-
port the view that this is indeed the relationship between oscilla-
ting migration and labour productivity in the supplying region, 
the general economic situation in the rural areas of KwaZulu is 
certainly one of abject poverty, economic stagnation, and depen-
dence which is in keeping with the overall picture of the effects 
that qne would expect following the arguments presented above. 
5.6.2 Migrant Labour and the Income Generating Leakages 
in the System. 
A migrant worker typically remits between 20 - 30 per cent of his 
earnings to the rural areas where his family lives. The remain-
ing percentage he spends in the area where he works. This means 
that the value of the expenditure multiplier in KwaZulu of a 
migrant worker is of the order of one quarter of the value of 
that of a worker employed in the area in a similarly productive 
job. When one remembers that the low estimate of the earnings of 
migrant workers from KwaZulu rural areas that are not remitted 
to the homeland totalled Rl07 216 000 in 1970 which was the equi-
valent of 174 per cent of KwaZulu's Gross Domestic Product in 
1970, it becomes evident that this is a leakage of massive pro-
portions particularly when one considers that a portion of the 
income that is remitted is spent on goods imported from the mod-
ern sector and that consequently this represents an underestimate 
of the magnitude of the 'import leakage'. 
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From the modern sector viewpoint, if the average propensity to save 
in the sector is assumed to be twenty per cent, the expenditure of 
migrants from KwaZulu in 1970 would have generated additional in-
vestment in the modern sector of R21 443 000. Investment of this 
magnitude would have been sufficient to create 7000 new jobs in 1970 
is one assumes that the capital labour ratio is R3 000 per man. 
7000 new jobs would be equivalent of 44 per cent of the official 
. (19) 
estimate of the new jobs that are required annually 1n KwaZulu. 
It is interesting to note that the grant payable to the KwaZulu 
Government by the Central Government in terms of sub section 
6(2)(c) and (d) of the Bantu Homeland Constitution Act, 1971 
totalled R33 776 000 in respect of the year 1973-1974. Two-thirds 
of this grant could therefore be viewed simply as a transfer of the 
savings generated in the modern sector by the expenditure of Kwa-
Zulu's migrant workers there. 
If one undertakes an academic exercise similar to that done by 
Amin [4] in respect of West Africa and assumes that the migrant 
workers could have been employed in KwaZulu had the capital supply 
in South Africa been more mobile, one can obtain an estimate of 
the opportunity cost to KwaZulu of the migratory labour system in 
terms of profits and investment lost and the consequent reduced 
levels of employment creation. 
In order to obtain the estimate the following assumptions have been 
made: 
(19 ) Official estimates of the number of new jobs 
annually inside KwaZulu is 16 000 per annum. 




1. That the ratio of wage payments to profit that exists for 
the South African economy as a whole, represents the ratio 
of the surplus generated by the migrants from KwaZulu to 
their total earnings in the modern sector. 
2. That the average savings rate out of this surplus is 20 
d 11 h · .. d' 1 1.·nvested.(20) per cent an that a t 1.S sav1.ng 1.S pro uct1.ve y 
3. That the cost of creating a job in KwaZulu was R948 in 
1936; Rl568 in 1946; R2849 in 1960 and R3500 in 1970, giving 
a weighted average cost of job creation over the period of 
R1587. (21) 
On the basis of these assumptions, a conservative estimate of 
the number of jobs that have been created from investment resu1t-
ing from the contribution to output made by the migrants from Kwa 
Zulu over the period is 113 000 jobs which represents an invest-
ment of Rl 793 million rand. (22) Although this- investment was 
(20) The ratio of Gross Domestic Capital formation to Gross 
Domestic Product in South Africa was - 1946-24 per cent, 
1960-20 per cent, 1964-24 per cent, 1968-23 per cent and 
1970-29 per cent. [249] 
(21) These figures have been obtained by deflating the 1970 
cost of R3500 per job by the wholesale price index 1970=100. 
The 1970 cost per job of R3500 has been obtained on the 
following basis: 
Cost per job to the corporation in Isithebe 
South African Year Book 1974 ~50] p.296 
Cost of inducements per job Permanent 
Committee Report 1969 
Social overhead investments estimated 
Total Estimated cost of job creation in 
KwaZulu 
(22) See Table D3 in Appendix D for the data from 






generated partly as a result of the labour exported from KwaZulu 
the output flowing from it has accrued for the benefit of indi-
viduals o~tside KwaZulu, except insofar as the investment has 
provided jobs for additional migrants from the area, in which 
case KwaZulu has at least benefitted from the remittances sent 
home 
. (23) 
by these m1grants. If one assumes a capital output 
ratio of three(24) then in 1970 investment of this magnitude 
would have generated output of the value of R598 million rand, 
which is nine times greater than the value of KwaZulu's Gross 
(25) 
Domestic Product in the same year. 
This type of estimate will overstate the magnitude of the loss 
to KwaZulu from the migrant labour system since it overlooks 
any transfer made by the central government for the development 
of the social overhead capital in the are,a and also assumes that 
jobs could have been created within KwaZulu had the development 
path of the South African economy been different. It does how-
ever serve to highlight the costs of the migrant labour system 
to KwaZulu in terms of development opportunities foregone. 
(23) Although as it was argued in Section 4.6 this may not 
represent a positive long run gain. 
(24) de Jager [42] p.2l estimates average capital output 
ratios for the South African economy as a whole of 
1946-1950 2,03; 1956-1960 2,25; and 1966-1970 2,18. 
(25) Kwa Zulu's Gross Domest ic Product from South Africa 
1974 [250] 
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5.7 The Impact of the Migrant Labour System on the Development 
of KwaZulu - A Summary of the Main Findings. 
The main findings concerning the impact that the migrant labour 
system has had on the rural areas of KwaZulu that emerge from 
the analysis carried out in this study are the following: 
1. The degree of out-migration amongst adult men in the area 
has accelerated throughout the period 1936 to 1970, in-
creasing most rapidly in the ten year period prior to 1970. 
2. In 1936 on average one in three adult men aged between 15 
and 64 years was absent as a migrant worker on the census 
date. In 1970 one out of every two adult men in this age 
category was a migrant and in the category 25 - 45 years, 
two out of every three men were absent. 
3. In particular districts of rural KwaZulu such as Msinga, 
Nkandla, Umvoti and Alfred County, the absentee rate was 
above 70 per cent in 1970. 
4. Over the thirty four year period studied here, the demo-
graphic patterns of the migration stream have altered quite 
substantially. In every age group a greater proportion of 
men migrated in 1970 than was the case in 1934 but in addi-
tion migrants leave the rural areas on average at younger 
ages than they did in ,the earlier years and remain away 
from their homes for a longer total period. 
5. OVer the thirty four year period out-migration grew nearly 
one per cent faster than popUlation and over the ten years 
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1960 to 1970 the rate of out-migration amongst adult men 
was more than twice as high as the rate of growth of popu-
lation. 
6. Although the rate of female migration is considerably 
smaller than that among men the behaviour of the stream of 
female migrants has similar characteristics to that of the 
men. Woman do however retire from the modern sector work 
force at a substantially younger average age than the men. 
7. The migrant labour system has significantly distorted the 
relationship between the demographic variables in the rural 
areas. Whereas the ratio of dependents to economically 
active individuals among the Zulu speaking people in South 
Africa as a whole in 1970 was 2,86:1 in the rural areas of 
Kwa Zulu, this ratio was 3,85:1 an increase of thirty five 
per cent in the dependency burden. 
8. The masculinity ratio in the rural areas of Kwa Zulu was 
1:3 for the age cohort 19-64 years, whereas in a normal 
population distribution one would expect this ratio to be 
of the order of 1:1. Thus the economy is suffering from a 
severe shortage of adult male workers which must substan-
tially affect the prospects for successful development in 
the area. 
9. The distribution of adult men by occupation highlights the 
inability of the area to provide jobs for its work force. 
51 per cent of all men between 15 and 64 were absent as 
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migrants. A further 9 per cent live in KwaZulu but 
commute to white South Africa to work. 28 per cent are 
still employed in subsistence agriculture, and so may in-
clude some degree of under-employment. Jobs outside agri-
culture within KwaZulu itself were only available for 12 
per cent of the adult male work force in 1970. 
Statistics of this order of magnitude indicate that the Kwa-
Zulu rural areas are heavily dependent upon White South 
Africa to provide employment and so a large proportion of 
the means of subsistence for sixty per cent of the areas 
total population. 
10. Such evidence as is avai lable indicates that it is highly 
probable that the marginal product of a migrant in the sub-
sistence sector is below his average consumption. This 
being so per capita consumption levels in the rural areas 
will rise as a result of his migration. 
However, the magnitude of the degree of out-migration, 
coupled with the fact that it is more highly concentrated 
among the young better-educated men implies that although 
prima facie one would expect average consumption levels 
to rise, the migrants absence may shift the area's production 
function downwards so that total and average outputs fall 
rather than rise as a result of the migration. Falling 
average products in agriculture over the period 1960-1970 
support this contention. 
11. The remittances sent into the rural areas of KwaZulu by 
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migrants are very substantial being the equivalent of 
41 per cent of the Homelands' Gross Domestic Product in 1970, 
88 per cent of the economy's subsistence production and 142 
per cent of its agricultural output in the same year. Remit-
tances from migrants over the thirty four year period have 
grown at an annual compound rate of 9,7 per cent. This 
rapid rate of growth in the amount of the remittances is due 
to a combination of three factors, namely the rate of growth 
of out-migration itself, the growth in the average wages paid 
to African workers over the period, and finally to the struc-
tural change that has accompanied South Africa's economic 
development which has resulted in a faster rate of growth of 
better paid jobs for Africans vis ~ vis the growth of jobs 
in the low wage sector. 
12. On average it would appear that a family in the rural areas 
of KwaZulu had a locally generated subsistence income per 
head of R16 in 1970. Remittances per head on average,in terms 
of the low estimate made in this section,were R16 in cash with 
a further R8 in the form of goods and services. On such data 
it is obvious that in the short term the maintenance of the 
migrant labour system is essential for the continuance of the 
very existence of a large portion of the area's population. 
13. The migratory labour system, whilst essential in the short 
term in no way represents an optimal allocation of resources 
in the longer term since it was shown that the system leads 
to a transfer of income within the family from those with 
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lower levels of consumption to the migrant himself as a 
result of institutional factors in the system that apparently 
make it necessary for the migrant to maintain living stan-
dards in the urban areas that are the equivalent of those of 
a settled urban worker. 
14. Due to the fact that the migrant appears to consume approxi-
mately 70 per cent of his earnings in the modern sector and 
also to the low productivity of the second worker in the 
rural sector vis a vis the second earner in the family set-
tled in the modern sector, per capita incomes of the family 
in the rural areas are of the order of one third of the per 
capita incomes of a similar family in the urban area, des-
pite the fact that the male workers in both families 
appear to be earning equivalent wages. 
15. Evidence presented in this chapter supports the view that 
whilst there has been very little private investment in the 
subsistence sector, what investment there has been has been 
allocated to education and to labour saving devices. It 
was further argued that this reallocation of investment re-
duces the productivity of subsistence agriculture and in-
creases the rate of out-migration. 
16. The evidence presented also supports the contention that the 
migrant labour system has mitigated against technical pro-
gress in the rural areas since it has drastically reduced 
the labour supply in the area, has resulted in low levels of 
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family incomes that , make saving almost impossible and has 
been highly selective of the young, better-educated men who 
one would expect to be the innovators in the area. 
17. The low level of remittances by migrants has lead to the 
generation of ~ massive expenditure leakage. Had the 
migrants spent all their earnings in KwaZulu rather than a 
mere 30 per cent, this additional expenditure would have pro-
vided jobs for 7000 men in 1970 assuming a savings ratio of 
20 per cent and a cost per job of R3000. 
18. If one assumes that capital invested in the modern sector to 
provide jobs for migrant s could equally well have been in-
vested in KwaZulu then a conservative estimate of the jobs 
that have been created i n the modern sector from the surplus 
created in that sector by KwaZulu migrants amounts to 
113 000 which represents investment over the period of 
Rl 793 million rand, which in turn with the assumption of a 
capital output ratio of 3 generated output in 1970 of R598 
million rand which is nine times greater than the Gross 
Domestic Product of KwaZulu in 1970. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE MIGRANT LABOUR SYSTEM AND 
SOUTH AFRICA'S FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
6.1 Introduction. 
It appears that three major conclusions emerge from this study 
of the migrant labour system and economic development in South 
Africa. These three conclusions are: 
1. The migrant labour system has now become institutionalised 
as a way of life in the South African economy. Both the 
economies of the supplying regions and that of the receiving 
area are totally dependent at present upon its continuance. 
The system has continued more or less unchanged, apart from 
some institutional reinforcement in the form of the influx 
control measures instituted in recent years, for more than 
a century. Throughout this period the size of the stream 
of oscillating migrants has continued to grow and, what is 
more, the rate at which the stream of migrants is growing 
has itself increased in recent years. 
2. Throughout the period of development with migrant labour 
the modern sector of the South African economy has progress-
ed at a very satisfactory rate. During the sixty years from 
1911 to 1970, Gross Domestic Product at factor incomes 
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measured in current prices, grew at a compound ra~e of 
5,36 per cent per annum. The retail price index showed an 
annual average compound rate of growth of 2,32 per cent over 
the same sixty year period. 
Over the thirty four year period covered by this study, 
1936 to 1970, the average annual compound rate of growth of 
Gross D.omestic Product increased to 8,33 per cent whilst 
the rate of growth of retail prices rose to 3,41 per cent 
per annum over the same period. During the ten year period 
1960 to 1970 the annual average rate of growth of Domestic 
Product rose still further to 8,96 per cent per annum, 
whilst the rate of growth of retail prices dropped to annual 
average rate of increase of 2,75 per cent. (1) 
In 1911 agricultural output contributed 21 per cent of 
Gross Domestic Product and by 1970 this percentage had de-
clined to 9 per cent. Mining and agriculture combined, 
formed 49 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product in 1911. 
By 1970 the percentage share of mining and agriculture in 
Gross Domestic Product had declined to 19 per cent. These 
statistics show that the modern sector of the South African 
economy, apart from mining and large scale agriculture, 
grew at a rate considerably above the rate of growth of the 
(1) Growth rates of South Africa's Gross Domestic Product 
have been estimated from data given in Table 21.4 South 
African Statistics, 1974 [249]. Growth rates of retail 
prices have been taken from Table 8.4 in the same publi-
cation. 
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economy as a whole, despite the sector's increasing reliance 
upon migrant labour. 
3. If, however, one take the economy of KwaZulu as being repre-
sentative of the economies of all the areas supplying mi-
grant labour to the modern sector of the South African 
economy, then from the indicators that it is possible to 
obtain, it seems that economic progress in these areas has 
been far less satisfactory. Over the thirty four year per-
iod 1936-1970 maize output in African Reserve Areas in 
South Africa rose by an annual average compound growth rate 
(2) 
of only 1,26 per cent. This rate of growth was insuffic-
ient to counteract the increase in population in the areas 
and maize output per head fell during the period at an 
annual average compound rate of just over one half of one 
per cent. 
The data assembled in chapter five also indicates that in-
vestment in KwaZulu's rural areas, measured in current 
prices, was' for all intents and purposes static over the 
period 1936-1970. When one considers that over the same 
period the wholesale price index increased at an average 
compound rate of growth of 3,85 per cent(3) these statistics 
(2) From Table D2 in Appendix D. 
(3) Indicators of investment in KwaZulu are contained in 
Table Dl in Appendix D. Wholesale prices were taken 
from Table 8.4 in South African Statistics, 1974 [249] 
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in fact imply that there was net capital consumption in the 
rural areas of KwaZulu rather than net investment. Capital 
consumption threatens future productivity and it seems poss-
ible that future output levels could fall rather than rise 
in these areas. There was, however, positive net investment 
in education in the Black areas, as the number of African 
children in school in South Africa grew at an average annual 
compound rate of 6,22 per cent over the thirty four year 
period 1934-1970. 
It seems very clear from this study that whilst the South African 
economy has grown satisfactorily in aggregate terms in the past 
with the migrant labour system, a closer investigation reveals 
that this growth has been highly uneven and has been to the 
detriment of the areas supplying labour and to the benefit of 
the area receiving the migrants. 
In the light of the analysis presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 
3 it appears that all the evidence that has been assembled in 
this study supports the view that South Africa has developed 
along a development by underdevelopment growth path, similar to 
that described by Arrighi 17J in respect of Rhodesia and Amin 
[4] in respect of certain West African countries. 
It also seems from the evidence presented in Chapter 5 that it 
is possible that the migrant labour system itself contributed to 
the further underdevelopment of the Homeland rural areas. This 
- 188 -
underdevelopment is the result of the effects that the system 
has had upon the supply of productive labour in those areas, the 
accumulation of capital, the patterns of investment and the gen-
eral level of technical progress in the domestic economy. 
Since the present South African Government is now c~mmit-
ted to a policy of separate development, which entails the estab-
lishment of independent African Homeland areas that must even-
tually become economically viable, it would seem essential that 
steps are taken to attempt to prevent any further underdevelop-
ment of the Homeland economies and indeed to ensure that in 
future the South African economy grows upon a development path 
that offers a more equal distribution of the gains from economic 
growth. 
Since the migrant labour system is in part. the cause and in part 
the result of the continuing economic underdevelopment in the 
Homelands, one of the major priorities in the development stra-
tegy should be an assessment of the likely future behaviour of 
the streams of domestic migrants. 
Wilson [233] argues that the South African economy has developed 
beyond the level where oscillating migration would continue if 
it were not for the artificial government imposed barriers 
against permanent in-migration by Africans from the rural areas. 
Consequently he believes that the removal of these barriers 
would go a long way towards the achievement of the eventual 
\ 
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elimination of the migrant labour system in South Africa. It 
was, however, argued in Chapter 3 that Wilson's view of the evo-
lutionary forces underlying the migration streams in South Africa 
implicitly assumes that the economy is travelling along a path 
in which development occurs in all sectors of the economy such 
as that described by Lewis [115] and Fei and Ranis [54]. If, on 
the other hand, the economy is developing along a development 
with underdevelopment path, the removal of the artificial bar-
riers, although it might reduce the size of the stream of mi-
grants would certainly not eliminate the system since the cause 
lies in the growth process itself in such a case. 
Since the policy prescription pertaining to the elimination of 
the migrant labour system and to the time scale involved are 
totally different on the two growth paths, it becomes essential 
that one forms an assessment as to which development path is the 
relevant one. As the predicted behaviour of future migration 
streams is also different on the two growth paths, it is possible 
to distinguish between the alternatives by predicting the future 
behaviour of the forces determining domestic migration. One can 
then make use of these predictions to assist in the identifica-
tion of the nature of the development path of the South African 
economy. 
6.2. The Evolution of the Forces Affecting Domestic Migration 
in South Africa. 
It was argued in Chapter 3 that there are four forces acting upon 
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domestic migration streams; rural push forces, rural pull forces, 
urban pull forces and urban push forces and further that these 
forces act upon the migrants in different fashions and will 
evolve in differing manners as development proceeds. The be-
haviour of these forces in the past, together with an assessment 
of their likely future behaviour will be considered separately 
in the following sections. 
6.2.1. The Evolution of the Rural Push Forces. 
The major rural push force is undoubtedly the level of income 
that can be generated in the rural area itself. The evidence 
presented in Chapter 5 showed that income per head generated 
within the Homeland rural areas had fallen over the period in 
absolute terms. Subsistence output per head per economically 
active worker in KwaZulu measured in current prices fell from 
R56 in 1960 to R51 in 1970. In addition, the area has become 
increasingly dependent upon the remittances from its out-migrants 
for its survival. Migrants remittances formed an increasing pro-
portion of KwaZulu's disposable income, increasing from 21 per 
cent of the Gross Domestic Product in 1960 to 41 per cent in 
1970. (4) 
(4) Subsistence output per head was estimated from data 
contained in South Africa 19741250] p.293, and Report 
02-02-02 of the 1970 Census [260] Migrants remittances 
are taken from Table 5.6 in Chapter 5. 
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On this data there seems no doubt that the intensity of the rural 
push forces has continued to increase in recent years. When one 
combines this information with the knowledge that the area has 
had rapid population growth rates and with the fact that capital 
consumption appears to have taken place in recent years in the 
rural areas of KwaZulu, it seems evident that the rural push 
forces will continue to increase in intensity in the immediate 
future. If this is indeed so then this anticipated increase in 
the push forces can be expected to increase the flow of out-
migrants from these regions providing there is no other inter-
ference in the present economic matrix. 
6.2.2. The Evolution of the Rural Pull Forces 
When one turns to consider the evolution of the rural pull forces, 
the position becomes less clear cut. It has been argued by 
Watson [224] that there is a maximum rate of out-migration that 
can be tolerated by a society before its traditional, social and 
economic modes become substantially disturbed. If this is so, 
one would expect the rate of increase of out-migration to drop 
as the level of out-migration approached the socially critical 
level. 
A study of the behaviour of migration rates in twenty eight dis-
tricts of KwaZulu for the years 1960 and 1970 revealed the 
following information: 
1. Nine out of the twenty eight districts had growth rates of 
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migration above the mean growth rate for the area as a 
whole. Of these nine districts all but two had average 
migration rates below the mean migration rate for the area 
as a whole in 1960. 
2. Seven districts had average rates of migration above the 
area mean rate in 1960 and all seven of these areas had 
growth rates of out-migration below the average rate over 
the ten year period. 
This data does support the view that the costs of migration 
to the supplying community increase as the average rate of 
absenteeism rises, increasing the power of the rural pull 
forces on the would-be out-migrant. 
If this is indeed S03 it would seem that once the rate of male 
absence has reached the limit that is tolerable in terms of the 
present set of social values of the community, the rate of growth 
of out-migration will tend to be limited to the rate of increase 
in the supply of available men in these areas at least in the 
short term. Time is required to change social values even when 
there is substantial economic pressure for such change. However, 
it should be noted that although this argument implies that there 
may well be a tendency for the rate of increase in the rate of 
out-migration to stabilise itself at the rate of population 
growth, the absolute numbers of out-migrants from the areas will 
continue to increase. 
The second major rural pull force stems from the fact that the 
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traditional society offers a form of social security to its mem-
bers, and that so long as the employers in the modern sector 
fail to supply an adequate substitute, migrant workers will re-
tain their ties with their traditional culture and economy in 
order to obtain this social security; both as a hedge against 
illness or unemployment in the modern sector and in order to pro-
vide a means of survival on their retirement. 
There is very little data available to enable one to establish 
the extent to which modern sector employers are now paying pen-
sions and other social security payments to their migrant workers. 
If one could obtain adequate data of this nature, it would enable 
one to make some assessment of the extent to which modern sector 
employers attempt to offset the rural pull force that arises 
from the migrant worker's inherent feeling of insecurity in his 
new environment. What data that is available indicates the ex-
tent of the provision of such services for migrant labourers is 
insignificant. The Bureau of Market Research's study [210] into 
the expenditure patterns of single African households in Durban 
in 1970 showed that only three income groups, out of the eleven 
surveyed, had members contributing to pension funds and that the 
average contributions were, i n all instances, less than one half 
of one per cent of the average income of the group, indicating 
that a very small number of individuals in each group actually 
contributed to such funds. This data is certainly not indica-
tive of substantial provision of social security payments to 
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migrant workers by modern sector employers. 
It would seem on this evidence that, far from declining as econ-
omic development proceeds as Wilson [233] believed, the rural 
pull forces appear to be increasing as: 
1) There appears to have been little effort made to provide 
social security benefits for the migrant workers to the 
modern sector 
2) As the male absentee rate rises in the rural areas, so the 
relative costs to the family of a migrant's absence appears 
to increase, which will encourage the family to exert 
pressure upon the migrant to return as often as is 
economically feasible. 
6.3 The Evolution of the Urban Pull Forces. 
It was argued in Chapter 3 that there are two major urban pull 
forces. The first force is the result of the existence of diff-
erences in the average levels of earnings in the rural and the 
urban sector Lewis [115]. The second force is the result of in-
creasing job opportunities in the modern or high-wage sector. 
Todaro [204]. In order to evaluate the size and direction of 
these forces adequately, one would ideally like to have informa-
tion on the behaviour of the following economic variables: 
1. the average wage rates paid to migrant workers in the 
modern sector, 
2. the number of migrant workers employed in the high wage 
sector as opposed to those who find work in the informal 
sector of the modern economy. Berg [17] Reynolds [162] 
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3. the relative rates of growth of unemployment in the high 
wage sector and the informal sector. 
Unfortunately, such statistics are not available for the South 
African economy and once again one is forced to reply upon the 
behaviour of surrogate data. 
Table 6.1 contains information on the behaviour of African em-
ployment, average African wage rates in real terms and the aver-
age capital/labour ratio for the manufacturing and construction 
sectors of the economy. These variables have been chosen as 
representative of the behaviour of African employment in the 
whole of the modern sector and average African wage rates in the 
modern sector. The capital/labour ratio has been included in 
order that it can be used as an indicator of the likely future 
trends in the growth of employment relative to that of investment 
in the modern sector and the behaviour of this ratio will be dis-
cussed in section 6.2.4 as being representative of one of the 
urban push forces. 
If one accepts the indicators used in Table 6.1 as being adequate 
surrogates for the behaviour of the true variables that affect 
the strength of the urban pull forces, it seems clear from the 
evidence in the table that over the period covered by this study, 
the pull forces generated by increasing job opportunities in the 
modern sector were positive throughout the period. In addition 















INDICATORS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE URBAN FORCES 
THAT ACT UPON MIGRATION STREAMS. 
Manufacturing Sector Construction Sector 
Employment Average Capital Average 
African Labour 
Employment African of of 
African Wage in Ratio Africans 
Wage in 
Men Real in Real Real 
Terms Terms Terms 
A B C D E 
122 357 274 - - -
187 468 467 906 34 646 432 
335 580 486 1601 83 488 446 
518 531 660 1790 248 300 639 
4,36 5,48 - - -
4,25 ,29 4,15 6,48 ,23 
4,45 3,11 1,12 11,52 3,66 
4,34 2,62 - - -





in Real Rural 
Terms Areas 
F G 
- 476 000 
451 635 000 
355 887 000 





- ,59 3,2 
A Total male African employment in manufacturing taken from the following sources: 
1936 Van der Horst [217] p.23. 1946 From Statistical Year Book 1964 1247] p.H.25. 
1960 from South African Statistics 1974 [249] p.7. 7. 1970 from Manufacturing 
Census 1970 [256]. The growth rates in the table are average annual compound 
rates of growth in all cases. 
B Average African real wages have been calculated from data obtained from the 
sources given in A. Money wages were then inflated by the inverse of the con-
sumer price index given in South African Statistics 1974 [249] p.8.4. 1970 was 
taken as 100. 
C The capital/labour ratio has been obtained by dividing the estimates of the 'capi-
tal stock in manufacturing in the year made by de Jager 142] by the total employ-
ment in manufacturing for the same year taken from South African Statistics 1974 [249] 
p.7.3. It is given in constant 1963 prices. 
D Obtained from the sare sources as were outlined in A, but for the Construction 
industry. 170 data from South African Statistics 1974 1249] 
E Obtained in the same manner as B, but for the construction industry. 
F Obtained in the same manner as C, but for the construction industry. As de Jager 
142] includes only contractors in his estimate of the carital stock of the con-
struction sector, this estimate of the capital/labour ratio is understated and 
its use implies the assumption that movements in this ratio are indeed represen-
tative of movements in the capital stock ratio of the construction sector of the 
economy. 
G From Table 4 in Chapter 4. 
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the ten year period 1960-1970. Jobs for African men in manufac-
turing and construction grew at an annual average compound rate 
of 5,3 per cent over the period 1946-1970. Out-migration from 
South Africa's rural areas by African men grew at an average 
annual compound rate of 3,2 per cent during the same period. 
However, during the period 1960-1970 employment of African men 
in the modern sector grew at an average compound rate of 6,23 
per cent and the growth rate of out-migration increased to 4,3 
per cent. 
On the other hand average African wage rates in real terms showed 
no apparent growth in these two sectors of the modern economy 
over the period 1946-1960. However, African real wage rates did 
start to increase after 1960 and grew at an annual average com-
pound rate of slightly over 3 per cent for the ten year period 
1960-1970. 
It would seem, therefore, that one can identify two distinct per-
iods of time in which the behaviour of the urban pull forces 
differed quite substantially: 
1. The period 1946-1960 during which the urban pull force came 
exclusively from an increase in job opportunities in the 
sector. 
2. The period 1960-1970 when two pull forces were operating, 
one from increased job opportunities; which in fact increased 
in its strength . over this period and the second, the result 
of rising real wage rates in the modern sector. 
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Consequently it is apparent that the strength of the urban pull 
forces increased substantially during the ten year period 1960-
1970, when compared with the earlier fourteen year period 1946-
1960. The relative magnitudes of the numbers of migrants away 
from the rural areas of the South African economy on the census 
dates over this period support this view. Domestic migration 
grew at an annual average compound rate of 2,4 per cent over the 
period 1946-1960 and then accelerated to an annual rate of 4,3 
per cent over the ten year period 1960-1970. 
On this evidence it seems that the urban pull forces have gained 
in strength as the economy has continued to develop in the manner 
that Wilson argued would happen. 
6.2.4 The Evolution of the Urban Push Forces 
As far as the evolution of urban push forces as a result of econ-
omic development was concerned, Wilson [233] argued that in-
creasing capital intensity in the modern sector would result in 
a need for a more sophisticated work force. This being so, he 
believed that the costs of a higher labour turnover, which is a 
concomitant of the migrant labour system, would become so great 
that it would pay employers to stabilise their labour force. 
Previously, when less capital was embodied in the individual 
labourer, Wilson argued that it had been more profitable for the 
employer to support the maintenance of the migrant labour system 
since by doing so the employer was able to escape some of his 
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commitments to the maintenance of the migrant's family. 
There are two problems with this argument; 
1. It has been argued by Reynolds [162] that it is not correct 
to assume that increased capital intensity in production 
implies that a higher level of skill is required from the 
labour force. Increased capital intensity may well 
'deskill' labour and reduce the level of training required. 
If this is so then it is possible that, as the degree of 
capital intensity in industry increases, so will the inten-
sity of the urban push forces arising from the employers 
likewise increase rather than diminish. 
2. The data in Table 6.1 on the behaviour of the capital/ 
labour ratio in manufacturing and construction over the 
twenty four year period 1946-1970 does not support Wilson's 
contention either. The data shows that in fact the capital/ 
labour ratio has not increased very rapidly in manufacturing 
over the period and has actually fallen in the construction 
sector. In addition, the capital/labour ratio increased 
more rapidly in manufacturing over the period 1946-1960 than 
it did in the ten years 1960-1970. These statistics do not 
show that Wilson's belief that the capital/labour ratio must 
eventually increase as development continues is incorrect, 
but merely that the South African economy has not yet attain-
ed that stage of development. Consequently taking Wilson's 
argument on his terms, the employers have not yet reached 
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the point where it will pay them to cease from supporting 
the continuance of the migrant labour system. 
It would seem therefore that there appears to be no reason to 
assume that the urban push forces will be substantially differ-
ent in the immediate future . 
6.3 The Future of Domest i c Oscillating Migration in South 
Africa 
From the analysis presented above, it appears that in recent 
times all the forces acting upon the domestic migration streams 
have increased in intensity and that Wilson's argument; 
"that the bal,ance of economic forces which 
previousl,y maintained the oscil,l,ations has 
been so al,tered by the process of economic 
growth that i it were not or other con-
straints (my emphasis) more an more peopl,e 
woul,d be mov?'ng to town." [233], p.158. 
appears to be too optimistic a view of the nature of the current 
South African development parameters. 
It seems evident that since the growth processes, together with 
the market forces operating within the growth path, have exacer-
bated the extent of the migratory labour system and have in-
creased the degree of underdevelopment of the regions supplying 
the migrants, substantial government intervention will be re-
quired to alleviate the situation. This intervention will have 
to be on a scale far beyond that of simply removing the present 
barriers to black advancement, if the stated government aims of 
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creating independent economically viable African Homelands are 
to have any hope of realisation. 
Up to the present time development in South Africa has resulted 
in the institutionalisation of a massive structural imbalance in 
the relationship between the geographical location of job oppor-
tunities vis-~-vis that of the African population in South Africa. 
Exactly how large this imbalance is can be gauged when one recalls 
that according to these estimates 43 per cent of all the economi-
cally active African men in South Africa are migrant workers. 
This massive reliance upon the system of migratory labour has re-
sulted in the Homeland rural areas loosing the major portion of 
their young, better educated, economically active male workers. 
More than half the adult males in the Homeland rural areas are 
absent from their homes for the greater part of their working 
life and amongst the better educated echelons, this absentee rate 
reaches nearly ninety per cent. 
The dependence of the Homelands on remittances, coupled with the 
high degree of dependence of the modern sector of the economy on 
the continuance of the supply of labour from the Homelands im-
plies that it will not be a simple task to eliminate or even to 
reduce the degree of reliance on the migratory labour system. 
Any problem that grows worse over time and which is allowed to 
persist is likely to prove highly intractable when one attempts 
to alleviate it. It seems that the migratory labour system will 
be no exception. Men from the rural areas show a greater pro-
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pensity to migrate now than they did even ten years ago, and 
they migrate at a younger age and for longer average periods 
than previously. Consequently it will be necessary to approach 
the problem from the point of view of both the supplying and the 
receiving economies since, until it is possible to offer an out-
migrant a viable employment opportunity in his home region, he 
has no alternative but to migrate in order to enable his de-
pendents to survive. 
There are three major problems to be tackled in respect of the 
migrant labour system, namely: 
1. How to reduce the social and economic costs that arise from 
the fact that continued migration is essential for 
the immediate future due to the continued interdependence 
of the two economies. 
2. How to reduce the level of dependency of the Homeland econ-
omies on the modern sector of the South African economy 
with a view to eventually eliminating the migrant labour 
system in its present form. 
3. How to replace the system with a permanent reallocation of 
workers and their families, which more closely approximates 
the patterns of demand for labour in the economy. 
6.3.1 Policy Measures Designed to Reduce the Social and 
Economic Costs of the Migrant LaboUr System. 
The major economic and social costs of the migrant labour system 
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stem in the main from the fact that the migrant himself is spa-
tially separated from his family, and apart from the costs that arise 
from the increasing underdevelopment of the supplying area, are 
made up of such things as high labour turnover, increased ille-
gitimacy, bigamy and prostitution, parental neglect of children 
left in the care of foster parents, increased corruption, in-
. 1 (5) creased dlsease leve s, etc .. 
As these costs are mostly the result of the family separation, 
it follows that they can be substantially reduced by decreasing 
the extent of this separation. This might be achieved in a number 
of ways: 
1. Additional family housing could be provided in Homeland 
areas adjacent to existing pockets of employment. Areas 
such as Clermont and Umlazi, which althougH they are part 
of KwaZulu, are adjacent to the Durban-Pinetown Complex, 
would be ideally suited for this type of additional housing 
development. Such housing should however be financed from 
central government funds, apart from those funds earmarked 
as development finance for the Homelands, since the rate of 
return on this type of investment is likely to be higher to 
the White sector than to the Homeland government, as the bulk 
of the worker's output accrues to the modern sector and not 
(5) An excellent description of the major economic and social 
costs of the migrant labour system is given ' in Wilson [233] 
Chapter 9. 
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to the Homeland itself. 
2. Additional impetus should be given to the continued decen-
tralisation of industry to areas within easy reach of the 
new Homeland urban areas that are being developed, that is 
to areas both inside and adjacent to the Homelands. Although 
the development of border industries is not likely to 
lessen the degree of dependence of the Homeland areas, it 
will have the beneficial effect of reducing the extent of 
the 'leakages' as the migrant will now live in the Homeland 
and spend the major portion of his earnings in the area. 
increased expenditure should generate employment within the 
Homelands as a consumption goods sector starts slowly to 
emerge. 
This 
3. The present government policy towards the permanent settle-
ment of migrants and their families in the modern sector 
should be changed to allow for a greater degree of permanent 
in-migration. If this was done it should be coupled with 
measures designed to encourage the private sector to stabil-
ise their labour force to a greater extent, and to assist 
with the financing of the additional housing that would be 
required. 
An additional cost of the migrant labour system to the Homelands 
that is not linked simply to family separation, is the cost that 
arises from the very high degree of out-migration among the more 
highly educated members of the community. On these grounds since 
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the White sector appears to be the major beneficiary of expendi-
ture on African education, additional subsidies specifically for 
education should be transferred from the central government to 
the Homelands, as the social rate of return on such investment 
to the Homelands themselves is again likely to be very low. 
Finally, since as it was argued in Chapter five, the investible 
surplus that is partly created by the labour of the migrant work-
ers accrues almost exclusively to the modern sector, apart from 
some Central Government investment in the Homelands and the trans-
fer of budgetary assistance to the Homeland governments, some 
part of the cost of migrant labour system could be offset by 
substantially increasing the transfer income flowing into the 
Homelands from the central government. This increase should not, 
however, be viewed as 'aid', but rather as 'reparation payments' 
made in compensation for the loss of surplus generating labour 
power in the Homelands that has resulted from the migrant labour 
system. 
6.3.2 Measures Designed to Reduce the Overall Dependency of 
the Homeland Areas on the Modern Sector of South Africa. 
As one of the major problems as far as the Homelands are con-
cerned is their almost total dependence upon the employment 
opportunities offered in the modern sector of the economy, every 
effort should be made by the Homeland governments to reduce this 
level of dependence by encouraging growth within the Homelands 
to the point where these areas are able to offer their citizens 
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a viable alternative to migration. This is not an easy task and 
one that is made more difficult by t .he high male absentee rate 
induced by the migratory labour system. However, some steps 
could be taken in an attempt to redress the balance: 
1. Homeland governments could centralise control over the supply 
of their migrant labour in an attempt to increase the bargain-
ing power of this labour and so transfer part of the modern 
sector surplus to the Homelands. This surplus could be 
transferred in part in the form of increased wage payments 
to migrant workers and in part in the form of an increased levy 
on employers payable directly to the Homeland governments. 
2. Wilson [235] makes the excellent suggestion that one of the 
best ways that the supplying economie.s could use the bargain-
ing power that they have over the White government due to 
their monopsonostic position in the labour market, would be to 
bargain for guaranteed markets for their domestic production 
in the modern sector. Such exports would hopefully lead to 
further development within the supplying economy. 
3. Homeland governments could impose an additional tax either 
upon the employers of migrant labourers or upon the migrants 
themselves and then use the proceeds as a payroll subsidy to 
employers located within the ·Homeland to encourage the adop-
tion of labour intensive techniques in the domestic economy. 
4. Greater emphasis should be placed upon the development of 
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agriculture, but in order to develop a viable agricultural 
industry a deliberate policy should be followed to encourage 
men to choose permanently between farming and industrial 
work. Men who choose to work as migrants should then be: 
(a) guaranteed a job or some sort of social security 
benefit for their working life; 
(b) encouraged to relinquish all title to agricultural land 
for due compensation. This land should then be re-
allocated to an emergent peasant farming class; 
(c) re-housed with their families in an urban area as close to 
the migrants' work as is feasible. Closer contact be 
tween the migrant and his family will hopefully 
(i) reduce the social costs of migration; 
(ii) reduce the migrant's living costs; 
(iii) increase the income generating effects of the 
migrant's employment as he will spend a far 
larger portion of his wage packet in the Homeland 
than he does at present. 
5. Every effort should be made to encourage the development of 
the manufacturing sectors within the Homelands, but care 
should be taken to ensure that the growth of these sectors 
does not reinforce the level of dependency on the rest of 
South Africa. The following steps could be taken to reduce 
the likelihood of such an increase in dependency: 
(a) Foreign capital, including that from the Republic, 
should be encouraged on a partnership basis only or 
for limited periods of time. 
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(b) Care should be taken to encourage labour intensive 
industries in the initial phase of development in an 
attempt to reduce the rate of out-migrancy. 
(c) Encouragement should be given initially to import re-
placement industries as far as is economically feasible, 
as these: 
(i) have a guaranteed market for their product; 
(ii) will lessen the dependence on industrial South 
Africa, resulting from the high level of imports; 
(iii) may help to offset any deterioration in the terms 
of trade between the Homelands and the rest of 
South Africa that may result from the increased 
wages paid to migrants or from the tax imposed 
upon their employers. 
Although this list of policy recommendations is lengthy and the 
implementation is likely to prove very costly, the estimated 
size of the pr~sent migration stream, coupled with the recent 
rapid rise in the growth rate of the number of migrants and the 
increase in the length of the migration period shows, in the 
writer's opinion, that if such measures are not put into effect 
quickly and on a large scale, the social, political and economic 
problems that are created by the South African economy's contin-
ued and increasing reliance on the migratory labour system could 
well become insurmountable. 
6.4 The Future Outlook 
The policy recommendations contained in the above sections do 
not appear to differ radically from the expressed policies of 
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the present South African government. If this is indeed so, then 
one should query why the migrant labour system has continued to 
grow in the face of such policies. The answer lies, in the 
writer's opinion, in the fact that although the present South 
African government has these stated aims, it lacks the true com-
mitment required to put them into practice. 
In terms of the analysis presented in this thesis, it is easy to 
see why the government has this ambivalent attitude. Morally 
the maintenance of the migrant labour system is indefensible, 
but up to the present time, its continuance has been beneficial 
to the development of the economy's modern sector. Since the 
government has itself benefitted from the continued development 
of this sector, both from an economic viewpoint and from a poli-
tical viewpoint; as the power base of the present government has 
become increasingly centred on the White urban electorate, it 
has had no incentive to impose measures to ensure a more even 
development path as such a path may well have been achieved at 
the cost of lower overall rates of development in the modern sec-
tor. In addition the bargaining position of the groups of indi-
viduals, who would have benefitted from the large scale intro-
duction of these measures, was so weak, due to the nature of 
the South African institutions, that they were unable to force 
such an introduction. 
It follows, therefore, that one must enquire whether there are 
at present grounds for believing that the situation will change 
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in the near future. Chcnge is essential to ensure that the 
policies recommended will be introduced on a scale sufficient 
to have any hope of success. 
Three factors could well operate to effect the introduction of 
such changes: 
1. World opinion against the unequal nature of South Africa's 
economic development is mounting. This coupled with the 
changing nature of the ruling regimes in countries in 
Africa, other than South Africa, makes it increasingly diff-
icult for the present South African Government to continue 
to ignore the inequalities. 
2. There are indications that South Africa may be reaching a 
situation where future development will take place in a 
labour limited, rather than in a labour surplus, context. 
Employment in the modern sector, from the indicators used 
earlier, appears to have grown faster than the labour supply 
and Black wages have started to rise in real terms in 
recent years. If this is indeed the case then the relative 
bargaining strength of the Black labour supply can be ex-
pected to increase in the future. Providing the labour 
force is able to utilise this increase in bargaining power , 
it may well be able to accelerate change in the South 
African scene. 
3. The nature of the independent Homelands provides, on the 
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face of it, a means of harnessing this increased bargaining 
strength of labour. The Homeland governments could under 
certain circumstances effectively control the supply of 
labour to the modern sector for the attainment of their own 
ends. 
It could well be, therefore, that in future if South Africa is to 
continue to develop peacefully along the lines laid down by the 
policy of separate development, the price of such development 
will be the successful attainment of a development path on which 
the proceeds of development are more equally shared by all the 
sectors of the economy. The present government and the 'captains 
of industry' may well soon be faced with a choice between con-
tinued growth with a bigger slice going to the Homelands and 
little or no growth due to increased political instability. For 
the continued wellbeing of all members of the community let us 
hope that, if they are faced with such a choice, they choose as 
"good capitalists" should, namely to continue to grow. 
It is obvious that the development strategy outlined in the policy 
prescriptions requires very high levels of investment in the Home-
land areas. It is equally obvious from the present economic dev-
elopment levels in the Homelands, taking KwaZulu as a represen-
tative of these areas, that the funds for such investment cannot 
be generated within the Homelands to any extent. Investment in 
these areas will, therefore, require massive transfers of resour-
ces from the modern sector of the economy. Consequently, one must 
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ask firstly under what circumstances such transfers are likely 
to be forthcoming and secondly, if they are forthcoming, 
what other difficulties will be encountered in generating the 
desired development levels. 
The Homeland governments will only succeed in forcing a transfer 
of additional investment funds to the Homelands if: 
1. they succeed in improving their bargaining position, and 
2. if they choose to exercise this increased strength. 
It was argued above that there are three positive forces working 
for change in South Africa. Whilst it seems at present that the 
first of these; the pressure of world opinion on the White gov-
ernment's attitudes is likely to increase, it is not so certain 
that the Homelands will succeed in gaining control over the 
supply of labour to the modern sector. Nor indeed is it necess-
arily the case that, even if they should attain such a position, 
these governments would in fact choose to use this power to re-
duce the Homelands dependency on White South Africa. 
Effective control of the labour supply implies firstly~co-opera­
tion and cohesion between the various separate Homelands and 
secondly~that these governments have sufficient popular support 
to ensure that any movements that they may make to withhold 
labour supplies are actively supported by their countrymen; both 
may be in doubt. 
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It is conceivable that development in the Homelands will take 
place in a manner that will not allow the Homeland governments 
to develop a common set of objectives. The way in which the Home-
lands have been set up is almost sufficient to guarantee the 
emergence of a conflict situation. The Homelands are autonomous 
but compete with one another for investment funds from the cen-
(6 ) 
tral government and probably of more significance in this con-
text is the fact that they also compete with one another for the 
jobs that are available in the modern sector for the migrant wor-
kers that they export. Consequently it will be difficult for a 
Homeland government to exercise any meaningful control over the 
labour supply until the economy reaches a position close to full 
employment. As long as there is unemployment there is substan-
tial competition amongst migrants for jobs and in such circum-
stances it will pay an individual Homeland to 'opt out' of a 
general agreement to withhold labour supplies to the modern sec-
tor. By doing so the Homeland will be able to increase its 
earnings from the export of labour through filling jobs pre-
viously held by the citizens of other Homelands with its own 
citizens. 
Another substantial problem that might prevent the Homeland gov-
ernments from emerging a substantial bargaining force in the 
(6) An example of this competition can be seen in Chapter 
of South Africa 1974, where a table is given showing the 
central government's view of the relative ratings of the 
Homelands in terms of the need for the provision of 
additional employment creation. [250] 
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labour market could arise from the nature of the emerging Home-
land governments themselves. The imposition of measures that 
are designed to reduce the overall levels of dependency in the 
Homelands requires that the policy makers, together with those 
who implement the policies,should be comprised of groups of in-
dividuals who do not themselves benefit from continuing the 
dependence relationship. If development in the Homelands should 
generate a ruling class comprised of bureaucrats, professionals 
and traders, as has been the case in so many developing coun-
tries, particularly in Africa, it is highly unlikely that a gov-
ernment composed of such people or who are dependent for their 
survival on them would ever embark on any set of policy measures 
. that might threaten the relative position of the elite class. (7) 
Bearing these problems in mind, it seems that one can draw the 
following conclusions: 
1. Unless the Homeland governments are comprised of men who 
are truly representative of the interests of the majority 
of the people in the Homelands and have their common aims, 
it seems highly unlikely that such governments will under-
take the measures necessary to reduce the levels of depen-
dency of the Homelands on the modern sector of South 
(7) Wallenstein [225] discusses the relationship between the 
power of the state, the class st~ucture of society and 
the role played by the state in the development process. 
So also do Arrighi and Saul [8] 
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Africa as the implementation of such policies are likely to 
threaten the position of the ruling parties. 
2. Even if such 'popular' governments should emerge in the 
Homelands, the poverty levels of the people are such that 
any action designed to withdraw labour from White South 
Africa on anything other than an extremely short term pasis, 
would extract such a cost in terms of human suffering that 
it would probably be out of the question. 
3. Generating development in any country is not a simple 
matter and the policies outlined have their own problems 
although they represent, in the writer's opinion, the 
'optimal' strategy. Import substitution is slow and expen-
sive and initially increases the degree of dependency of 
(8) 
the economy. Reliance on capital from outside, whilst 
essential in the present context~ can also prove unsuccess-
ful from the long term view in that it implies the export 
of profits, reliance on foreign technology and again in-
(9) 
creases the level of overall dependency. 
If development in the Homelands does indeed increase rather 
(8) The problems that result from following a policy of import 
substitution are well spelt out in Little, Scitovskyand 
Scott [120] 
(9) A good summary of the disadvantages that result from 
development with foreign capital is given in Griffin [61] 
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than decrease the level of dependence of those areas, then in a 
bargaining context, one must hypothesise that it will be the 
desires of the stronger party, the White government that will 
prevail. In such a case the development strategy followed in 
South Africa will be comprised in the main at least of the devel-
opment strategy map.ped out by the White government. Consequent-
ly, pressures fo~lreformist change'will effectively be limited 
to those that can be directed at changing the White government's 
development strategy in favour of one that offers a more egali-
tarian distribution of income. 
It seems likely that in view of the above arguments, the Home-
lands will remain as major exporters of labour and that contin-
ued economic growth in South Africa, whilst it may well reduce 
the rate of growth of migration, as full employment levels are 
approached, is unlikely to eliminate the system in the fore-
seeable future. 
There is, however, no doubt that government policies could be 
adapted fairly simply to effect changes that would drastically 
reduce the social costs of the system and indeed in the present 
political climate it could well be argued that continued economic 
growth in South Africa may be contingent upon the implementation 
of such measures. Horwitz [86] describing the gap in wage rates 
and working conditions that exist originally between White 
skilled immigrants and Black African migrant workers, says: 
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"But the gap that was formed by market 
realities became the gulf of institu-
tionalised culture and, finally the chasm 
of the South African social system." 
[86] p.168. 
If South Africa is to have any future as a multiracial state, it 
is essential, in the writer's view, that work is commenced now 
on a project to bridge that chasm. 
A P PEN D I X A 
THE BASIS OF THE ESTIMATES OF MIGRATION. 
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APPENDIX A 
.THE BASIS OF THE ESTIMATES OF MIGRATION 
The estimates of the extent of temporary migration amongst South 
African Africans have been made by establishing some standard 
demographic features for the African population of South Africa 
as a whole and then utilising the characteristics of these 
features to generate an estimated standard population for the 
area from which the estimate of out-migrants is to be made. The 
difference between the standard population generated and the ac-
tual population is then the number of migrants. 
The basic demographic features used are; firstly the ratios of 
women to children Ln the different age cohorts and secondly, the 
masculinity ratios. For example, in order to estimate the number 
of migrants from the areas now KwaZulu in 1970, firstly the 
ratio's of all Zulu women to Zulu children 0-14 years in South Africa 
in the separate age cohorts were estimated from the census data. 
These ratios were then assumed to hold in the Zulu Homeland. 
The number of children under 14 years in the homeland was taken 
from census data and the ratios of the various adult age cohorts 
were applied to the number of children in the homeland, in order 
to obtain an estimate of the number of adult women in each age 
group that should be in the homelands to support the number of 
children actually present. The difference between the standard 
population and the actual population gives the number of female 
migrants from the area. 
In order to obtain a standard population of adult males, the 
- 220 
standard masculinity ratio for the specific age cohort was applied 
to the estimated number of females. Again the actual number of 
males was then subtracted from the estimated male population in 
order to obtain the number of migrants in the age cohort. 
Table Al. illustrates this process for the Bantu Homeland Rural 
areas of South Africa. 
Tables A5.l through to A15 contain estimates of the number of 
migrants from the rural areas in 1960, 1946 and 1936, from areas 
that are not Homeland areas and from the Homeland areas of Xhosa, 
the Zulu, the Bapedi and the Sotho people for 1970. There are a 
number of other working papers included for interest and these are 
referred to in chapter 4 of the thesis. 
The validity of any estimate of migration made by this type of 
method depends on whether or not the key deJIlographic variables, 
the ratio of children to adult women in particular age cohorts 
and the masculinity ratios, that were assumed to be constant, were 
in fact relatively constant both through time and between diff-
erent selected populations. The masculinity ratio is normally 
constant between populations and so in the absence of any sex 
selective catastrophies, one would not normally expect any diffi-
culties to arise with the behaviour of this variable. The ratio 
of children to women is, however, in a different category since 
if family patterns vary between regions one would expect this 
variable to behave likewise. Table A2. shows the ratio of adult 
women in five year age cohorts to children 14 years and under 















ESTIMATION OF THE NUMBER OF AFRICAN MIGRANTS FROM 
THE HOMELAND RURAL AREAS OF SOUTH AFRICA IN 1970. 
Ratio 
Women/ Population Female Female >, Population Male 
Chil- Migrants -I" ·rl 
dren Estimated Actual J:: Estimated Actual ·rl 
in .-I :J 0 
South U·rl Ul-fJ 
Africa III III ::;:oe:; 
A B(l) C(l) D E F G 
,13 413 000 377 000 36 000 10 413 000 296 000 
,10 318 000 282 000 36 000 ,99 315 000 123 000 
,09 286 000 250 000 36 000 ,98 280 000 88 000 
,08 254 000 219 000 35 000 ,98 249 000 81 000 
,06 191 000 187 000 4 000 ,98 187 000 75 000 
,05 161 000 161 000 1,0 161 000 74 000 
,04 139 000 139 000 ,98 136 000 74 000 
,04 124 000 124 000 ,95 118 000 68 000 
,05 184 000 184 000 ,89 164 000 114 000 













1 030 000 
A = All African Women in S.A. 
in age cohort All African Women 20-24 yrS 
e.g. All Children 0-14 years 
644 720 = .10 All African Children in 
S.A. aged 0-14 years. 
= -::"6-4C-:0:-::8--=-320 
B = Number of children in rural areas 0-14 yrs. x ratio A for particular 
age cohort 
C = From 1970 census rounded to the nearest 1000. 
D = B - C. 
E = From J. L. Sadie, [174] 
F = B x maSCUlinity rate for that particular age cohort. 
G = From 1970 census rounded to the nearest 1000. 
H = E - F. 
(1) Where actual figures for women are greater than the estimated, the 
actual figures have been used to estimate the male population in 
column F. However, in the case 50-54 years, the actual population 
is 3000 less than the estimated, but has still been used as the basis 
for calculating male migrants as it was felt that the difference 














RATIO OF ADULT FEMALE AGE COHORTS TO CHILDREN 
0-14 YEARS FOR SELECTED SOUTH AFRICAN POPULATIONS. 
Ratio of Adult Females in Cohort to Children 0-14years 
All All All All All 
Africans Africans Africans Africans Zulus 
1936 1946. 1960. 1970. 1970. 
,12 ,13 ,11 ,13 ,13 
,11 ,11 ,11 ,10 ,10 
,09 ,10 ,09 ,09 ,09 
,09 ,09 ,08 ,08 ,08 
,07 ,07 ,07 ,06 ,06 
,06 ,06 ,06 ,05 ,06 
,04 ,05 ,04 ,04 ,04 
,04 ,04 ,04 ,04 ,04 
,05 ,05 ,05 ,05 ,05 
SOURCE: Estimated from data given in Vol. II of the Report on 
the Seven~h Census of the Population of the Union of 
South Africa. U.G. 60/1950. Government Printer, 
Pretoria, 1950. Report on the Population Census 6th 
September, 1960. Vol. 7, No.1 D.l, D7 and D.10. 
Government Printer, Pretoria, 1968; and Report 02-02-02, 
Population Census, 6 May, 1970. D.l, D.10, Department 
of Statistics, Pretoria, March, 1973. [257] [258J [260] 
The data in Table A2 shows that in fact over the 34 year period 
from 1936 to 1970, these demographic ratios have remained very 
stable. Only in the case of women 15-19 years in 1960 did the 
ratio vary by more than 1 per cent in any instance. Since the 
1960 census is not noted for its high degree of accuracy, this 
deviation probably reflects census undercounting rather than a 
marked change in demographic patterns. This opinion is borne 
out by the fact that this age cohort in the 1970 census then 25-29 
years, shows no deviation in pattern from the ratio of similar age 
cohorts in previous census years. Consequently estimates for 
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19.60 will be based on the assumption that the percentage of 
women 15-19 years to children under 14 is in fact 13 per cent 
and not eleven as shown in Table A2. 
The evidence in Table A2 is not sufficient per se to justify the 
assumption that family patterns in the area from which the out-
migration occurs are the same as those of the standard popula-
tions selected. Had the urban population been selected as the 
standard population this assumption would most certainly have 
been invalid as the migration process generates structural demo-
graphic imbalance in the urban populations in the same way as it 
does in rural populations. However, since the global African 
populations have been selected as standards i.e. All Africans in 
South Africa for total South African migration and All Zulus in 
South Africa for migration from KwaZulu, it is reasonable to 
assume that since 67% of all Africans (without the migrants) 
were in fact in the rural areas on the census date in 197~ 
the family patterns of the global population are a reasonable 
surrogate for family patterns in the various rural regions. 
The second set of demographic magnitudes that are assumed to re-
main constant are the masculinity ratios of the various adult age 
cohorts. Since the masculinity rate among new born babies is con-
stant as was pointed out earlier one would expect, apart from a 
major catastrophe that was male selective, such as war, or the 
presence of a phenomenon that is selective of particular age 
groups such as migration, that the population would exhibit 
fairly constant masculinity ratios between similar age cohorts 
through time. 
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Table A3. gives masculinity ratios for age cohorts of various 
South African African populations at selected census years and 
one can see from the data in the table that far from being con-














MASCULINITY RATIOS IN CERTAIN SELECTED SOUTH AFRICAN 
AFRICAN POPULATIONS. 
Population 
All Sadie's All African Populat ions Zulu Masculinity 
1936 1946 1960 1970 1970 Ratios 
1,06 1,07 1,02 ,94- ,88 1,0 
1,01 ,95 1,00 ,97 ,79 ,99 
1,20 1,15 1,06 ,96 ,78 ,98 
1,09 ,99 1,04 ,95 ,77 ,98 
1,24 1,15 1,13 ,98 ,82 ,98 
1,07 1,00 1,07 1,0 ,84 1,00 
1,21 1,14 1,21 1,04 ,93 ,98 
,94 ,87 1,03 ,98 ,86 ,95 
,89 ,83 ,97 ,91 ,84 ,89 
Estimated from the Population Census data for 1936, 
1946, 1960 and 1970 censuses, and J. L. Sadie [l74] 
population projections. 
The extent of the variations of the masculinity ratios through 
time varies considerably between age cohorts varying from as much 
as 54 per cent in the case of the 25-29 year cohort to 17 per cent 
in the case of the 55-64 year age group. 
In South Africa's case one can explain the variations in a ratio 
that one intuitively expects to be constant in terms of two forces 
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operating in the economy. The first is the influence that for-
eign migrants will have upon domestic masculinity ratios and the 
second, the effect of illegal migrants on census data. 
In-migrants to South Africa from other African Territories, main-
ly Mozambique and Malawi, have entered South Africa in substan-









FOREIGN AFRICAN IN-MIGRANTS TO SOUTH AFRICA -
1936-1970. 
Males Females Total Masculinity 
Ratio 
261 000 73 000 334 000 3,58 
445 000 111 000 556 000 4,01 
482 000 103 000 585 000 4,68 
443 000 49 000 492 000 9,04 
Adapted from data given in J. L. Sadie, [l74]. 
Foreign migrants are predominantly migrant workers and consequent-
ly fall largely into the adult male groups. 
In 1970, 97 per cent of male foreign Bantu enumerated in the 1970 
census were between 14 and 64 years and 56 per cent were aged be-
tween 20 and 35 years. Consequently with the high masculinity 
ratios coupled with the degree of concentration in the middle 
adult age groups, one would expect fluctuations in foreign 
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migrants to exert substantial influences on the behaviour of the 
masculinity ratios of Africans in South. Africa. 
The second influence in masculinity ratios recorded in the census 
is that exerted by the presence of illegal migrants in urban areas. 
Since 1948 the present South African government has tightened up 
progressively the controls on African labour movements from rural 
to urban areas in South Africa. As it has become more difficult 
to migrate through the legal channels, ·so the incentive to migrate 
illegally has increased. Similarly as the number of illegal mi-
grants in the urban areas increases so the number of individuals 
who deliberately evade the census count also rises. If the pro-
portion of illegal migrants grows faster than that of the legal 
migrants and the illegal migrants evade the census then one would 
expect the recorded masculinity ratios to be low. 
Finally, a third reason that might account for the disparity is 
the fact that a larger proportion of African women live in rural 
areas and as the count of individuals in rural areas has been 
progressively more accurate with succeeding censuses the propor-
tion of women undercounted has decreased. 
As the estimate of the number of migrants requires a stable esti-
mate of the masculinity ratios of the populations from which the 
migrants have come and it was apparent that this could not be ob-
tained from the census data for the reasons outlined earlier it . , 
was decided to use the masculinity ratios that resulted 
from Sadie's projections of the Bantu Population of South Africa 
from 1970 - 2020 [174]. These ratios are given in the final 
column of Table 2. In making these projections Sadie assumed 
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that the survival rates of coloured males were an adequate surrogate 
for the survival and fertility rates of the Bantu language speaking 
people of South Africa. This population still, however, exhibits 
masculinity ratios below those of normal populations. This diff-
erence in masculinity ratios will have the effect of biasing the 
estimates of the number of migrants downwards. 
Another possible source of bias could come from differences in the 
actual and the dejure numbers of children in the areas. If, for 
example, urban families send their children out to the rQral areas 
to their other relatives to be brought up away from city life, then 
the presence of these children in the rural areas would result in an 
overestimation of the numbers of migrants. A study of the female/ 
child ratios in the population, 'all Africans and Africans in urban 
African areas' revealed, however, that, after due adjustment had been 
made for the migrants in the towns, the female/child ratio was in 
fact slightly higher in the towns than was the case in the rest of 
the country. This implies that once again the direction of the bias 
in this estimate of the numbers of migrants from South Africa's rural 
areas is likely to be downwards. Al 
It appears from this discussion that this method of estimating the 
number of temporary migrants from a particular population at a 
specific moment of time is likely to yield too conservative an 
estimate. This is particularly true of the years such as 1970 in 
which it was apparent that the number of children was itself thought 
to represent a degree of underestimation. Sadie [176]. 
Al. The female/child ratios of the two populations; the population 
'All Africans' and that of 'Africans in Urban Bantu Areas' 















ESTIMATE OF AFRICAN MALE MIGRANTS FROM THE RURAL AREAS 
OF SOUTH AFRICA IN 1970. 
Female Male Male Population 
Age 
Male Specific 
Child Female Migrants Migra-
Ratio Ratio Estimated Actual tion 
rate 
A 0/0 
,13 1,0 628 000 500 000 128 000 20 
,10 ,99 478 000 267 000 211 000 44 
,09 ,98 426 000 214 000 212 000 50 
,08 ,98 379 000 194 000 185 000 49 
,06 ,98 284 000 177 000 107 000 38 
,05 1,0 242 000 166 000 76 000 31 
,04 ,98 192 000 151 000 41 000 21 
,04 ,95 183 000 134 000 49 000 27 
,05 ,89 217 000 191 000 26 000 12 
















A Estimated on the basis outlined in this Appendix. The standard population used here 
was the population "All Africans in South Africa" and the estimates were made from 
data contained in Table 1 of Report 02-02-02. Population Census 6 May 1970, Sample 
Tabulation Bantu-Age, Occupation, Industry, School Standard, Birthplace. Depart-
ment of Statistics, Pretoria, 1973. [260] 
TABLE A5.1.B THE FEMALE/CHILD RATIOS FOR THE TWO POPULATIONS FOR THE RESPECTIVE AGE 
COHORTS AS FOLLOWS. 
Population Age Cohorts 
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
All African ,13 ,10 ,09 ,08 ,06 ,05 ,04 
Africans in 
Urban Bantu 















ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBERS AND AGE CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN 
FEMALE MIGRANTS FROM THE RURAL AREAS OF SOUTH AFRICA IN 1970. 
Female Age Age 
Child 
Female Population Female Specific Distribution 
Ratio Estimated Actual 




A 0/0 0/0 0/0 
,13 628 000 581 000 47 000 8 18 18 
,10 483 000 428 000 55 000 11 21 39 
,09 435 000 36<+ 000 71 000 16 27 66 
,08 387 000 324 000 63 000 16 24 90 
,06 290 000 271 000 19 000 7 8 98 
,05 242 000 234 000 5 000 2 2 100 
,04 196 000 196 000 
unreliable 
,04 193 000 174 000 taken 
as zero 
,05 244 000 244 000 
3 098 000 260 000 8 100 -
, 
A As in note A on Table A5.1. Note the migrants from the three oldest cohorts have 
been omitted as the distribution appears to show evidence of inaccurate age 
reporting by the women, and whereas the number of men migrants in all three cohorts 
is sufficiently large to be relatively insensitive to such inaccuracies, the number 
of female migrants is small enough to be highly sensitive. 
TABLE A6.1 ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER AND AGE CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN MALE MIGRANTS FROM THE 
RURAL AREAS OF SOUTH AFRICA IN 1960. 
Age Female Male Male Population Male Age Age Distribution 
Cohort 
Child Female Migrants Specific 
Ratio Ratio Estimated Actual Migration Actual Cumulative 
Rate 
A 010 0/0 0'0 
15-19 ,13 1,0 452 000 343 000 109 000 24 16 16 
20-24 ,11 ,99 378 000 211 000 167 000 44 25 41 
25-29 ,09 ,98 307 000 188 000 119 000 39 "18 59 
30-34 ,08 ,98 272 000 164 000 108 000 40 16 75 
35-39 ,07 ,98 238 000 158 000 80 000 34 12 87 
40-44 ,06 1,0 208 000 149 000 59 000 28 9 96 
45-49 ,04 ,98 136 000 135 000 1 000 ) 
50-54 ,04 ,95 132 000 108 000 24 000 
) 
7 4 100 
) 
55-65 ,05 ,89 158 000 154 000 4 000 ) 
Total 2 281 000 671 000 29 100 
-- _ . - ----
A as in note A on Table A5.1 - Estimates of the female/child ratios and the masculinity ratio were 
made from data contained in The Population Census Vol. 7, No.1, Characteristics of the Population 
in each Magisterial District and Economic Region, Age, Marital Status and Home Language. Govern-
ment Printer, Pretoria 1968. [258J Note the female/child ratio in the age cohort 15-19 was in fact 
,11. However, since the 1960 census is known to be undercounted and this ratio is out of line with 
the data for similar populations given in Table A2, the ratio that was used in the calculation for 



















ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER AND AGE CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN FEMALE MIGRANTS FROM THE 
RURAL AREAS OF SOUTH AFRICA ON THE CENSUS DATE IN 1960. 
Female Female Population Female Age Age Distribution 
Child Migrants Specific 
Ratio Estimated Actual Rates Actual Cumulative 
B A 0/0 ·/0 "0 
,13 452 000 383 000 36 000 8 17 17 
,11 382 000 323 000 59 000 15 27 44 
,09 313 000 279 000 33 000 11 15 59 
,08 278 000 242 000 36 000 12 17 76 
,07 243 000 205 000 38 000 16 18 94 
,06 208 000 193 000 ) ," 1""1 ( ,04 139 000 145 000 ) 14 000 I ) 
) 2 6 100 
,04 139 000 128 000 ) ) 
,05 178 000 179 000 
) I 
) ,J 
2 332 000 216 000 8 100 
A As in note A on Table A5.2. 
B The actual figures for the age cohort 15-19 years appear to be heavily undercounted yielding 
migrants in this age cohort of 69 000 giving an age specific migration rate for this age 
category of 24 per cent three times greater than that in 1970. It was therefore decided to 




TABLE .A7.1 ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER AND AGE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AFRICAN MALE MIGRANTS FROM 
THE RURAL AREAS OF SOUTH AFRICA IN 1946. 
Age Female Male Male Population Male Age Age Distribution 
Cohort Child Female Migrants Specific 
Ratio Ratio Estimated Actual Rates Actual Cumulative 
A 0/0 0/. ~o 
15-19 ,13 1,0 348 000 302 000 46 000 13 11 11 
20-24 ,11 ,99 292 000 177 000 115 000 39 28 39 
25-29 ,10 ,98 262 000 179 000 83 000 32 20 59 
30-34 ,09 ,98 236 000 160 000 76 000 32 18 77 
35-39 ,07 ,98 184 000 150 000 34 000 18 8 85 -
40-44 ,06 1,0 164 000 136 000 28 000 17 7 92 
45-49 ,05 ,98 131 000 122 000 9 000 7 2 94 
50-54 ,04 ,95 101 000 87 000 14 000 14 4 98 
55-65 ,05 ,89 127 000 117 000 10 000 8 2 100 
Total 1 845 000 415 000 22 100 
- ~.~ 
A As per note A on Table A5.1 - Estimates were based on data contained in Union of South Africa 
Seventh Census Vol II Ages of the European, Coloured, Asiatic and Native Population, 7th May 1946. 
U9.60/1950 Government Printer, Pretoria, 1950. L257] 
'" (.oJ 
'" 
TABLE A7.2 ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER AND AGE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AFRICAN FEMALE MIGRANTS 
FROM THE RURAL AREAS OF SOUTH AFRICA ON THE CENSUS DATE IN 1946. 
Age ~ema1e Female Population Female Age Age Distribution 
Cohort 
Child Migrants Specific 
Ratio Estimated Actual Rates Actual Cumulative 
A ok ~o .~ 
15-19 ,13 348 000 325 000 23 000 7 19 19 
20-24 ,11 295 000 261 000 34 000 12 28 47 
25-29 ,10 268 000 240 000 28 000 10 23 70 
30-34 ,09 241 000 220 000 21 000 9 17 87 
35-39 ,07 188 000 172 000 16 000 9 13 100 
40-44 ,06 164 000 165 000 ) unre1ia-
45-49 ,05 134 000 124 000 ~ b1e taken 
50-54 ,04 107 000 106 000 ) as zero 
55-65 ,05 143 000 143 000 
) 
) 
Total 1 888 000 122- 000 100 
-



















ESTIMATE OF NUMBERS AND AGE CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN MALE MIGRANTS 
FROM THE RURAL AREAS OF SOUTH AFRICA ON THE CENSUS DATE IN 1936. 
Female Male Male Population Male Age 
Child Female Migrants Specific 
Ratio Ratio Estimated Actual 
A 
Rate 010 
,12 1,0 294 000 266 000 28 000 10 
,11 ,99 266 000 153 000 113 000 42 
,09 ,98 216 000 145 000 71 000 33 
,09 ,98 216 000 134 000 82 000 38 
,07 ,98 168 000 128 000 40 000 24 
,06 1,0 147 000 110 000 37 000 25 
,04 ,98 97 000 92 000 5 000 ) 




,05 . ,89 119 000 104 000 15 000 ) 













A As per note A on Table A5.1 apart from the fact that the standard population ratios used were those 





TABLE A8.2 ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER AND AGE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AFRICAN FEMALE TEMPORARY 
MIGRANTS FROM THE RURAL AREAS OF SOUTH AFRICA ON THE CENSUS DATE IN 1936. 
Age Female Female Population Female Age Age Distribution 
Cohort Child Migrants Specific 
Cumulative 10 0 Ratio Estimated Actual 
A Rate ~o 
Actual % 
15-19 ,12 294 000 280 000 14 000 5 21 21 
20-24 ,11 269 000 241 000 28 000 10 42 63 
25-29 ,09 220 000 215 000 5 000 ) 18 8 71 
30-34 ,09 220 000 207 000 13 000 
) 
19 90 ) 
35-39 ,07 171 000 164 000 7 000 4 10 100 
40-44 ,06 147 000 147 000 -
45-49 ,04 99 000 99 000 -
50-54 ,04 98 000 99 000 -
55-64 ,05 134 000 134 000 -
Total 1 652 000 67 000 4 100 
----------- --- - -- - - -- - - -
A As per note on Table A8.1 but the estimations were based on the data in the 1936 census 





TABLE A9 AN ESTIMATE OF AFRICAN MIGRANTS FROM NON-HOMELAND 






Age Migrants from Migrants from Migrants from 
Cohort All Rural Areas 
Homeland Rural Non Homeland 
Areas Rural Areas 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
A B C D E F 
15-19 128 000 47 000 117 000 36 000 11 000 11 000 
20-24 211 000 ' 55 000 192 000 36 000 19 000 19 000 
25-29 212 000 71 000 192 000 36 000 20 000 35 000 
30-34 185 000 63 000 168 000 35 000 17 000 28 000 
35-39 107 000 19 000 112 000 4 000 15 000 
40-44 76 000 5 000 87 000 5 000 
45-49 41 000 62 000 
50-54 49 000 50 000 
55-64 26 000 50 000 
Total 1 035 000 260 000 1 030 000 147 000 67 000 113 000 
from column A, Table A5.1 in this Appendix 
from column A, Table A5.2 in this Appendix 
from column H, Table Al in this Appendix 
from column D, Table Al in this Appendix 
= A-C so long as the answer is positiv~ In-migration to other 
rural areas by Homeland migrants has been excluded as the 
estimate made was for out-migration to the modern sector. 
F = B-D subject to the note E. 
TABLE A 10 ESTIMATION OF GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF HOMELAND CITIZENS BY EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL IN 1970. 
School Homelands Rest of South Africa 
Standard 
Attained Number Number in Number out Number Number Number Ratio 
in 1970 with School in of School Ratio with in out of 
standard Homeland with Standard School School F:G 
in 1970 with Standard C:B in 1970 in 1970 with 
Standard Standard 
. in 1970 1970 
A B C D E F G H 
3 years 220 000 136 000 84 000 ,62 282 000 147 000 135 000 ,92 primary 




Full 96 000 27 000 69 000 2,56 198 000 27 000 171 000 6,33 
Primary 
Primary 129 000 31 000 98 000 3,16 284 000 29 000 255 000 8,8 
Plus 2 
years 




A Number of African males in the Homelands on the 1970 census date who attained that level of education. 
B 
Report 02-02-02. 
1973. Table 2. 
1970 census Report Bantu Age, Education and Occupation, Dept. of Statistics, Pretoria 
[260] 
Number of boys enrolled in the standard + 2 years in the Homelands in 1971 as a surrogate for the enrolments 
Department of Bantu Education Annual Report 1971. Part III : Table 3Bl, Pretoria, 1973.[268] in 1969. Obtained from 
C = A-B 
D = C-B 
E 
F 
Bantu males in White Areas with the education standard in 
Number of Bantu children in standard + two years in 1971 
two years were added since in order to have attained Sub 
1971 one would have progressed to standard 1. 
G = E-F H = GtF 
1970, from Report 02-02-02 in A. [260] 
in White Areas from the report quoted in B. The 




TABLE A 11 ESTIMATE OF THE STABILISED WORK FORCE IN WHITE AREAS 
Age Males Migrants Foreign Males Stabilised Age 
Group in From Male Attending Labour Distribution White Homelands Migrants School in Force of 
Areas all Areas White in White 
(Males) Areas in Areas Total Stable 
Age Group Labour Labour 
Force Force 
A B C D E % F %G 
14-19 434 000 117 000 21 000 120 000 176 000 12 13 
20-24 477 000 187 000 94 000 4 000 192 000 17 15 
25-29 421 000 186 000 75 000 160 000 15 12 
30-34 355 000 164 000 57 000 135 000 13 10 
35-39 310 000 106 000 44 000 160 000 12 12 
40-44 261 000 81 000 32 000 148 000 10 11 
45-49 209 000 47 000 25 000 137 000 8 10 
50-54 162 000 53 000 17 000 92 000 6 7 
55-54 171 000 28 000 15 000 128 000 6 10 
Total 2 801 000 969 000 380 000 1 328 000 100 100 
-
A All Males in White areas in the age category. Table 1 Report 02-02-02 Population Census 1970 
Dept. of Statistics, Pretoria, 1973. [260] 
B Estimated male migrants from all Homeland areas not simply Rural Homeland Areas to take account 
of rural migrants settling in Urban Homeland areas. Report 02-02-02. [260] 
C Foreign males in White areas in age group less foreign females in age group to take account of 
permanent foreign workers. Report 02-02-02. [260] 
-
D School children in age group 14-19 years allocated between White and Bantu Areas on the basis of 
the percentage of total African school enrollment, that is enrollment in schools in White areas. 
This figure is then allocated between males and females on the basis of the overall masculinity 
rate among African school children, which is 50 per cent. Source: Department of Bantu Education 
Annual Report, 1971. RP 31/1973. Government Printer, Pretoria, 1973; - [268] 
F A-D age cohort ~ Total (A-D). G: Age cohort E ~ total E. 















ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MALE XHOSA 
MIGRANTS FROM HOMELAND RURAL AREAS ' IN 1970. 
Estimated Age Age Percen-
Number of Specific Distri- tage in 
Migrants Migra- but ion Cohort 
tion of or 
Rate Migrants Less 
A 010 "/0 % 
33 000 26 10 10 
58 000 60 19 29 
57 000 67 18 47 
48 000 63 15 62 
40 000 61 13 75 
33 000 58 11 86 
22 000 47 7 93 
12 000 33 4 97 
10 000 19 3 
313 000 49 100 100 
A Estimates have been made using the basis set out in this 
Appendix. The standard population female/chil~ ratios used 
here were those calculated for the population "All Xhosa 
People in South Africa" from Table 1 in the Census Report 
02-02-02. These ratios were ,13 ,10 ,09 ,08 ,07 ,06 ,05 
,04 and ,06 respectively for the age cohorts 15-19 through 
to 55-65. The masculinity ratios used were Sadie's estimates 
given in column 7 of Table A3. 
Note that 98 per cent of the Xhosa people enumerated in the 
1970 census in Homeland Rural areas were in rural areas in 
the Transkei or Ciskei. 
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TABLE A13 ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MALE ZULU 
MIGRANTS FROM -HOMELAND RURAL AREAS IN 1970. 
Age Estimated Age Age Percen-
Number of Specific Distri- tage Cohort 
Migrants Migra- but ion in 
tion of Cohort 
Rate Migrants or Less 
A % 0/0 01. 0 
15-19 42 000 34 13 13 
20-24 55 000 50 18 31 
25-29 55 000 57 18 49 
30-34 50 000 57 15 55 
35-39 33 000 59 10 75 
40-44 35 000 51 11 85 
45-49 15 000 42 5 91 
50-54 17 000 47 5 95 
55-55 12 000 29 4 100 
Total 317 000 52 100 
A Estimated as shown in Table Cl.l in Appendix C. 
Note that 95 per cent of all Zulus who were enumerated as 
resident in Homeland Rural areas in 1970 were in fact 
resident in the rural areas of KwaZulu. 
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TABLE A14 ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PEDI 'MALE MIGRANTS 
FROM HOMELAND RURAL AREAS IN '1970 • 
• 
Age Estimated Age Age Percen-
Number of Specific Distri- tage Cohort Migrants Migra- but ion in 
tion of · Cohort 
Rate Migrants or Less 
A "0 % tyQ 
15-19 13 000 23 8 8 
20-24 33 000 69 20 28 
25-29 34 000 . 78 ' 20 48 
30-34 24 000 72 14 62 
35-39 24 000 72 14 76 
40-44 15 000 61 9 85 
45-49 14 000 58 8 93 
50-54 5 000 35 3 96 
55-65 6 000 25 4 100 
Total 168 000 56 100 
A As in note A on Table A.12 but the standard population used 
here was "All Pedi in South Africa" and the relevant female/ 
child ratios used were ,12 ,10 ,09 ,07 ,07 ,05 ,05 ,03 
,05 for the age cohorts 15-19 through to 55-65. 
Note that 90 per cent of the Pedi resident in Homeland 
Rural areas on the census date were resident in the rural 
areas ' of Lebowa. 
. 
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TABLE A15 . ESTIMATE ·OF THE MALE TSWANA MIGRANTS FROM THE 
HOMELAND RURAL AREAS IN 1970. 
Age Estimated Age Age Percen-
Number of Specific Distri- tage Cohort 
Migrants Migra- but ion in 
tion of Cohort 
Rate Migrants or Less 
I 
A ello ./0 "0 
15-19 10 000 26 11 11 
20-24 18 000 65 20 31 
25-29 16 000 71 18 49 
30-34 13 000 68 14 63 
35-39 11 000 69 12 75 
40-44 8 000 59 9 84 
45-49 5 000 48 6 90 
50-54 6 000 56 7 97 
55-65 3 000 23 3 100 
Total 90 000 52 100 
A As note A on Table A12 but the standard population used here 
was "All Tswana in South Africa" and the relevant female/ 
child ratios were ,13 ,10 ,08 ,07 ,06 ,05 ,04 ,04 ,05 for 
the age cohorts 15-19 through to 55-65. 
Note that 98 per cent of the Tswana enumerated as resident 
in the Homeland Rural areas in the 1970 census were resident 
in th~ rual areas of Bophutatswana. 
. 
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TABLE A16 X2 TESTS ON TABLE 4.9 TESTING THE NULL HYPOTHESIS THAT THERE 
IS NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JOB PATTERNS OF MIGRANTS 
FROM DIFFERENT REGIONS. 
Transkei Ciskei KwaZu1u Bophut - Lebowa 
atswana 
Transkei 58,51 189,02 484,74 189,02 
Ciskei 58,51 62,24 153,58 62,24 
KwaZu1u 189,02 62,24 147,57 
Bophut- 484,74 153,58 147,57 147,57 at swan a 
Lebowa 189,02 62,24 147,57 
Foreign 55,36 398,05 6304,77 500,33 6304,77 
All 
Repub- 285,58 77,77 93,97 39,68 93,97 
lican 
Africans 
X2,01 9 df. = 20,090 









Repub- 23,05 1ican 
Africans 
x2 .01 1 df. 6,635 
X2 .05 1 df. 3,841 
21,0 16,51 19,05 16,51 
,35 ,04 ,35 
,35 ,16 
,04 ,16 ,16 
,35 ,16 
70,59 60,94 67,24 60,94 




































AN ESTIMATE OF THE SAVING IN SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN HOUSING THAT HAS RESULTED FROM 
THE PERPETUATION OF THE MIGRATORY LABOUR SYSTEM. 
Cost of Housing Marginal Number 
Cost ' of Housing Difference 
Single Married Difference of new 
New Migrants, due to 
Migrants Single Quarters Quarters Single Family Migration 
E R million R million 
50 A 200 A 150 476 000 23 800 95 200 71 400 
240 B 960 B 720 61 000 14 640 58 560 43 920 
-
250 C 1 100 C 1 150 350 000 122 500 525 000 402 500 
500 D 2 000 D 1 500 408 000 204 000 816 000 612 000 
-
A In 1936 the average family rent paid by a sample of 170 households in Durban not housed in barracks 
was 4 shillings and 5 pence. If this is compounded at 5 per cent for 20 years it yields a present 
value of R189 and if compounded over 25 years - R214. R200 was therefore assumed to be a reasonable 
estimate. Single quarters were taken as ~ of married housing. Since the costs per bed in the 
hostels built in Durban in ' 1930 were R52 for the Bell Street Hostel, and R18 for the Dalton Road 
hostel, the assumption of R50 will be of the right order of magnitude. The data on costs were 
obtained from "The Durban Housing Survey", Department of Economics, University of Natal; University 




B The average cost of providing a bed in the S.J. Smith Hostel built in Durban in 1949 has been taken 
as representative of the cost of providing single accommodation for migrants in 1946. Family cost 
housing has been estimated on the basis of the cost of a dwelling built in Chesterville in Durban 
over the period 1940-1946. The disparity in the dates will probably bias the estimate downwards. 
Data from the Durban Housing Survey quoted in A above p.337 and 334. [207] 
C Has been estimated from the average cost of erecting a house in Meadowlands in 1960. The cost of 
the single quarters has been taken as approximately the same as 1946. Data from .Native 
Resettlement Boani Annual Re~~1960/61. RP131/1962. Government Printer, Pretoria, 1961. [264] 
D Estimate of the cost of a house in an African Township in 1975. Made by word of mouth by a 
township official and quoted in "From Shantytown to Township" Maasdorp and Pillay [123J 
Cost of single accommodation has been taken as twenty five per cent of the cost of family 
accommodation. 
E The increase .in rural migrants estimated from data in Table 4. For the purposes of this 





TABLE A18 ESTIMATE OF THE LOSS OF PRODUCTIVITY IN THE MIGRANT 
LABOUR FORCE THAT COULD BE COMPENSATED BY THE 
INCREASED OUTPUT THAT HAS RESULTED FROM THE TRANSFER 
OF CAPITAL FROM SOCIAL CAPITAL TO PRODUCTIVE CAPITAL. 
Gross Domestic Product in 1970 at 
1973 
Gross Domestic Product attributable to 
migrants on the assumption that they 
are equally productive ,43 per cent 
of G.D.P. = migrant labour force x G.D.P. 
total Bantu male labour force 
Less Output generated from savings 
on housing from Table 4.9 
Gross Domestic Product generated by 
migrants whose lower productivity 
offsets the savings in housing 
Percentage reduction in productivity 
of the migrant labour force that 
exactly offsets the gain from housing 
[1,117,000 ~ 3,961,000] 
R 9212 million 
R 3961 million 
R 1117 million 
R2844 million 
28 per cent 
Source: South African Statistics 1974 - Department of 
Statistics,. Government Printer, Pretoria, 1975. [249] 
A P PEN D I X B 
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APPENDIX B 
THE BASIS FOR THE ESTIMATES OF MIGRATION 
FROM KWAZULU FOR THE PERIOD 1936-1970 
The basic method utilised to estimate migrants from any given 
population was the same as that outlined in Appendix A. However s 
due to the lack of available census data covering the area required 
for 1960, 1946 and 1936, as the census was then taken in terms of 
Natal rural areas rather than KwaZulu rural areas or Homeland rural 
areas, certain other adjustments have had to be made to obtain 
time series data for KwaZul~'s rural areas on a comparable basis. 
These adjustments are outlined in the following sections. 
Migration from KwaZulu Rural Areas in 1970 
1. It was assumed that all Zulu migrants from Homeland rural areas 
were in fact migrants from KwaZulu rural areas. According to the 
1970 census 96 per cent of all Zulu males resident in Homeland rural 
areas were in fact resident in KwaZulu rural areas. (Calculated from 
data in Report 02-02-02, pp. 58-59.) This being so, the use of the 
population 'Zulus in Homeland rural areas' in Report 02-02-02 
seems a reasonable surrogate for Zulus in KwaZulu rural areas and 
one that is unlikely to compound the calculation errors unduly. 
2. Having obtained a surrogate population fur 'Rural Homeland Zulus's 
migrants from the areas were estimated using the basis outlined in 
Appendix A~making use of Sadie's estimated masculinity rates and the 
ratio of children 0-14 years to the women in the age cohorts that 
existed in the population 'All Zulus in South Africa' which were , 
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calculated from the 1970 population census data. 
3. Detailed estimates of the number of male and female migrants 
from the area on the 1970 census data are given in Tables Bl.l and 
Bl.2 respectively which are found at the end of this Appendix. 
Migration from KwaZulu Rural Areas in 1960, 1946 and 1936 
1. 1960 posed an additional estimation problem, as indeed did all 
the estimates prior to that for 1970, since the census data pertain-
ing to the KwaZulu rural areas was not given separately but was in-
eluded in the data for Natal rural areas. Consequently, it became 
necessary to obtain a basis for dividing the population into those 
. 
resident in the areas that were later incorporated into KwaZulu and 
those resident in Natal proper. According to the 1970 population 
census, 76 per cent of Africans living in rural areas in Natal were 
in fact resident in KwaZulu rural areas. It was felt, however, 
that the use of this percentage for the earlier periods would be 
incorrect since there were substantial popUlation movements in 
these areas during the period 1960-1970 as the 'Black Spots' re-
movals took place. The growth of rural townships in KwaZulu over 
the period 1960-1970 was substantial and accounted for nearly 3 per 
cent of the 76 per cent referred to earlier. It was, therefore, 
decided to reduce the percentage from 76 per cent to 72 per cent for 
the years 1960, 1946 and 1936. All popUlation estimates for the 
rural areas now KwaZulu for 1960, 1946 and 1936 have, the~efore, 
been obtained by taking 72 per cent of the popUlations resident 
in the Natal rural areas on those dates as being resident in the 
areas now KwaZulu rural areas. 
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2. As far as the estimates of the migrants are concerned, yet 
another complication arises once there is no reason to assume that 
the propensity to migrate is the same from the Natal rural areas as 
it is from KwaZulu. Estimates of Zulu migrants from all rural 
areas in South Africa were made for 1970 and are presented in Table 
B5 and Table B6. From these estimates the percentage of all Zulu 
migrants from rural areas that were from Homeland rural areas for 
1970 by age cohort was obtained. Following on from this for the 
earlier estimates for KwaZulu, it was assumed that these percent-
ages would remain stable through time. In other words, it was 
assumed that the relative propensities to migrate in the age 
groups in the Homelands and in the non-Homeland areas would remai~ 
stable relative to one another although the absolute magnitudes 
could vary. This is not an ideal surrogate but in the absence of 
any further information was the only one available for the estima-
tion. 
3. Detailed estimates of the number of migrants from the KwaZulu 
rural areas for 1960, 1946 and 1936 by age cohort are presented in 
the following tables B2.1, B2.2, B3.1, B3.2, B4.1 and B4.2. 
4. The age cohort estimates for the female migrants for these 
periods do not seem to be reliable as they exhibit inconsistencies 
between age cohorts through time. This is probably due to two fac-
tors: firstly, women are notoriously poor at revealing their ages 
accurately on census returns! Secondly, in the early years of 
census taking in South Africa the rural counts were not as accurate 
as they should have been with respect to the number of women in the 
rural areas. Sadie [176]. 
TABLE B1.1. 
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AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF ZULU MALE MIGRANTS 
FROM THE HOMELAND RURAL AREAS FOR 1970 
Age Female 
Male Male Population Male Migrants 
Child Female from Cohort Ratio Ratio Estimated Actual the Area 
A B C D E 
15-19 0,13 1,00 124 000 62 000 42 000 
20-24 0,10 0,99 94 000 31 000 56 000 
25-29 0,09 0,98 84 000 2S 000 56 000 
30-34 0,08 0,96 75 000 24 000 50 000 
35-39 0,06 0,9S 56 000 23 000 33 000 
40-44 0,06 1,00 57 000 22 000 35 000 
45-49 0,04 0,98 37 000 22 000 16 000 
50-54 0,04 0,95 36 000 19 000 17 000 
55-65 0,05 0,89 42 000 30 000 12 000 . 
Total 605 000 317 000 
A Ratio of children in the age cohort 0-14 in tr-= standard popula-
tion which in this case was the population 'All Zulus in South 
Africa' estimated from data in Table 1 in the 1970 Population 
Census Report 02-02-02, Department of Statistics, Pretoria, 1973. 
B Masculinity ratios estimated from data contained in J.L. Sadie, 
Projections of the South African Population, 1970-2020, Indus-
trial Development Corporation, Johannesburg. [173] 
C Estimated by the following procedure: 
number of children (Zulu) female/child 
x 0-14 years in the Homeland ratio 
masculinity x . 
rat~o 
D Actual number of males in the cohort in the Homeland rural areas 
on the census date in 1970 as per report 02-02-02 above. [260] 
E C - D. 
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TABLE Bl.2 ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF ZULU FEMALE MIGRANTS 
FROM THE RURAL AREAS OF THE BANTU HOMELANDS FOR 1970 
Female Female Population Female Age 
Child Migrants Cohort Ratio Estimated Actual from Area 
A C D ' E 
15-19 0,13 124 000 116 000 8 000 
20-24 0,10 95 000 86 000 9 000 
25-29 0,09 86 000 73 000 13 000 
30-34 0,08 76 000 64 000 12 000 
35-39 0,06 57 000 55 000 2 000 
40-44 0,06 57 000 48 000 9 000 
45-49 0,04 38 000 39 000 -
50-54 0,04 38 000 35 000 -
55-65 0,05 48 000 50 000 -
Total 619 000 53 000 
A As in A in Table Bl.l. 
C Estimated by the following procedure: 
children 0-14 in area x female/child ratio 
estimated from data in Report 02-02-02 of the Department of 
Statistics, Pretoria, 1973. [260] 
D Actual females in the area on the census date in 1970. Report 
02-02-02 above. [260] 

















ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF MALE MIGRANTS FROM THE HOMELAND RURAL AREAS IN 1960 
FOR KWAZULU 
Estimated Actual Males Male 
Estimate of 
Male Percentage Number of 
Female Population in Cohort in Migrants that are in Migrants 
Ratio in Cohort Natal Rural from Natal Homeland from Homeland Males Areas Rural Areas Rural Areas 
B C D E F G 
1,00 98 000 82 000 16 000 89 14 000 
0,99 89 000 50 000 39 000 86 34 000 
0,98 72 000 44 000 28 000 87 24 000 
0,98 64 000 35 000 29 000 89 26 000 
0,98 56 000 35 000 21 000 92 19 000 
1,00 49 000 32 000 17 000 90 15 000 
0,98 32 000 29 000 3 000 100 3 000 
0,95 31 000 25 000 6 000 89 5 000 
0,89 41 000 36 000 5 000 86 4 000 
532 000 164 000 89 144 000 
-- - -- - - - -- - - - - ~- - - - -
A Female/child ratio of standard population taken here to be the population 'All Africans in 
South Africa' and estimated from the data in the 1960 census, Vol. 7 No.1, Bureau of 
Statistics, Pretoria, 1968. [258] 
B Masculinity Ratios from Sadie, Projections of the South African Population 1970-2020, Indus-







TABLE B2.l (CONTD.) 
C Children 14 years and under in Natal rural areas estimated from the 1960 census Vol. 7 No. 1 
were 820 583. Males were estimated by applying the ratio in column A to the children under 
14 years and then applying the relevant masculinity ratio to the result. 
D Actual males in Natal rural areas from the 1960 Population Censuss Vol. 7 No. ls Bureau of 
Statistics s Pretoria, 1968. [258] 
E C - D. 
F From column H in Table B6. This means that these estimates have been made on the assump-
tion that the ratio of male migrants from KwaZulu rural areas to male migrants from all Natal 
rural areas that existed in 1970 has been assumed to hold constant back through time. 




TABLE B2.2 ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF FEMALE MIGRANTS FROM THE RURAL AREAS OF KWAZULU FOR 1960 
Age 
Female Estimated Actual Migrants Percentage Migrants from 
Child Female Female from in Homeland Group Ratio Population Population Cohort Homeland Rural Areas 
A C D E F G 
15-19 0,12 98 000 96 000 2 000 80 1 500 
20-24 0,11 90 000 81 000 9 000 82 7 500 
25-29 0,09 74 000 70 000 4 000 62 2 500 
30-34 0,08 66 000 58 000 8 000 67 5 500 
35-39 0,07 57 000 51 000 6 000 40 2 500 
40-44 0,06 49 000 46 000 3 000 · 64 2 000 
45-49 0,04 34 000 34 000 - - -
50-54 0,04 33 000 33 000 - - -
55-65 0,05 46 000 46 000 - - -
Total 32 000 64 21 500 
- --- -~ 
A As in Table C2.1. 
C Number of children 14 years and under in the areas on the census date in 1960, namely 820 583 
multiplied by the ratio in column A. 
D Female population in age cohort in the Natal rural areas as per the 1960 Population Census, Vol. 7 






TABLE B2.2 (CONTD.) 
E C - D. 
F From Table B6, column G this assumes that the ratio of female homeland migrants to female migrants 
from the other Natal rural areas that existed in 1970 also held in 1960. 






ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF MALE MIGRANTS FROM THE AREAS THAT ARE NOW RURAL KWAZULU 
FOR1946 
Male Estimated Actual Males Male Percentage 
Estimate of 
Female Population in Cohort in Migrants Male Migrants 
Child Female from Cohort in Cohort Natal Rural from Natal from KwaZulu Ratio Ratio 
Males Areas Rural Areas 
KwaZulu Rural Areas 
A B C.H D E F G 
15-19 0,13 1,00 86 000 74 000 12 000 89 11 000 
, 
20-24 0,11 0,99 72 000 43 000 29 000 86 25 000 
25- 29 0,10 0,98 65 000 39 000 26 000 87 23 000 
30-34 0,09 0,98 58 000 33 000 25 000 89 22 000 
35-39 0,07 0,98 45 000 31 000 14 000 92 13 000 
40-44 0,06 1,00 44 000 31 000 13 000 90 12 000 
45-49 0,05 0,98 34 000 28 000 6 000 100 6 000 
50-54 0,04 0,95 27 000 21 000 6 000 89 5 000 
, 
I 55-65 0,05 0,89 35 000 30 000 5 000 86 4 000 
I Total 
L 
466 000 136 000 89 121 000 
-- - --- - -
A Female/child ratio in the standard population taken here to be the population 'All Africans 
in South Africa' and calculated from data in Table 23 of Population Census, 7th May 1946, 
Vol. II, Ages. UG.60/1950. [257] 
B Standard male/female ratios estimated by Sadie in Projections of the South African Population 





TABLE B3.1 (CONTD.) 
C Males estimated by applying the ratio in A to the total number of African children in the Natal 
rural areas that were 14 years or under on the census date, namely 653 034 which was adjusted 
upwards by 10 000 to 663 034 to allow for an obvious underenumeration in the age group 5-9 
years in the census. See note H below. Once the estimated number of females had been obtained 
the masculinity ratio in column B was applied to obtain column C. 
C = adjusted children 
0-14 years x 
female child ratio 





tion in cohort 
D Actual from Census 1946, Table 23, UG 60/1950. [257J 
E C - D. 
F From Table B6 , Column H. 
G F x E. 
H The growth ratio of children in the three age cohorts in the two census 1936 and 1946 are given 
below: 
0- 4 years 
5- 9 years 
10-14 years 
4,3 per cent 
4,0 per cent 
The inconsistency in the age 5-9 years indicates that this category has probably been under-
counted in the 1946 census. Consequently the number of children in this category was adjusted 
to make the growth rate 4 per cent as well, which increased the number of children in the age 



















ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF FEMALE MIGRANTS FROM THE 
RURAL AREAS OF NATAL THAT ARE NOW THE RURAL AREAS 
OF KWAZULU FOR 1946 
Female Population Migrants Percentage Migrants from 
from in Homelands 
Estimated Actual Area Homelands Rural Areas 
C D E F G. H 
86 000 85 000 1 000 80 1 000 
73 000 67 000 6 000 82 5 000 
66 000 57 000 9 000 62 5 500 
60 000 50 000 10 000 67 6 500 
46 000 42 000 4 000 40 1 500 
40 000 44 000 - 64 -
33 000 34 000 1 000 a -
27 000 29 000 - a - . 
33 000 40 000 - a -
22 000 19 500 
A As in Table C3.1. 
C Number of children 14 years and under in the Natal rural areas on 
the census date in 1946 adjusted as per note C in Table B3.1. 
D Actual women in the Natal rural areas on the census date in 1946 
from Table 23, Population Census Report on Ages of the European, 
Coloured, Asiatic and Native Population, UG 60/1950. [257] 
E C - D. 
F From Table C6, column G on the assumption that the percentage 














ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF MALE MIGRANTS FROM THE RURAL AREAS OF NATAL THAT ARE NOW 
KWAZULU FOR 1936 
- -
Female Estimated 
Male Percentage Estimate of Male Actual Migrants Estimated Male Migrants Child Female Male ' Male 
Ratio Ratio Population Population 
from Natal to be in from KwaZulu 
Rural Areas Homeland Rural Areas 
A B C D E F G 
0,12 1,00 76 000 68 000 8 000 89 7 000 
0, 11 0,99 69 000 40 000 29 000 86 25 000 
0,10 0,98 62 000 37 000 25 000 87 22 000 
0,09 0,98 56 000 34 000 22 000 89 20 000 
0,07 0,98 44 000 33 000 11 000 92 10 000 
0,06 1,00 40 000 29 000 11 000 90 10 000 
0,04 0,98 28 000 25 000 3 000 100 3 000 
0,04 0,95 24 000 19 000 5 000 89 4 000 
0,06 0,89 34 000 27 000 7 000 86 6 000 
109 000 107 000 
--
A Standard population here taken to be 'All Africans in South Africa'. Estimates of female child 





TABLE B4.1 (CONTD.) 
B Masculinity ratios from Sadie, Projections of the South African Population 1970-2020, Industrial 
Development Corporation, Johannesburg. [174] 
C Number of children under 14 years in the rural areas of Natal in the 1936 census, namely 635 219 
children x A x B. 
D From Table 23, Actual Males in Rural Areas of Natal in 1936, UG 60/1950 [257]. 
E C - D. 
F From Table B6, i.e., assuming that the ratio of migrants from rural areas not homeland/migrants 
from homelands in 1970 was constant through time. 





TABLE B4.2 ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF FEMALE MIGRANTS FROM THE NATAL 
RURAL AREAS THAT ARE NOW KWAZULU RURAL AREAS ON 
THE CENSUS DATE FOR 1936 
Female Female Population Female Percentage Migrants from Age Child from Homeland Cohort 
Ratio Estimated Actual 
Migrants Homeland Rural Areas 
A B C D E F G H 
15-19 0,12 76 000 75 000 1 000 80 1 000 
20-24 0,11 70 000 59 000 11 000 82 9 000 
25-29 0,10 64 000 52 000 12 000 62 7 500 
30-34 0,09 57 000 54 000 3 000 67 2 000 
35-39 0,07 44 000 45 000 - 0 -
40-44 0,06 38 000 40 000 - 0 -
45-49 0,04 25 000 28 000 - 0 -
50-54 0,04 25 000 26 000 - 0 - . 
55-65 0,06 38 000 39 000 - 0 -
Total 27 000 64 19 500 
A From Table B4.1, column A. 
C Number of children 14 years and less in the Natal rural areas on the 
census date in 1936, namely 635 219 multiplied by the ratio in 
column A, UG.60/1950. [257] 
D Actual female population in Natal rural ar.eas on the census date in 
1936 from Table 23 of the 7th Census of the Population of the Union 
of South Africa, Vol. II, Ages, UG.60/1950. [257] 
E C - D. 

















ESTIMATION OF THE NUMBER OF ZULU MIGRANTS FROM ALL RURAL AREAS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
FOR1970 
Ratio of Estimated Actual Estimated Total 
Women to Male Population Population Migrants Number 
Children Female in Cohort in Cohort from Cohort 
in Ratio 
of 
Cohort Females Males Females Males Females Males 
Migrants 
A B C D El E2 F G H 
0.13 1,00 176 000 176 000 166 000 129 000 10 000 47 000 57 000 
0,10 0,99 135 000 134 000 124 000 69 000 11 000 65 000 76 000 
0,09 0,98 122 000 119 000 101 000 55 000 21 000 64 000 85 000 
0.08 0,98 108 000 106 000 90 000 50 000 18 000 56 000 74 000 
0.06 0.98 81 000 80 000 75 000 44 000 5 000 36 000 41 000 
0,06 1,00 81 000 81 000 67 000 42 000 14 000 39 000 53 000 
0,04 0,98 54 000 53 000 53 000 37 000 1 000 16 000 17 000 
0,04 0,95 54 000 51 000 47 000 32 000 7 000 19 000 26 000 
0,05 0,89 68 000 60 000 66' 000 46 000 2 000 14 000 16 000 
89 000 356 000 445 000 
- - - - ---- - - -- --
A Ratio of children 0-14 years to women in the age cohort in the standard popUlation here taken 
to be the popUlation 'All Zulus in South Africa'. 
/ ... 
'" en w 
TABLE B5 (CONTD.) 
B Estimated Bantu masculinity ratios from J.L. Sadie, Projections on the South African Population 
1970-2020, Industrial Development Corporation, Johannesburg.[174] 
C Number of children 0-14 years of age in 1970 in the population 'Zulus in all rural areas in South 
Africa' was 1 352 500 as estimated from Table 1 in the Report 02-02-02 on the Population Census, 
1970, Department of Statistics, Pretoria, 1973. This number was then multiplied by the age 
cohort ratios in column A to obtain column C. 
D Is obtained by mUltiplying the estimated number of women in column C by the masculinity ratio for 
the age cohort in column B. 
El and E2 : From the 1970 Population Census, Table 1, Report 02-02-02, Department of Statistics, 
Pretoria, 1973. [260] 
F Is obtained by C - E
l
• 
G Is obtained by D - E
2
• 




TABLE B6 ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF ZULU MIGRANTS FROM RURAL AREAS THAT ARE NOT FROM 
HOMELAND RURAL AREAS FOR 1970 
Migrants from 




15-19 10 000 47 000 
20-24 11 000 65 000 
25-29 21 000 64 000 
30-34 18 000 56 000 
35-39 5 000 36 000 
40-44 14 000 39 000 
45-49 1 000 16 000 
50-54 7 000 19 000 
55-65 2 000 14 000 
Total 89 000 356 000 
A From Table C5, column F. 
B From Table C5, column G. 
C From Table Cl, column F. 
Migrants from Migrants from 
Homeland Rural Rural Areas 
Areas not Homelands 
Females Males Females Males 
C D E F 
8 000 42 000 2 000 5 000 
9 000 56 000 2 000 9 000 
13 000 56 000 8 000 8 000 
12 000 50 000 6 000 6 000 
2 000 33 000 3 000 3 000 
9 000 35 000 5 000 4 000 
1 000 16 000 2 000 -
3 000 17 000 4 000 2 000 
3 000 12 000 5 000 2 000 
52 000 317 000 37 000 39 000 
D 
E 
From Table Cl, column G. 
A-C. 
F B D. 
Percentage of 
Migrants from 
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APPENDIX C 
THE BASIS OF THE ESTIMATE OF THE TOTAL EARNINGS 
OF AND REMITTANCES BY MIGRANT MEN FROM KWAZULU 
RURAL AREAS FOR 1936, 1946 AND 1960-1972 
To obtain an adequate estimate of migrants' earnings and remitt-
ances one would ideally draw upon data obtained by a question-
naire survey of a representative random sample of out-migrant men 
from the KwaZulu rural areas. Unfortunately very little data of 
this nature exists and it was felt that none was entirely suitable 
to form a basis for an estimate of this nature. 
In 1972 the Bureau of Market Research undertook a survey of the in~ 
come and expenditure patterns of single Bantu households in Durban 
[210] and one estimate of the likely size of the earnings and 
remittances of migrants from KwaZulu was made on the basis of data 
included in their report and given in Table 5.7 It was felt, 
however, that since the bureau's sample was restricted to Durban 
and also included single householders who were not migrants, an 
estimate of earnings based on their data was likely to be biased in 
an upward direction and should be used as a comparative standard 
rather than as a basis for the main estimates. 
The estimates contained in this Appendix are t~erefore based on the 





YM is the 
total income earned by the migrants 
M is the total number of migrants from the rural areas 
WH is the 
average wage in the high wage sector 
D' H is the 
proportion of migrants employed in the high 
wage sector 
WL 
is the average wage in the low wage sector 
DL is the proportion of migrants employed in the low 
wage sector 
DL + DH = 1, i.e., it is assumed that all the migrants 
are employed in one or other of the two 
sector s. 
In order to estimate YM at particular moments of time, the following 
specific function was assumed to hold. 
= (2) 
In other words, it was assumed that the total earnings of the 
migrants were a function of the number of migrants from the area, 
the percentage distribution of the migrants between the high and 
the low wage sectors and the average wage rates in these two 
sectors. 
Following on from this the remittances from the migrants were esti-
mated from the following assumed relationship: 
~t = Mt DH WH RH + Mt (1 - DH ) WL RL ...... t t t t t t 
where RH is the average remittance rate per migrants employed 
t 





is the remittance rate from wages earned in the low 
wage sector. 
The Estimation of Mt 
M was estimated on the basis outlined in Appendix A for the years 
t 
1936, 1946, 1960 and 1970 and the details of these calculations are 
contained in Tables Bl.l, B2.1, B3.1 and B4.1 in Appendix B. The 
population used to make these estimates was the population in the 
rural areas now KwaZulu or a suitable surrogate for this population. 
The rural population was used because since many migrants move to 
KwaZulu urban areas and then commute to the modern sector to work 
and it was felt that had the estimates of Mt been based on the 
total population of KwaZulu, in time t, the estimate of the number 
of migrant workers, would have been understated. 
The estimates of migrants for the years 1961 through 1969 have 
been obtained by compounding the number of migrants on the census 
date in 1960 at the annual compound growth rate of migration that 
existed between the estimates of migrants in 1960 and the number 
of migrants in 1970, namely 8.2 per cent. 
The Estimation of DH 
t 
Unfortunately insufficient data exists to allow any accurate esti-
mation of the job distribution of migrants in 1936, 1946 and 1960 
to 1969. Consequently a suitable surrogate had to be found and it 
was decided to use the ratio of employment of Africans in 
- 270 -
manufacturing to the employment of Africans in mining. This ratio 
was chosen mainly on the grounds of its accessibility. In addi-
tion, however, it was felt that the use of employment in agricul-
ture rather than mining as a substitute for the employment of 
migrants in the low wage sector would have been even more unsatis-
factory since agricultural employment figures include a degree of 
underemployment and this underemployment was unlikely to exist 
to the same extent throughout the low wage sector of the modern 
economy. The estimates used were as follows: 
1. The estimate of DH when t = 1936 was 0,28 and was based on 
t 
data on employment obtained from Van der Horst [216] pp. 216 · 
and 263. 
2. The estimates of DH where t = 1946 or 1960 were obtained from 
t 
employment data for 1946 and 1960 included in the Statistical 
Year Books for 1964 and 1972. [247] [248] and were 0,30 and 
0,38 in magnitude respectively. 
3. The estimate of DH when t = 1970 was based on the job dis-
t 
tribution of the Bapedi migrants in 1970 which was obtained 
from data given in the Annual Report of the Department of 
Bantu· Administration and Development [267]. No similar data 
for KwaZulu migrants could be obtained and it was decided to 
use the data on the Pedi migrants since the job distributions 
of the Bapedi and the Zulus in the 1970 census data did not 
(Cl) 
differ significantly. . It was felt therefore, 
2 
(Cl) X tests on the data on the jobs distributions of the 
Baped~ and the Zulus in Table 5 of Report 02-02-02 
gave the following results X2 = 6.81 (8d.f.) which 
is not significant. 
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that it would be reasonable to assume that 
the job distribution amongst the migrants from the two 
groups would exhibit similar characteristics. The job class-
ifications were aggregated into high and low wage sectors on 
the as'sumption that the high wage sector would comprise manu-
facturing, commerce and the public sector. On this basis the 
estimate of DH when t = 1970 was found to be 0,48. 
t 





= 0,38 to DH = 0,48 at the rate of 0,01 per 
= 1960 t = 1970 
The Magnitudes of WH 
t 
In all the estimations it was assumed that the average annual money 
wage paid to African men in the manufacturing sector was representa-
tive of the wage rate paid to migrants employed in the high wage 
sector. The estimate for 1936 was obtained from Van der Horst 
[216] p.263 and the subsequent data from the Statistical Year 
Books 1964 and 1972. [247] [248] 
The low wage sector wage rate was taken to be 48 per cent of the 
high wage sector wage rate . The Marais Commission [265] produced 
certain evidence to show that the wage rate typically paid in agri-
culture in 1966, after adjustment for payments in kind, was R216 
which was approximately 43 per cent of the average wage paid in the 
manufacturing sector over the same period of time. Since wage rates 
in agriculture are likely to be lower than those in the other indus-
tries included in the low wage sector such as mining and the 
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service sector in general, possibly apart from domestic service, 
this percentage was increased by 5 per cent from 43 per cent to 48 
per cent for the purpose of these estimations. 
The Estimate of ~ and RL 
t t 
Once again the accuracy of the estimate of ~ was hampered by a 
t 
lack of sufficient statistical data on which to base such an esti-
mate. There is not a great deal of data on remittance rates by 
migrants in South Africa and of what there is, very little differen-
tiates between the behaviour of high wage earning migrants and those 
in the low wage sector. In fact, Leistner Il12] argues that the , 
length of the stay in the urban areas is probably more significant 
in determining the remittance rate than the income level, since he 
found that recent arrivals remitted on average 58 per cent of their 
cash wage, whereas those who had been in Pretoria long enough to 
regard it as their home remitted on average only 10 per cent. 
Similarly, the Bureau of Market Research data 1210] also shows no 
really significant relationship between income levels and remit-
tance rates, taken here as 'payments by single Bantu Households in 
support of relatives'. In t he absence of any conclusive data, 
magnitudes of 0,2 and 0,17 were assumed for the variables ~t and 
RL and it was further assumed that these magnitudes would remain 
t 
constant over the thirty-four year period. 
Making estimates that are based on assumptions of this nature is 
not an ideal practice, but it was felt that it was unavoidable in 
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this case. The data in Table Cl shows the magnitude of these 
assumptions in terms of the overall picture of remittance rates 
that one can obtain from the statistical data that is available. 
Four surveys are included in Table Cl and, from the evidenoe that 
they present, it would seem that the assumed remittance rates for 
the purpose of this estimate are o~ the low side. 
Despite the apparent downward bias of these estimates vis-a-vis the 
survey data, the assumed rates do not differ significantly from the 
average remittance rates that are used by the Department of Statis-
tics in their estimates of the National Income of KwaZulu[250] 
nor from the magnitudes used by Lombard, [121] Leistner, [112] 
and Van der Merwe. [219] 
It was felt in selecting these magnitudes that, since a further 
estimate was to be made on the basis of the Bureau of Market 
Research data which was likely to be biased upwards, this estimate 
should, if anything, be biased towards the low side so that the 
two taken together would give some idea of the magnitude of the 
range within which an accurate estimate of earnings and remit-
tances was likely to lie. 
- 274 -
TABLE Cl A COMPARISON OF THE VARIOUS ESTIMATES OF 
REMITTANCE RATES OF MIGRANT WORKERS 
Remittance Rate 
High Low Basis of Year Source of Estimate Average Estimate 
% Wage Wage % % 
1946 University of Natal, 29 - - Survey 
Department of Economics 
[206] 
1962 Leistner Pretoria [112] 19 17 58 Survey 
1962 - do - Foreign [113] 18 - 23 Assumption 
(A) 
1966 Estimates from data of 19 - - National 
P.J. van der Merwe[219] Accounts 
Estimates 
1968 Lombard [121] 20 - - Assumption 
1972 Bureau of Market 23 24 18 Survey 
Research [212] 
1972 Bureau of Market 31 - - Table 5.8 
Research adjusted for 
commodity transfer [210] 
1973 McDowell [129] 66 - - Survey 
1974 Department of Statis- 19 - - Assumption 
tics [250] 
i 1975 Present estimate 19 20 17 Assumption 
, 
A Leistner [113] p. 45 gives a similar table cites different 
studies which give average cash remittance rates for foreign 
migrants ranging from 8 per cent to 44 per cent with a mean 
rate of 27 per cent. 
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The Overall Magnitudes Assumed for the Variables 
Table C2 gives a summary of the magnitudes that were assigned to 
the variables in the different time periods. 
TABLE C2 
! Year 
t = 1936 
t = 1946 
t = 1960 
1 t = 1961 
f 
I t = 1962 
! t = 1963 
! t = 1964 1 
t = 1965 
t = 1966 
t = 1967 
I t = 1968 
l t = 1969 
I 
I t = 1970 
1 
t = 1971 
I t = 1972 • 
SUMMARY OF THE MAGNITUDES ASSIGNED TO THE VARIABLES 
IN THE INCOME AND REMITTANCE ESTIMATES 
M










107 000 0,28 88 42 0,20 0,17 
120 000 0,30 198 95 0,20 0,17 
144 000 0,38 346 166 0,20 0,17 
155 000 0,39 371 178 0,20 0,17 
167 000 0,40 395 190 0,20 0,17 
180 000 0,41 397 191 0,20 0,17 
195 000 0,42 410 197 0,20 0,17 
211 000 0,43 446 214 0,20 0,17 
229 000 0,44 496 238 0,20 0,17 
248 000 0,45 508 244 0,20 0,17 
269 000 0,46 544 261 0,20 0,17 
291 000 0,47 550 261! 0,20 
I 0,17 I 317 000 0,48 572 275 0,20 0,17 
I 
I 
I I 341 000 0,48 627 301 0,20 0,17 I 
I 









Table C3 gives details of the estimates of the total earnings of and 
remittances by migrant men from the rural areas that are now KwaZulu 
rural areas for the years 1936, 1946, 1960-1972. These magnitudes 
are based on the estimates of the number of migrants from those areas 
in the relevant years, which are taken from Appendix B, and on the 
magnitudes of the variables DH ' WH ' WL ' ~ and ~ contained in 






















ESTIMATES OF EARNINGS AND REMITTANCES OF MALE MIGRANTS FROM KWAZULU RURAL AREAS IN 1936, 
"1946, "1960..:.1970 
Modern, High Wage Sector Low Wage Sector All Migrants 
Number of Migrants Wage Number 
Migrants 
Total Migrants 
Remittances Per of Earnings 
Remittances 
in Sector Total Man Migrants 
Total 
Remittances 
Earnings to KwaZulu Earnings 
B C D E F G H I J 
30 000 2 636 000 527 000 42 77 000 3 234 000 550 000 5 879 000 1 077 000 
36 000 7 128 000 1 425 000 95 85 000 8 001 000 1 373 000 15 129 000 2 798 000 
55 000 19 0 30 000 3 806 000 166 89 000 14 774 000 2 512 000 33 804 000 6 318 000 
60 000 22 260 000 4 452 000 178 95 000 16 910 000 2 875 000 39 170 000 7 327 000 
66 000 26 070 000 5 214 000 190 101 000 19 190 000 3 262 000 45 260 000 8 476 000 
73 000 28 981 000 5 796 000 191 107 000 20 437 000 3 475 000 49 418 000 9 271 000 
81 000 33 210 000 6 642 000 197 114 000 22 458 000 3 818 000 55 668 000 10 460 000 
90 000 44 014 000 8 028 000 214 121 000 25 894 000 4 402 000 69 908 000 12 430 000 
100 000 49 600 000 9 920 000 238 129 000 30 702 000 5 219 000 80 302 000 15 139 000 
III 000 56 388 000 11 278 000 244 137 000 33 428 000 5 683 000 89 816 000 16 961 000 
123 000 66 912 000 13 382 000 261 146 000 38 106 000 6 478 000 105 018 000 19 860 000 
136 000 74 800 000 14 960 000 264 155 000 40 920 000 6 956 000 115 720 000 21 916 000 
152 000 86 944 000 17 389 000 275 165 000 45 375 000 7 714 000 132 319 000 25 103 000 
165 000 103 455 000 20 691 000 301 176 000 52 976 000 9 006 000 156 431 000 29 697 000 
179 000 122 615 000 24 523 000 329 187 000 -61 523 000 10 459 000 184 138 000 34 982 000 





TABLE C.3 (CONTD.) 
A Wages per man in the high wage sector are taken as the equivalent of the average wage per man in the manufacturing 
sector. 1936 wages in manufacturing were taken from S.T. van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, [216] 
p. 263. Wages for 1946 and 1960-1970 were taken from Statistical Year Book 1964 [247] and South African 
Statistics 1972 [248] and were obtained by dividing the total wage payments to Bantu males for the year by the 
number of Bantu men employed -in manufacturing in the year. 
B The total number of male migrants in 1936, 1946, 1960 and 1970 were taken from Tables Bl.l, B2.1, B3.1 and B4.1 
in Appendix B. These migrants were then allocated between the high and the low wage sectors on the following basis: 
(1) 1936, 1946 and 1960 on the basis of the ratio of Bantu employed in mining to those employed in manufacturing. 
These ratios were estimated from data in the Statistical Year Books 1964 and 1966 for the years 1946, 1960 
and 1970 and were 28 per cent, 30 per cent and 38 per cent respectively. For the years 1960-1970 the ratio was 
escalated from 38 to 48 per cent at 1 per cent per annum. The 1936 ratio was obtained from van der Horst [216] 
(2) 1970 migrants were allocated between the high and low wage sectors on the basis of the job allocation of the 
Pedi migrants taken from the Annual Report of the Department of Bantu Administr ation and Development, 1971. 
See note C on Table 4.9 
migrants in 1970. 
for further justification of the use of the Bapedi as a surrogate for the Zulu 
(3) Estimates of migration and of the distribution of migrants between the high and low wage sectors for the years 
1961-1969 and 1971 and 1972 have been obtained by escalating the migrants in the high wage sector from 1960-
1969 at the rate of 10,7 per cent and similarly for 1972 and 1973. 1970 from Table Bl.l in the Appendix B. 
Low wage sector migrants were escalated at the annual rate of 6,37 per cent, the overall compound rates of 
growth of the migrants in the two sectors between the census dates 1960 and 1970 being 10,7 and 6,37 respectively. 
C A x B. 
D C x 20 per cent. Other estimates of the percentage earnings remitted by migrants Leistner Il13J 18 per cent plus 
kind for foreign bantu migrants. Leistner [lllJ 19,3 per cent of the mean wage. University of Natal [206] 





E Taken as being 48 per cent of the wage in the high wage sectors. The 2nd Report of the Commission of Enquiry 
into Agriculture (Marais Commission) gave data for agricultural wages for 1960 and 1966 which were 43 per cent 
of the wage in manufacturing. This percentage was increased to 48 per cent on the grounds that wages in agri-
culture are likely to bethelowest of the low wage sector wage rates. The relationship was then assumed to 
have held constant over the period 1936-1970. 
F The total number of migrants in the year less those in the high wage sector. 
G F x E. 
H F x E x 17 per cent. Leistner [113] gives estimates of remittances for foreign bantu in agriculture which are 
of the order of 17 per cent of earnings and the data considered by Williams [229] and P.J. van der Merwe [219] 
also substantiates a remittance rate of 17 per cent from the low wage sector. 
I C + G. 





A P PEN D I X D 
OTHER SUPPORTING TABLES 
FOR CHAPTER ONE. 
TABLE Dl INDICATORS OF INVESTMENT IN THE RURAL AREAS OF KWAZULU(l) 
Cattle Woolled Wagons and Children Migrants I Year Units Sheep Ploughs Cultivators Trolleys in School Remittances (000) (000) R'OOO 
A A B B B A C 
1936 3 628 3 023 4-7 834- - 1 588 351 908 1 077 
194-6 3 695 3 100 62 995 7 181 1 708 64-8 64-0 2 798 
1960 3 767 3 04-6 74- 728 14- 4-54- 2 014- 1 587 084- 6 318 
1970 3 391 3 4-90 61 978 12 893 1 130 2 74-8 650 25 103 
Rate of 
growth % 




(1) Data has been obtained from the following sources: 1936 and 194-6 - The Handbook of Agricultural 
Statistics [251] ; 1960 and 1970 - South African Statistics 1974- [249]; All years are 
three year averages apart from 1970 which is a two year average. Children in school were taken 





TABLE Dl (CONTD.) 
A Data applies to all Bantu Reserve areas in the Republic of South Africa and so will only be a 
reasonable surrogate for the rural areas of KwaZulu as long as the patterns in the different 
reserve areas do not show marked deviations from one another. 
B Natal Bantu Reserve areas. 






! 1936 I 
I 
I 
I 1946 I 
I 1960 I 1970 
I Growth rate 
i per annum 
I 
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OUTPUT OF MAIZE IN AFRICAN RESERVE AREAS OVER 
THE PERIOD 1936-1970 
Maize Output Maize Output 
per Head 
Tons Index Index 
A 
214 800 100 100 
277 500 129 110 
270 571 126 92 
328 460 153 83 
% 1,26 -0,56 
A Maize output in Bantu Reserve Areas, 1970 and 1960 from South 
African Statistics 1974 [250] 1946 and 1936 from The Handbook 
of Agricultural Statistics [251]. 
TABLE D.3 AN ESTIMATE OF THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF THE MIGRANT LABOUR SYSTEM TO KWAZULU IN 
TERMS OF LOST EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES OVER THE PERIOD 1936-1970. 
Annual Profits Annual 
Migrants' Ratio of Generated Savings Cost Year Wages to out of Earnings Profits by Profits per Job R'OOO Migrants 
R'OOO R'OOO 
A B C D E 
1936-1946 5 879 1,03 6 055 1 211 948 
1946-1960 15 129 0,72 10 893 2 178 1 568 
1960-1965 33 804 0,79 26 705 5 341 2 849 
1965-1970 132 319 0,76 100 562 20 112 3 500 
Total 
~----- - -- -----
A From Table 5.6. 
B Taken from South African Statistics 1974 [249] , p. 21.4. 
C A x B. 
Employment Employment 
Opportunities created over this Created during period in 
the Year Modern 
Sector 
F G 
1 277 24 064 
1 389 26 674 
1 875 15 256 
5 746 46 818 
112 812 
D C x 0,2 on the assumption that the average propensity to save out of profits is 20 per cent. 
E 1970 estimated cost of job creation in KwaZulu explained in Chapter 4, footnote (20) deflated 
by the wholesale price index from South African Statistics 1974 [249] , p.8.4. 
F D ~ E. 
! 
G F compounded as an anuity on the assumption that in the first year the jobs become available at 
the end of the year and thereafter on a monthly basis. The rate of interest used was 20 per 
cent to allow for an accelerater. link between demand created by employment and the further 
creation of employment. 
'" 00 w 
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APPENDIX E 
A Paper on Economic Growth and Social Change 
Presented to a Workshop on Economic Growth 
and Change Held at the University of Natal in 
July 1974-
'ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE - A SUGGESTED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK' 
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APPENDIX E 
Alternative Economic Development Paths 
(1) 
and Social and Political Change 
E.l Introduction 
This paper makes a preliminary attempt to explore the relation-
ships between economic growth and social and political change. 
In the first part of the paper existing~ well known development 
models are outlined and the level of social and political changes 
implied by the models is discussed. It is then argued that the 
conscious introduction of social change into an economic growth 
environment can in fact provide a link between these models~ at 
present treated as direct alternatives. Finally an attempt is 
made to provide a framework within which it may be possible to 
analyse the South African development path on an empirical basis. 
E.2 Economic Development Models and Social and Political Change 
The basic axiom on which the arguments developed in this paper 
rest is that aLthough poLitiaaL and soaiaL ahange may be 
(1) My thanks are due to my colleague Michael McGrath for the 
comments that he made on this paper~ and to the post grad-
uate students~ on whom I initially sounded out the ideas 
presented here. I am~ of course~ solely responsible for 
any errors that may remain and for the opinions expressed 
in the paper. 
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independent of economic growth, sustained economic growth is not 
independent of social and political change. 
The successful attainment of any particular growth path is depen-
dent upon the existence of a social and political climate that is 
favourable for that path. Furthermore, continued economic growth 
implies changes in the balance of economic forces in the economy. (2) 
Consequently it is argued that any particular growth path will 
only be maintained if the social and political structures evolve 
sufficiently to satisfy the demands of the groups of individuals 
that are gaining increased economic power as a result of the dev-
elopment process. If such change is not forthcoming then the 
economic activity of these groups can be sufficient to cause the 
economy to deviate to another growth path. The nature of the 
changes and the rate at which they are required to take place, if 
the existing pattern of economic growth is to be maintained, is 
a function of the nature of growth path itself, and consequently 
differs with different economic growth patterns and with differ-
ent rates of growth. 
E2.l The Nature of Economic Growth Paths 
Since the purpose of this paper is to attempt to provide a theo-
retical framework within which one might successfully analyse 
(2) Apart from the theoretical bench mark namely the path of 
steady state growth with output-augmenting technical pro-
gress. 
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South Africa's economic development, the growth alternatives dis-
cussed in this section are limited to those applicable to a com-
petitive market economy. This economy comprises two classes; 
capitalists, defined for the purpose of this argument to be those 
individuals who make the necessary decisions as to the level and 
nature of the investment undertaken in the economy, and workers, 
who participate in the process of production, but who have no con-
trol over investment decisions. The savings necessary to finance 
the desired levE11 of investment are the result of decisions of 
. h b h . 1" d k (3) e~t er or ot cap~ta ~sts an wor ers. 
Traditionally development paths can be classified broadly in terms 
of whether they are dealing with an economy enjoying full employ-
ment throughout the development phase, or whether development 
commences with unemployed, or surplus labour. 
These two classifications can then be further sub-categorized in 
terms of their estimated course of future evolution, i.e. in 
terms of whether. it is considered likely that continued develop-
ment in the same mode will maintain or generate full employment 
or, on the other hand, increasing levels of unemployment. 
The initial growth path att ained in any market economy is deter-
(3) Although the terminology used in this paper has been 
borrowed from the 'Cambridge Schools' approach to econ-
omic growth, the models analysed postulate behaviour 
suited to the Neo Classical, Labour Surplus and Marxian 
Development models. 
- 288 -
mined by the relative stocks of, and the distribution of the 
ownership of the productive resources of the economy, together 
with the patterns of economic behaviour of the groups of indiv-
iduals who handle these resources. The evolution of the growth 
path therefore, will be a function of the changes in both the 
distribution of assets and the economic behaviour of the major 
groups controlling their use. 
E2.2 Development from Full Employment 
"" d 1 "h"d 1" " (4) ThlS path m1ght be seen as eve opment 1n .t e 1 ea sltuat1on. 
In a developing country consisting of the juxtaposition of a 
modern, capital-using sector and an agricultural sector dependent 
upon subsistence agriculture, all available labour at anyone 
moment of time is productively employed" Development in this 
type of world, therefore, requires the emerging modern sector of 
a dual economy to compete with the traditional sector for the 
"1 bl 1 b 1 Th (5) . d "d b h ava1 a e a our supp y. e wage rate 1S eterm1ne y t e 
productivity of labour and the intersectoral allocation of labour 
by the relative attractiveness of the employment opportunities in 
the two sectors. 
(4) The best known neoclassical development model is that 
of Dale Jorgenson. [99] 
(5) All mentions of wages and profits in this paper refer· to 
real wages and profits and not simply to their money 
values. 
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As the dual economy evolves over time the size of the labour 
force in the traditional sector decreases in relative terms. 
Development is capital intensive, rather than labour intensive, 
as the relative shortage of labour encourages increased speciali-
zation in both sectors from an early stage in the development pro-
cess. 
Throughout the development phase labour is becoming increasingly 
more productive and competition ensures that wage rates are rising. 
Conversely, as capital accumulates the productivity of capital 
declines, profit rates, therefore, also decline except insofar as 
these falls are successfully offset by technological advances. In 
this type of situation the benefits gained from economic develop-
ment do not accrue solely to the capitalists but are shared quite 
rapidly with labour. 
Providing the growth process does not generate changes in the 
behaviour patterns of the groups making the economic decisions 
all further growth will be at full employment levels and labour 
will continue to benefit on an increasing scale. 
E2.3 Development with Unemployment - the Development-Development 
Path(6) 
In the unemployment case, in the early stages of development the 
(6) This path has been called the Development-Development Path 
to distinguish it from the Development Underdevelopment 
Path discussed in Section E2.4. 
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traditional sector houses more individuals than can be produc-
(7 ) tively employed. The modern sector can, therefore draw 
labour away by offering a wage that is only marginally higher 
than exisiting traditional sector living standards. Lewis [115] 
Fei and Ranis [52] • 
In this unemployment situation the initial growth phase is one 
that leads to increased employment rather than to increased wage 
rates. Labour migrates from the low wage, backward, frequently 
overpopulated area, to the modern, growing, labour-hungry sector. 
As the process gathers momentum, wage rates in the low wage sec-
tor start to increase. As migrants leave so they reduce the pop-
ulation pressures on existing resources, leaving more available 
for those who remain behind. 
In the modern, high wage sector the migrants are put to work, 
output increases, profits rise, investment increases and so more 
labour can be absorbed from the low wage sector. This process 
will continue, all -being well, until standards of living in the 
two sectors become equalised and the low wage peasant sector has 
been totally absorbed into the high wage, advanced, modern economy. 
On this growth path one would expect modern sector wage rates to 
increase, once the traditional sector's living standards have 
(7) This situation is conventionally kno~ as one in which 
"surplus labour" exists. Surplus labour being defined as 
labour which is paid a wage in excess of its marginal pro-
duct; irrespective of the value of the marginal product. 
Thirlwall [l95] 
- 291 -
risen to the point where life in the sector can offer the would-
be modern sector migrant a real alternative. Once this happens 
further labour can only be ontained by increasing modern sector 
wage rates. It is only when this institutional wage is forced 
up that continued development starts to redistribute income in 
(8) 
relative terms to wage earners, through lower profit rates. 
As long as the growth of the modern sector is sufficient to en-
sure that the rate of labour migration and absorbtion into the 
sector is greater than the rate of growth of the labour supply 
in the traditional sector, continued migration will eventually 
result in the elimination of the inter-sectoral wage differential. 
Once the differential has disappeared, the situation that was 
labour surplus has evolved into one labo~ limited and the growth 
path will, once again, be that described in the preceding section; 
namely development from a full employment situation. 
Again this path of economic evolution presupposes that the growth 
process will not affect the size or direction of the forces 
driving continued economic development. 
(8) At this stage the relative gap between the rewards of 
profit earners and wage earners starts to close however 
the gap in absolute terms will continue to increase for' 
some time longer. 
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E2.4 Development with Unemployment - The Development Under-
development Path. 
The two views of development described in the above sections 
might be classified as representing the "orthodox" view of devel-
opment, which sees the process as an ongoing one in which both 
sectors of the economy benefit or at least neither becomes worse 
off as a result of development. These views have been seriously 
challenged by writers in the Marxian Tradition, Arrighi [6] 
dos Santos [45], who argue that the growth process will alter the 
values of the growth parameters themselves and that, as a result, 
the economy must deviate from the growth path on which it was 
travelling. This deviation results from their belief that where 
two regions or countries are linked economically, the development 
of one region, if it is achieved by the capitalist mode, re-
quires and generates underdevelopment and poverty in the other 
region. 
The underdevelopment of one region is achieved by the expropria-
tion of the surplus of the region and its appropriation by the 
capitalist owners of the means of production in the modern sector 
or the developing region. The expropriation of this surplus is 
achieved by a combination of economic and pOlitical methods; the 
latter being used, either to reinforce the former, or where the 
former are inadequate. 
As the surplus in the one region is expropriated and appropriated 
by the capitalists in the other region for investment there, the 
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growth paths of the two economies alter; the rate of capital 
accumulation increases in the developing sector and declines in 
the other. There is no tendency to stability and as standards of 
living drop in the traditional sector, perhaps to as low as sub-
sistence levels, the inhabitants of the region become totally 
dependent upon the growing sector. 
Growth with this type of evolution results in very rapid growth 
of the modern sector with increasing poverty in the dependent 
(9) 
sector. Modern sector wage rates will not rise and may even 
fall and the gains from development accrue almost exclusively to 
capital in the initial stages. 
If the economy continues to grow, unhindered by its uneven devel-
opment, the modern sector must eventually run against a labour 
bottleneck and the economy will revert to the development-devel-
opment path; wages will start to increase, despite the underdevel-
opment of the traditional sector and capitalists will be forced 
to share the fruits of economic growth, if they wish to ensure 
that further economic development takes place. 
Writers in this school believe however, that the problems of the 
process of capitalist accumulation such as; the growing concen-
tration of ownership of the means of production, the lack of 
(9) Subject to some subsistence floor to wage levels in the 
sector. 
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mobility of capital and the growing inflexibility of the price 
system will affect the growth of the economy and push it towards 
economic stagnatiqn rather than to the development-development 
path. Arrighi [6] Frank [55]. 
E3.l Simple Economic Growth Paths and Social and Political 
Change in a Capitalist Society 
Development from a traditional peasant or tribal society by the 
capitalist mode implies that, in the initial stages of develop-
ment, one has a highly organized capitalist system facing vir-
tually unorganised labour, who are likely to be both economically 
and politically naive. 
In the early development phase, therefore, effective political 
and economic power is virtually certain to be in the hands of 
the capitalist class. The model that follows postulates that 
this will indeed be so and, furthermore, that the capitalist 
class will not relinquish their political power until they are 
forced to choose between continued economic growth and maintain-
ing their political dominance. At this point it is assumed that 
they will choose to continue accumulating in the traditional 
capitalistic manner and so will share the political control in-
creasingly with labour. 
In terms of this postulated mode of behaviour by the capitalist 
class, progression along anyone of the three growth paths out-
lined earlier, implies a certain rate of social and political 
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change. The rate and direction of change will depend upon the 
rate of growth of the economic bargaining power of labour. Since 
the growth of labour's economic power is reflected in growing real 
wage rates, one can argue that the rate of social and political 
change is likely to be positively correlated with the rate of 
change of real wage rates experienced on the three growth paths. 
Development by means of underdevelopment is a growth path on 
which the increase in the economic power of labour is so insigni-
ficant that there is virtually no growth in wage rates. Conse-
quently, using the hypothesis concerning capitalists behaviour 
patterns stated earlier, on this path one would anticipate no 
substantial changes in the political and social systems within 
which the economic development is taking place. On the contrary, 
capitalists may continue to use both their economic and political 
power to entrench themselves more securely and by doing so succeed 
in weakening the economic position of labour even further. 
The conventional labour surplus development path, the development-
development path referred to earlier, has implicit in it a diff-
erent picture of the development process. Social and political 
change is possible on this path but the rate of change is very 
low. However, labour gradually becomes more and more significant 
on the economic scene and once the supply of labour becomes lim-
ited the bargaining power of labour increases substantially. 
On the other hand development from full employment presents a 
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different picture. Continued development, or initial development 
from labour limited situation implies the existence of a bargain-
. . . (10). b . dl b . . f . t lng sltuatlon, slnce l a our rapl y ecomes a slgnl lcan 
economic force. Continued development in this situation results 
in changes on the social political and economic fronts. Social 
and political change is likely, as the workers are in a position 
to force such changes, as their price for continued co-operation 
on the economic scene. 
The balance of economic forces will alter in this situation, since 
development with rising wage rates implies a relative redistribu-
tion of income to labour, savings must be made out of wages if the 
required level of economic development is to be maintained. By 
saving workers will gradual ly acquire ownership of increasing 
quantities of the means of production in the economy and so class 
distinctions based upon relative access to the means of produc-
tion will become continuously less significant. 
E4.1 The Evolution of a Developing Economy 
When one considers the relationship of the three growth paths to 
one another it becomes tempting to postulate, at the theoretical 
level, a "stages of economic growth thesis" for developing coun-
tries. Fei and Ranis [54] suggest that the three stages in an 
(10) It does not follow that formal collective bargaining 
n~rma~ly takes place although labour's economic posi-
tlon lS undoubtedly stronger when labour is organised 
than when it is not. 
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economy's life cycle are agrarianism, duallism and economic 
maturity. Flow Chart 1 shows one possible view of the growth 
paths followed as the economy proceeds through these stages of 
development. 
The path of social and political change implied by this course of 
economic evolution is similar to that postulated by Q'Dowd [143]. 
In the early stages capital is the limited resource and capital-
ists have effective control over the market however, as growth 
continues, so labour gradually becomes absorbed and labour's bar-
gaining strength grows, enabling it to secure increasing, social 
and political concessions from the capitalists. It should be 
stressed however, that there is nothing in the system to force 
social and political change, but that progression along this path 
is only possible if the required social and political change 
takes place. 
This view of economic development and its concommittant social 
and political development seems too simplistic since it rests 
upon two assumptions that mayor may not hold, namely: 
1. ~L That the growth ~ate of productive employment, ~ is great-
er than the rate of growth of population, ~ throughout the 
life cycle of the economy. 
2. That development in anyone period generates the correct 
group behaviour for continued development in subsequent 
periods. 






















A less limited representation of the relationships between the 
three major types of growth path is shown in Flow Chart II. In 
this chart there is no unique route through the life cycle of an 
economy, the actual path followed at any moment of time being 
determined by the relative strengths of the growth parameters. 
Flow Chart 2 illustrates the two major types of economic develop-
ment: development from full employment and from a labour surplus 
situation, subdiyided in terms of the relative strengths of the 
initial growth parameters i.e. in terms of whether growth commen-
ces with the rate of growth of employment greater or smaller than 
that of population. 
The linkages between the economic variables on the growth paths 
shown in the flow chart highlight two things; 
1. There is no unique path through the life cycle; underdevelop-
ment of one sector, or complete economic stagnation in both 
sectors can occur on anyone of the four growth paths illus-
trated and at any stage in the economy's life cycle. 
2. That the critical determinant of the growth path followed 
in subsequent periods is the relationship between the rate 
of growth of employment and the rate of growth of the labour 
supply. 
Employment growth rates are dependent upon the rate of growth of 
investment and upon the type of production techniques chosen. A 

























such as a general increase in their cons~ption levels, or a 
continuing emphasis on the use of more capital intensive methods 
of production, could be sufficient to divert an economy, well 
established on the development-development path, away from that 
path and down a path of development and underdevelopment, or of 
economic stagnation. The crucial economic variables in a develop-
ment situation are, firstly the relationship between wage rate 
. (11) 
movements and changes in investment behavlour and, secondly, 
the relationship between changes in investment and changes in 
employment. Adverse relationships between these variables alone 
could be sufficient to generate a labour surplus situation from 
one that was initially labour short. In certain circumstances a 
strong capitalist class may well be able to make use of a combina-
tion of the political and economic processes to change the con-
ditions governing the labour supply to achieve the same ends. (12) 
(11) The effect that rlsmg wage rates will have on investment 
will depend upon how investors view the future yields of 
their investments in terms of these higher wage rates. 
Where the size of the market is a decisive factor, in-
creased wage rates may well lead to increased investment, 
as unit costs may fall with larger output levels. On the 
other hand, increased wages may reduce profit rates and 
cut investment in a situation where costs of production 
cannot be reduced and the goods are sold on a competitive 
market. 
(12) Francis Wilson argues along similar lines in his paper 
in this collection when he says that the cry of a 
'labour shortage' is not a new one on the South African 
scene, but is one that has been overcome in the past by 
various political moves. 
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E4.2 The Implications of this View of Economic Development 
for Social and Political Change 
This picture of development is essentially one that postulates 
the existence of a situation in which, in the early stages of 
development, capitalists may face a choice between accepting the 
growing strength of labour in terms of existing market conditions, 
or of using the political machine to change market conditions to 
undermine labour's bargaining power. Capitalists may, in other 
words, have the political power to force early growth onto the 
development underdevelopment path. If they do exercise this 
power, this path can be maintained for as long as there is sur-
plus labour in the economy, or, for as long as it is possible to 
change the economic parameters sufficiently to regenerate this 
surplus labour. The use of increasingly capital intensive 
methods of production may further extend the period of time that 
can elapse before the requirements of continuing economic growth 
force social and political change. 
Once the supply of surplus labour is finally absorbed capitalists 
face a different choice namel y; that between continued growth 
accompanied by the social and political change required by labour 
as their price for continuing to contribute to the growth process 
and the alternative, economic stagnation. 
The relationship between economic development and social and poli-
tical change in this type of economy will be dependent upon 
whether or not economic development absorbs or generates surplus 
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labour. When labour is absorbed one would expect rapid change 
in the social and political spectrum to accompany economic growth. 
If however development generates surplus labour, the growth rate 
can be maintained and may even accelerate without any concommi-
tant social and political change. 
Following on this argument, it seems that anyone interested in 
the relationship between economic growth and social and political 
change in an economy would be unwise to postulate a stages of 
growth theory based on the level of economic development, since 
this level may have been achieved by anyo~e of four different 
paths, or by a combination of some or all of these paths. 
E5 The Recent Debate upon South Africa's Development Path 
Although, as was argued above, it m~y be unwise to generalise the 
relationship between economic, development and social and politi-
cal change, anyone particular country can, ex poste, be identi-
fied as having followed a particular path of evolution. In this 
context, the differing viewpoints on the . relationship between 
economic growth and social change in South Africa, O'Dowd [143] 
Trapido [205], may be viewed in terms of their respective con-
cepts of the growth path currently being followed and the most 
likely future course of economic evolution in South Africa. 
Flow Chart 3 shows a diagrammatic representation of the growth 
paths implied by the orthodox and the revisionist views of South 
Africa's economic development path. Path 1 is analogous to the 
Flow Chart 3. 

















































development-development path of Lewis [115] and Fei and Ranis [52]. 
Since it leads eventually to full employment and a more egali-
tarian income distribution, this path implies that the substantial 
social and political change, that is required for its attainment, 
will take place in South Africa. 
The second path which is very similar to the development under-
development path of Frank [5~ and Arrighi [6] shows growth pat-
terns based on political and economic power, but since the pro-
ponents of this view argue that economic growth will not bring 
change, and what is more, since change is required for the con-
tinuance of economic growth, one has no link out of this phase, 
other than that of exogenous revolution. If one rejects revolu-
tion, the outcome of this path is eventual economic stagnation. 
In terms of the argument advanced in Section E4, that these dev-
elopment paths are not simply direct alternatives but that it is 
possible and indeed probable that an economy will proceed from 
path to path in no particular predetermined pattern, these views 
appear too simplistic. The "leave it all to economic growth 
thesis" has the following problems: 
1. It ignores the difficulties created b~ groups whose status 
is dependent upon maintaining a situation of no change. 
2. It overlooks the time scale involved. Since South Africa 
has been growing in a highly uneven manner for more than a 
century there may be no reason to expect rapid change through 
·the workings of the market mechanism alone. 
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3. It overlooks, or assumes away, the problems of continued 
accumulation by the capitalistic mode of development. 
The proponents of the pure underdevelopment or the slave economy 
point of view of South Africa's development, arguing as they do 
that economic growth will not bring change, give no role to the 
possible evolution of capitalism. There seems no justification 
for simply asserting that a system will not evolve as growth it-
self is a situation implying change. 
Whether or not the growth process will bring with it eVOlutionary 
social and political change depends directly on the changes that 
occur in the behaviour patterns of the major economic role play-
ers. It would seem that the most fruitful approach, to an 
attempt to predict the most likely future changes in the South 
African economy, would be to concentrate on the patterns of econ-
omic behaviour of the groups controlling the critical growth 
variable; namely the rate of growth of black employment. 
In order to do this, one would need to establish some con census 
as to South Africa's present position on the growth path and to 
elaborate on the nature of that growth path, i.e. is it one, 
still in the development underdevelopment stage, or has South 
Africa, in fact, progressed to the development-development phase? 
It would also be essential to review the prospects for continued 
economic development. One would need to question whether the 
economic variables themselves were sufficiently strong to contin-
ue growing. One should ask whether the social and political 
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changes required to sustain that level of growth are likely to be 
forthcoming or does the more likely course of action appear to be 
that individuals, who have vested interests in maintaining the 
status quo, are likely to drive the economy towards stagnation. 
Such an enquiry necessitates research directed towards answering 
the following more limited questions; 
1. Is the economy approaching full employment? If not, what 
are the major factors impeding economic growth? 
2. What are the determinants of investment? 
3. Is there any substantial movement towards the adoption of 
more capital intensive techniques? 
4. Which group of individuals, who have an economic role to 
play, whether direct or indirect, have a vested interest in 
maintaining their existing status, how are they likely to 
behave, and how much influence do they in fact exert over 
the major policy making groups in the economy. In this res-
pect one would like to know whether White labour as a group 
still feels sufficiently "threatened" by Black labour to 
oppose actively capitalists' moves to increase Black produc-
tivity and how much power the White farming community con-
tinues to exercise through its influence on the governing 
party's political base? 
5. To what extent is it possible for the capitalist class to 
create additional supplies of labour either by further use 
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of the political or economic machines, or by means of exten-
ding the field from which labour is drawn? 
6. If the supply of labour is drying up, then to what extent 
will the growth process result in the emergence of groups 
that will accelerate change. In this connection the emer-
gence and attitudes of African Trade Unions are of prime 
importance. 
Having established a sound empirical basis for answering these 
questions one is in a far better position to speculate on whether 
or not continued economic growth in South Africa will bring with 
it evolutionary social and political change. Indeed it is sub-
mitted that without such investigations, predictions such as the 
conflicting views of the 'conventionalists' and the 'revisionists' 
come down to being pure expressions of faith. 
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